PROPAGANDA-PUBLIC OPINION-FOREIGN POLICY

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MARATHON ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION PROGRAM

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THE EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

PROPAGANDA - PUBLIC OPINION - FOREIGN POLICY

Marathon Study Kit No. 2

Discussion Program

Prepared by

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Marguerite Ann Stewart - Mrs. Frederic Beggs

National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War

Section Topics

1. Introductory Discussion - World Events and American Public Opinion
2. Enlightenment, not Propaganda
3. Landmarks of American Foreign Policy
4. Which Road to Peace
5. Trade Rivalries and American Profits
6. The World Since 1919
7. Facing the Future

Kit No. 2

Contents - Unit A

1. Discussion Program (first five sections)
2. Recommended Program of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War
3. Pamphlet, "American Foreign Policy," - Anne Hartwell Johnstone
4. Leaflet, "Work and Needs of the State Department," - George S. Messersmith
5. Five Bulletins of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis
6. Pamphlet, "America Looks Abroad," - Frederick L. Schuman and George Soule
7. Diagram Showing the Foreign Policy of the United States
8. Special Significance of the Trade Agreements Program Today - Francis B. Sayre
9. "Latin America, Germany and the Hull Program" - Bidwell
   International Conciliation Pamphlet for February, 1939
10. Booklet, "Report of the Committee of Experts" - National Peace Conference
11. Two World Economic Cooperation Posters
12. Two leaflets, "Tasks of a World Economic Conference" - Eugene Staley
    "The Road to Peace" - The New Commonwealth
13. Covenant of the League of Nations
14. Four sheets: "What Is a Marathon?" "Discussion Group Procedure,"
    "Propaganda Yardstick" and "Group Findings."

Contents - Unit B (To be mailed in November)

1. Discussion Program (Sections VI and VII)
2. Headline Book, "The World Since 1919" - Raymond Leslie Buell

Note to Leader

The leader, before the first meeting, should secure:

1. A Secretary to enroll members. This assistant should arrange for meetings, make announcements and take care of publicity. At end of meetings she should send group findings to Marathon Chairman of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War.
2. A Reference Custodian who will display contents of kit at first meeting, as well as books and additional reading material from local library. She will distribute to members of the group at each meeting material on subject to be discussed at the following meeting.

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SECTION I

WORLD EVENTS AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

Introductory Remarks (15 min.)

A spirit of informality and friendliness should guide discussion from the first meeting. The leader, secretary and reference custodian should be introduced to the group. Members of the group should be given an opportunity to meet each other. They should examine the Marathon kit and the new books on international relations which the reference custodian may wish to display. On this occasion the time and place of future meetings should be determined.

In opening the discussion, the leader should briefly explain the goals of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War and the recommended program adopted at the Washington Conference by representatives of the eleven national women's organizations comprising its membership. If the group is not familiar with the Marathon project, the leader should stress not only the fact that it offers opportunity to study and discuss the program of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, but that groups all over the United States are following the same study program, so that together organized women can help to create an effective public opinion for a constructive policy for peace. (The enclosed leaflets, "What Is a Marathon?" "Discussion Group Procedure," and "Program of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War" will be found helpful for introductory remarks.) She should point out that these group discussions will be of value in direct proportion to the amount of reading done by members of the group. While basic material is included in kits, members of groups should be encouraged to secure additional material from books, magazines and current papers and in local libraries. She should conclude by pointing out that the study group offers an opportunity to its members for equipping themselves so that as citizens they can meet the inescapable and continuing responsibility of helping to determine governmental action on questions of relations with other countries.

Group Discussion

I

Object of Discussion

To inquire into the extent world events influence American public opinion and to discover how this opinion shapes domestic and foreign policies.

II

Suggested Questions to Stimulate Discussion (45 min.)

1. Czechoslovakia was dissolved as a state last March.
   a. How do you think the events in Europe at that time affected the majority of our people?
   b. What impression do you think our Government intended to make upon Germany by the 25% increase in duties on German imports to the United States?

Compare this unilateral action to "punish the aggressor" with the same type of action taken by an international body such as the League of Nations.

c. Our investments in and trade with Czechoslovakia were relatively small. Why do you think there were "Save Czechoslovakia" mass meetings and "Stop Hitler" parades throughout our country at that time?

2. Japanese military domination continues in China.

a. Do you believe American women are sufficiently concerned about the bombing of civilian population in China and thousands of war orphans to stop wearing silk stockings? Is there any connection between our wearing silk stockings, the United States exportation of scrap iron to Japan and the destitute people of China?

b. Why do you think notice was sent to Japan of termination of the Trade Treaty of 1911? Why do you think the government took such a step? Do you think that it will accomplish the purpose intended, or can you think of a better way?

3. Situations in Europe and the Far East are like forest fires in a civilized community.

a. Do you believe that larger appropriations for national defense will save your interests from the fires or the results of the fires?

Note: Questions relating to recent world happenings may be substituted or added.

III

Conclusion Supported by Majority of Group (15 min.)

To what extent do you believe your personal welfare and the security of your home dependent upon world conditions? In what way does your opinion affect world events?

Preparation for Section II on Propaganda

1. The leader should suggest that members of the group read the five enclosed Letters of the Propaganda Analysis Institute, which analyze propaganda and tell how to detect it in the news, on the radio, and in the movies.

2. Members of the group should measure the units of information which they read with the Propaganda Yardstick (sheet enclosed in kit) in order to be able to discuss the amount of propaganda which they find in everyday reading.

3. Interesting material to add to the value of the discussion will be found in "Propaganda," by Violet Edwards, listed in the bibliography, as well as in other books on the subject in your local library.

SECTION II

ENLIGHTENMENT NOT PROPAGANDA

I

Object of Discussion

To understand propaganda and to determine to what degree it is being used to influence public opinion on questions of foreign policy

II

Subject Material (30 min.)

1. Members of the group who have read Propaganda Bulletins or other material of interest on the subject should summarize their reading for the benefit of the group. An effort should be made to define what group members mean by the term "propaganda."

2. Those who used propaganda yardstick on their reading should give examples of propaganda which they found.

III

Can you Recognize Propaganda? (10 min.)

Discuss each of the following and decide which of them you regard as examples of devices often used in propaganda. Discuss these devices.

1. All intelligent people are in favor of passing the Neutrality Law and keeping America out of the Far Eastern conflict.

2. Take George Washington as your guide and avoid entangling foreign alliances.

3. What American business needs is a good way to bring back prosperity.

Can you think of some other popular statements in everyday use that are employed in propaganda on questions of foreign policy?

IV

Suggested Questions to Stimulate Discussion (20 min.)

1. What distinguishes good from harmful propaganda? When, if ever, do you think propaganda is justified? What is the difference between propaganda and education?

2. In which channels of communication - newspapers, radio, movies or libraries - is one likely to find the most propaganda? Why?

3. What evidence can you observe that propaganda is influencing public opinion today on world affairs?

4. How much propaganda do you believe is being spread in this country on the war in China? What is its purpose?

V

Public Opinion on Foreign Policy in Your Own Community (20 min.)

1. What organized groups and institutions in your community influence public opinion on foreign policy? (include clubs, schools, churches, etc.) Who determines the policies of each? Are opinions of leaders conditioned to have a particular point of view?

2. Do the women's organizations, service clubs, adult education classes, forums, newspapers, the radio, the movies or the libraries in your community affect public opinion on world affairs the most? Do you believe any of them are colored by propaganda?

3. Out of what have your opinions grown? To what extent have they been influenced by family, church, education or background?

VI

Conclusion Supported by the Majority of the Group (10 min.)

Do you believe that factual information or propaganda is determining public opinion on world affairs in your community? What can your group do to develop accurate thinking on issues affecting our relations with other countries?

VII

If group is interested in finding out what persons in their community think on questions of foreign policy and what is molding that opinion, a public opinion survey could be carried out by members of the group. Group should decide on one definite question, such as for example, revision of Neutrality Law or support of Reciprocal Trade Agreements or embargo against Japan. All types of people - store keepers, teachers, laborers should be asked and answers listed, whether they are in favor or against the measure on which group has decided to test opinion. Some members of group should survey the molders of public opinion. Items and editorials in local papers, broadcasts on local radio stations, movies, as well as books and magazines in libraries that touch on measure should be listed. Are there any organizations or individuals agitating for or against the measure? Group should analyze results of survey and see if there is any connection between the opinions of the people and the information they are receiving through the channels of communication. If this project is undertaken, the National Marathon chairman would be pleased to have a brief report of findings.

Preparation for Section III on American Foreign Policy

1. Leader should suggest that members of group read
   a. "American Foreign Policy" - Johnstone
   b. "Work and Needs of the State Department" - Messersmith
   c. Study chart on American Foreign Policy

2. Leader should ask a different member of group to read each one of the above three suggestions especially carefully.

SECTION III

LANDMARKS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

I

Object of Discussion

To understand the policies that have guided our relations with other nations and the mediums through which those relations are directed.

II

Our Foreign Policy

If chart on American Foreign Policy is posted where all can see, it will help group to get a clear picture of phases of our American Foreign Policy. A large world map with North and South America in the center would be useful to see relative importance of relations with other nations.

A. What Is Its Make-up? (15 min.)

Members of group who read "American Foreign Policy" by Johnstone should explain major policies regulating relations with other nations.

1. Consider the list of conditions and needs on the chart. Which of these has had most influence in shaping our foreign policy? Which have changed most rapidly?

2. Have the policies that have guided our relations with other nations kept pace with changing conditions in the last 150 years?

3. In what way have our relations with the three different special areas differed? In which areas do you think policies have protected American interests? In which have they not?

B. How Does It Function? (15 min.)

Different members of group who did background reading should explain (1) the work of the State Department, (2) Powers of Congress, (3) Committees and Departments dealing with foreign relations, and (4) the citizen's part in influencing foreign policy.

1. Does the executive branch, the legislative branch or the departments of government have the most power in shaping foreign policy?

2. How does the cost to the government of the Department of State compare with the cost of other departments? (Consider especially the cost of the War and Navy Departments.) What deductions do you make from these facts?

3. In what way may our State Department be considered our first line of defense?

III

Questions to Stimulate Discussion (40 min.)

1. When has the United States followed a policy of isolation? When has the policy been disregarded because it did not suit America's needs? What bearing does Twentieth Century industrialized civilization have on this problem?

2. Why do we support a trade promotion policy, yet maintain an isolation policy with regard to maintenance of peace?

3. How do you think opinion on foreign policy differs in various sections of our country? What is the predominating opinion in your state? How do you account for it?

4. Consider our relations with various countries and sections of the world today. What do you think should be done to improve these relationships?

5. What can you do as a citizen to help build peaceful relations with other nations?

IV

Conclusion Supported by the Majority of the Group (20 min.)

Do you believe American foreign policy has safeguarded American interests in the world?

Preparation for Section IV on Present Problem of Neutrality

1. All members of group should read "America Looks Abroad" by Schuman and Soule.

2. Leader should ask two members to read "America Looks Abroad" especially carefully so that one can act as an expert on Mr. Schuman's point of view and the other as an expert on Mr. Soule's point of view in answering questions in Section IV.

3. Articles on Neutrality in magazines and newspapers last April, May and June, when there were hearings before committees and when issue was debated in Congress will give group much interesting material.

4. Books giving two points of view are "Men Must Act" by Lewis Mumford, Harcourt Brace and Co. Inc., and "War Peace and Change" by John Dulles, Harper Bros.

SECTION IIII

WHICH ROAD TO PEACE? - THE CONTROVERSY OF THE MOMENT

I

Object of Discussion

To understand the different policies proposed that will lead towards security for the United States and peace for the world.

II

Purpose of American Foreign Policy (15 min.)

Secretay Hull's statement, Page IV "American Foreign Policy" by Johnstone and statements since made by the executive branch of the government indicate that maintenance and promotion of peace is the purpose of American foreign policy. Congress and the people, for the most part, agree with that purpose.

1. Why is there such disagreement in Congress on all issues of foreign policy if there is agreement on purpose? What factors influence this difference of opinion?

2. In groups and organizations of which you have been a member, is there a difference of opinion on domestic as well as foreign policies? What does that indicate?

3. If a democracy is to be effective, what should be the prerequisites for the expression of opinion on questions of foreign policy.

III

Charting the Course (25 min.)

Leader should set the stage by asking the following questions, first from the "expert" on Dr. Schuman's essay and then from the "expert" on Mr. Soule's essay in "America Looks Abroad."

1. What is the chief argument to support point of view?

2. What government measures are proposed to guide peace time policy?

3. What provisions should a neutrality act contain? What would be the purpose of such an act?

4. Give arguments to support proposed provisions of Neutrality Act.

IV

Questions to Stimulate Group Discussion

1. Why is attitude of our people and policy of our government towards nations at war important at this time? Is it possible to be absolutely neutral?

2. Should our policy be guided by a desire to prevent war, to prevent involvement by this country in war, or to prevent the growth of fascist states?

3. How much do you think the present Neutrality Act prevents trade with nations at war? If it had been in effect in 1914-16, would it have prevented our involvement?

4. To what extent do you believe the neutrality issue will be decided by facts? How much will the issue be influenced by national politics and emotional reactions to current conditions?

V

Conclusions Supported by the Majority of Group (15 min.)

How best can America build for peace under present world conditions? What provisions do you believe a neutrality act should contain?

Preparation for Section V on Problems of Trade

1. Leader should suggest that members of group read "Significance of Trade Agreements Program Today" by Sayre; "Latin America, Germany and the Hull Program" by Bidwell (International Conciliation, Feb. 1939); "Tasks of a World Economic Conference" by Staley and "Report of the Committee of Experts to the Conference on World Economic Cooperation."

2. Everyone should try to read current books and magazine articles on present world economic situation.

3. Current books recommended are: "Imperialism and World Politics" by Parker T. Moon, Macmillan Co. 1926; "Political Myths and Economic Realities" by Francis Delaisi, Viking Press, 1927; "The Way Forward" by Francis Sayre, Macmillan, N.Y. "World Economy in Transition" by Eugene Staley, Council on Foreign Relations, 45 East 65th Street, N. Y. "Battles without Bullets", Headline Book, Foreign Policy Asso'n. 8 West 40th St., New York, N.Y.

SECTION V

TRADE RIVALRIES AND AMERICAN PROFITS

I

Object of Discussion

To understand reasons for struggle over raw materials and markets and to find possible ways of solving problem.

II

Two Ways of Seeking Trade

Place the red and green posters and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Map so that the group can study and examine them. Summary of "Special Significance of the Trade Agreements Program Today" by Sayre should be given by two persons, each explaining one of the opposing trade systems.

1. What changed world conditions have made trade today essential to all nations?

2. Why would a nation use trade restrictions and barter agreements in place of free trade?

3. What effect do controls on international trade have on national life?

4. With how many countries has the United States completed agreements? What type of agreements do these countries have? What makes it difficult to conclude agreements with Germany, Italy and Japan?

5. Has the barter system increased trade as rapidly as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Trade Agreements Program under present world conditions?

6. In what way does increased international trade lead to higher standards of living and peace?

III

Conflicting Trade Policies in Latin America (15 min.)

Member of group should summarize the high points of the article "Latin America, Germany and the Hull Program" (International Conciliation, Feb. 1939)

1. How much of our exports do we send to Latin America each year? What commodities do we send?

2. In which countries do United States goods predominate and in which British? To which countries has Germany sent more goods? Has German trade increase been made at the expense of the United States?

3. Why do we import more goods from Latin America than we export?

4. What three paths could the United States follow in dealing with the drive to promote the barter system? Which do you think would be the best?

IV

A Possible Solution (15 min.)

Member of group should explain Staley's plan for World Economic Conference.

1. How do you think this plan would meet present world trade situation?

2. What needs of the various nations could be met through such a conference?

V

Questions to Stimulate Group Discussion (30 min.)

1. What elements do you think enter into the struggle for markets and raw materials?

2. How would it be possible for all nations to satisfy their peace-time trade needs?

3. What effect do you think the solution of the trade problem would have on the armaments race and aggression?

4. What opposition do you find to the Hull Trade Program in your community? Is it justified?

5. What can your group do to help community understand facts of national trade problems?

VI

Conclusions Supported by the Majority of Group (15 min.)

How best can America help solve the problem of economic warfare?

Preparation for Section VI

1. Leader should suggest that members of group read Headline Book, "The World Since 1919" by Raymond Leslie Buell.

2. Current books and magazine articles on causes of present world situation will be found of value in promoting discussion.

3. Recent books recommended are "Europe in Retreat" by Vera Micheles Dean, Knopf, N.Y., "Europe on the Eve" by Frederick Schuman, Knopf, N.Y., "Survey after Munich" by Graham Hutton, Little Brown & Co., N.Y., "In Quest of Empire" Headline Book, Foreign Policy Asso'n., N. Y., and "War in Our Time" by Speier and Kohler, Norton Pub. Co., 70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.

SECTION VI

THE WORLD SINCE 1919

I

Object of Discussion

To analyze events during the period between the World War and the present war in order to understand why the peace of 1919 has failed.

II

Do We Really Want Permanent Peace? 10 minutes

1. What have peoples within nations always been ready to fight for?

2. Why is it difficult after any war to make a treaty that fairly solves the problem?

3. What are you willing to sacrifice in order to end war and build for permanent peace?

III

The Sad Saga of the Last Twenty Years 25 minutes

It is suggested that a large map of Europe be hung in the front of the room so that boundaries of 1914, 1924 and 1939 can be traced.

A large chart prepared for Kit No. 3 showing "Steps to War" by Mrs. Malbone Graham which gives dates and events since 1919 can be secured for 10¢ from the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War.

Those who read "The Peace that Failed" and other current pamphlets, books and magazine articles on events and their significence during the post-war period should summarize their reading for the benefit of the group.

The European map should be studied to see countries and peoples affected by the different boundary changes.

IV

Can We Blame the Versailles Treaty? 25 minutes

1. If Wilson's 14 points had been accepted as a basis for peace, what difference do you think it would have made in the post-war period?

2. What fundamental problems were left unsolved by the Versailles Treaty?

3. Why didn't the concessions which eased the terms of the Versailles Treaty made to Germany by the Allies, such as the early evacuation of the Ruhr, end of reparations and re-militarization of the Rhineland, lead to better understanding and cooperation in Europe?

4. In spite of the terms of the Versailles Treaty, how could the United States and Great Britain have helped to build an enduring peace?

5. To what extent do you believe the present war is to wipe out the Versailles Treaty and the control of the Allies, a conflict between two rival sets of imperial interests or a struggle between dictatorship and democracy?

V

The Next Peace — 15 minutes

1. If America is going to demand a fair peace, what price must the American people be willing to pay?

2. What terms do you think would best lead to a firm foundation on which to build a peaceful society in each country?

VI

Conclusion — 15 minutes

In what way do you believe America is responsible for the failures of the last peace and outbreak of the present war in Europe? What do you think Americans can do to help the next peace to succeed?

Preparation for Section VII on Problem of the World after War

1. Leader should suggest that members of group read leaflets in kit, "The Covenant of the League of Nations," "A Federation of Nations," "The Way to Peace" and "What Kind of Peace Can Europe Make?"

2. Members of group should follow current magazines, newspapers and radio programs, such as Town Hall Meetings, for material on the peace that is to come and possible bases for a world society. Recent articles especially recommended are "After War What?" by J. Anton de Haas, Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1939. "Rebuilding World Order" by M. Garnett, Contemporary Review, August, 1939.

3. Recent books recommended are "Security: Can We Retrieve It?" by Arthur Salter, Macmillan. 1939. "Union Now" by Clarence Streit, Harpers, 1939. "Analysis of the War Problem" by Clyde Eagleton, Ronald Press, New York, N.Y. 1937.

Note to Leader

"A Guide to World Affairs" part of Kit No. 3, gives an excellent list of selected references and sources of information for the study of international relations. Published by the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs., 1819 Broadway, New York, N.Y. Price 30¢.

SECTION VII

FACING THE FUTURE

I

Object of Discussion

To examine proposed plans for building a World Society.

II

Must We Organize?

1. Why is some form of world organization necessary in this modern world?

2. Compare the sacrifices of a neutral in time of war, the cost of conflict, and the price of cooperation in a world society.

3. Why are nations able to cooperate on economic and social issues but must fight to settle political questions?

4. Do you believe our present machinery for world organization should be revised, implemented or scrapped? Defend your answer.

III

Looking over the Blue-prints

Members of the group who have read material on different plans for world organization should review reading for the benefit of the group, touching on the following points:

1. League of Nations
   a. What is the basis for membership?
   b. What is its structure for work?
   c. What has been accomplished?
   d. Why has the League failed to prevent aggression and war?
   e. What parts of the Covenant should be revised and implemented?

2. A Federation of Nations
   a. What is the basis for membership?
   b. What is its structure for work?
   c. What are the chief obstacles contronting any plan for the formation of a Federation of Nations?

3. The New Commonwealth
   a. What new provisions does the commonwealth plan offer?
   b. Do you believe an international police force would be able to maintain peace?

4. Regional plans and organizations for particular problems
   a. Through what machinery have nations in the Western Hemisphere cooperated?
   b. Could a Federation of European States meet the economic and political problems which have led to conflict?
   c. How could a Customs Union, an Economic Tribunal, International Labor Organization, World Court or other such machinery to handle special questions contribute to the building of an organized world?

IV

Problems a World Society Must Solve if It Is To Succeed.

1. How can aggression be stopped?

2. What methods shall be used to make nations respect their treaty obligations?

3. How can national trade practices and private economic interests be subordinated to support international law and order?

4. How can sufficient raw materials be made available to various nations; by what method can a sufficienby be determined?

5. How shall the world society provide for changing political and economic situations?

6. What provisions can be made for the development of backward areas so as to give equal opportunity to all nations and independence to the peoples in those areas?

7. How can security be guaranteed to all nations so that armaments can be reduced?

8. How can desire for sovereignty and belief in nationalism be prevented from destroying workings of any international group?

V

Charting the Course

1. What do you believe should be the principal aim of a world society?

2. Which of the proposed plans seem best able to meet the problems facing the world?

3. What attitudes are essential on the part of peoples within nations if any efforts towards international cooperation are to succeed?

4. Do you believe the war will tend to defeat or to increase man's effort to build for enduring peace through cooperation?

VI

Conclusion Supported by the Majority of the Group

What sacrifices must the United States make to play its part in a world society? What sort of program can be worked out in your community for developing a spirit of international cooperation to support membership in a world organization?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Angell, Sir Norman. PEACE WITH THE DICTATORS? New York. Harpers. 1938. $3.00

Doob, Leonard William. PROPAGANDA--ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND TECHNIQUE. New York. Holt. 1935. $3.60

Dulles, A. and Armstrong H. CAN WE BE NEUTRAL? New York. Council on Foreign Relations 1936. $1.50

Edwards, V. PROPAGANDA. Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 130 Morningside Drive, New York. 1938. 60¢

Ferguson, J. M. LANDMARKS IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT. New York. Longmans Green & Co. 1938. $1.00

Hinton, Harold B. AMERICA GROPES FOR PEACE. New York. Johnson Publishing Co. 1937. $2.00

Jacks, L. P. COOPERATION OR COERCION? New York. Dutton. 1938. $2.00

Shotwell, James. ON THE RIM OF THE ABYSS. New York. Macmillan. 1936. $3.00

Thompson, Dorothy. DOROTHY THOMPSON'S POLITICAL GUIDE. New York. Stackpole Sons.1938.$1.25

Pamphlets

WAR IN CHINA. Headline Book. Foreign Policy Asso'n., 8 West 40th St., New York. 25¢

PEACE OR WAR? Day and Hour Series. University of Minnesota Press. 50¢

TOWARD A COLLECTIVE PEACE SYSTEM. Louise Leonard Wright. League of Women Voters, 726 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. 25¢

WAR LOSSES TO A NEUTRAL. Eugene Staley. League of Nations Association, 8 West 40th St., New York. 25¢

WORLD ECONOMIC COOPERATION. National Peace Conference, 8 West 40th St., N.Y.C. 10¢

BUILDING AN INTER-AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOOD. Samuel Inman. National Peace Conference. 35¢

Magazine Articles

WOMEN MUST WEEP OR UNITE AGAINST WAR by V. Woolf. Atlantic Monthly. May & June, 1938.

PROPAGANDA FOR WAR MODEL 1938. by L. Dennis American Mercury. May, 1938.

1937 IS NOT 1914 by I. F. Stone. Nation. November 6, 1937.

1937 IS NOT 1914 by A. M. Bingham. Nation. November 20, 1937.

PEACE AND THE COUNTRY TOWN (A Survey) Christian Science Monitor. August 18, 1937.

OPEN LETTER TO THE WOMEN OF AMERICA. Woman's Home Companion. January, 1938.

NATION POLL ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Nation. April 9 and 23; May 7, 1938.

Note: World maps with the Americas in the center can be secured from McKinley Pub. Co., 1021 Filbert Street, Philadelphia, Pa., size 10 x 15 inches, price about 2¢ ea; 15 x 20 inches, price about 3¢ ea.

MARATHON ROUND TABLES
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE
CAUSE AND CURE OF WAR
1949 GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL
NEW YORK CITY

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no. 1

THE EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD

Marathon Study Kit No. 1

Study Guide

Prepared by

Mrs. Howard G. Hymer, Chairman, Marathon Committee

National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War

Section Topics

1. Introductory Discussion - We and the World Neighborhood
2. A Newcomer in the Family of Nations
3. America Grows Up
4. Tying the World Together with Trade Routes
5. Our Neighbors in North and South America
6. Building a Peaceful World Through Cooperation

Contents of Kit

1. Study Guide in Six Sections
2. Recommended Program of the Cause and Cure of War
3. America Contradicts Herself - Headline Book
4. American Foreign Policy - S. D. Myres
5. Conduct of American Foreign Policy - Lamb
6. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Program - Hubbard - Valentin - Reeve
7. Trade Agreements and the Farmer
8. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Map
9. Two Posters on World Economic Cooperation
10. Pros and Cons of Neutrality - Mrs. Stewart
11. Primer on Pan Americanism
12. Bricks Without Mortar - Headline Book
13. Twenty Questions on the League of Nations
14. Twenty Questions on the I. L. O.
15. Sheets - What is a Marathon - Peace Glossary - An International Police Force - Suggestions for Group Discussion Leaders - Suggestions for Discussion Group Members

How to Proceed

Material on which study is based is in this kit. The outline plans the use of this material for six discussions although more time can be spent on subjects if group so desires. While there are suggested questions for discussion the leader can change questions to those related to current happenings or special interests of group which are related to topic being discussed.

Each Group Should Have

A Leader to act as chairman at all meetings and conduct the discussions.

A Secretary (1) to enroll members; (2) arrange meetings; (3) send out notices and publicity; (4) and to send group findings to the Marathon Chairman of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War after series is finished.

A Reference Custodian (1) to take care of material in kit seeing that all members of group have opportunity to read it; (2) to see that all reports are assigned well in advance and that those reporting are provided with necessary books; (3) to secure books and magazines on subjects to be discussed from the local library for the use of the group; (4) to act as referee to give or find correct information on any question which cannot be settled without reference to some material outside the kit.

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SECTION I

Introductory Remarks

A spirit of informality and friendliness should guide discussions from the first meeting. The leader, secretary and reference custodian should be introduced to the group and members of the group should be given an opportunity to meet each other. Contents of the Marathon Kit and new pamphlets and magazines on events in other countries should be spread out on a large table so that all the group may look at them. The time and place of meetings should be decided.

In opening the first discussion, the leader should tell about the eleven women's organizations making up the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War. She should explain that the recommended program is adopted by representatives of these organizations at the conference in Washington each year so that womens' groups in all parts of the country can work together on the same program. It is helpful to stress the fact that the material in kit and study guide were planned so that women could study and discuss this program. The enclosed leaflets - "Recommended Program of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War" and "What is a Marathon", give information helpful for these remarks. In concluding, ask the group what they think makes a good dicussion. Refer to sheets "Suggestions for Discussion Group Leaders" and "Suggestions for Discussion Group Members".

Informal Discussion

1.

Object of Discussion

To understand why today we and our homes are a part of the world neighborhood.

2.

1. Why is it possible for us to know more today than our grandparents did about people living in other countries?

2. In what way have the following events helped to build a world neighborhood:

1819 - First Steamboat Crossed the Atlantic
1844 - Telegraph Invented by Morse
1876 - Telephone Invented by Bell
1894 - Automobile First Operated
1896 - Wireless Invented by Marconi
1903 - Wright Aeroplane First Flown
1927 - Lindbergh Crossed the Atlantic in 33½ hours
1930 - International Broadcasting Began
1932 - Sixty Countries Connected by Telephone
1938 - Television Perfected
1939 - Regular Aeroplane Clipper, Passenger and Mail Service to Europe, South America and the Orient

3. What cultural ties bind us to the rest of the world? Do the music, literature, art and scientific discoveries from other countries make our lives any richer and more interesting?

4. America had almost 14 billion dollars invested in other countries last year and sold almost 3 billion dollars worth of goods.

   a. When there are hard times in other countries do you believe people in those countries continue to buy the same number of automobiles and other goods we have to sell?
   b. In what way does war in China hurt the factories and stores that Americans own there?

5. If at least four of the most important countries were fighting each other,-

   a. Do you believe we could continue trading with other countries?
   b. Do you believe we would get into the war?
   c. Do you believe we could avoid the world depression which would follow another world war?

6. Have events in other countries affected your personal welfare and happiness?

For the Next Meeting

1. Everyone should read "America Contradicts Herself".

2. One person should be prepared to tell the story of America's Growth - Pages 1 to 20 - America Contradicts Herself.

3. It would add to understanding of question if someone would read "American Foreign Policy" - Myres - Pages 1 to 18 - so that he or she could tell the group about world conditions Young America had to meet.

SECTION II

A NEWCOMER IN THE FAMILY OF NATIONS

I

OBJECT OF DISCUSSION

To examine the world neighborhood in which America grew up and the problems she faced as a new nation.

II

VIEWING AMERICA'S MOST IMPORTANT NEIGHBORS (20 min.)

1. How do you think most of the people who came to America felt towards their neighbors in Europe?

2. Discuss the differences between the old world social system governed by class distinction, traditions and the church, and the new social order the colonists were trying to establish.

3. How did members of the world neighborhood get along with each other?

4. What events led to Washington's and Jefferson's advice about "foreign political connections?"

III

CONQUERING NEW LANDS (30 min.)

If possible, hang up a large map of North America which shows the United States and its possessions.

A. Seeing America's Growth
Leader should ask different members to describe or to point out on map each of the following and tell how it was secured.

1. The 13 original colonies and explorations west to the Mississippi.
2. Territory gained from France known as the Louisiana Purchase.
3. Territory gained from Spain known as Florida.
4. Territory gained from Great Britain known as Oregon.
5. Territory gained from Russia known as Alaska.
6. Puerto Rico in the Caribbean.
7. Guam, Hawaii and the Philippines in the Pacific.

B. Discussing America's Growth.

1. Why do you think the early statesmen wanted so much new territory? To what extent were "honorable means" used to secure the state in which you live?

2. Which neighbors felt less friendly toward us because of the way in which we secured new territory?

3. How do you think the enlarged size of our country affected its importance and responsibility in the world neighborhood?

IV

EARLY PROBLEMS AND POLICIES DEVELOPED TO MEET THEM (25 min.)

1. New Settlers
   In what way were new settlers welcomed to this country? How do you feel today about letting anyone become a citizen who wishes to come to this country?

2. Trade
   To what extent were the colonists dependent on trade? Which nations interfered with our trade with other countries? How did the early statesmen try to encourage trade and build up home industries?

3. War
   What measures were adopted to protect our trade when other nations were at war? How successful were these measures in preventing America from being drawn into war?

4. Western Hemisphere
   What nations tried to seek control of the new countries to the south of us? What policies did President Monroe set up to keep European nations from settling in Latin America? How did our southern neighbors feel about our "protection?" In what way did his policy assist in the development of the Western Hemisphere?

5. Promoting Peace
   What would you be willing to give up to help build peace between nations? What was the first effort this country made to promote peaceful settlement of disputes?

V

CONCLUSION SUPPORTED BY MAJORITY OF GROUP (15 min.)

To what extent do you believe the policies laid down by Washington should guide affairs of our nation in the world neighborhood today?

FOR THE NEXT MEETING

1. As many of the group as possible should read "Conduct of American Foreign Policy" by Lamb.

2. Leader should suggest that members of group try to find out what people in their community think about present world events and what they believe our government should do to protect our own interests as well as to build for permanent peace. Ask friends and acquaintances their opinions. Follow local radio comments, editorials, speeches of their Congressmen and statements of local leaders.

3. One member of group should read carefully "America Contradicts Herself" p. 20-36.

4. For additional information, members of group should read "American Foreign Policy" by Myres, p. 21-39 for detailed account of policies.

SECTION III

AMERICA GROWS UP

I

OBJECT OF DISCUSSION

To understand policies that have guided our relations with other nations and the machinery which maked them work.

II

GROWING PAINS (10 min.)

1. Compare how America made her living in 1860 - 1910 - 1932. What conditions helped America to find new ways of making a better living?

2. What did we do with our surplus farm products, automobiles and dollars?

3. In what way did our prosperity affect our relations with other nations? How has this new relationship affected your own personal feelings toward other countries compared with those of your grandparents?

III

THE "GIANT OF THE WESTERN WORLD" (40 min.)

A. Looks across the Atlantic

   1. Why do you think America was involved in the War of 1812 and the World War?

   2. What made America return to a policy of "no entangling alliances" after the World War?

   3. What effect do you think that policy has had in building the present situation?

B. Looks across the Pacific

   1. Why have we been interested in keeping China an independent nation?

   2. What measures have we adopted to protect our possessions in the Pacific and our trade with the Orient? (In June America sent notice to Japan that she would end our trade treaty of 1911 in six months.)

   3. Are you sufficiently interested in stopping Japan to get along without silk stockings?

C. Considers World Organization

   1. After America was willing to send her soldiers and her dollars to Europe to fight to protect her interests, why do you think she was unwilling to help establish a new world order to permanently protect those interests and her own security?

   2. In what way do you believe our attitude toward world cooperation has been contradictory to our desire for trade and our belief in peace?

D. Wishes to avoid war

1. What measures did Congress adopt in 1935 designed to keep us out of war?

2. How do you tnink we can now best protect our interests in Europe?

NOTE TO LEADER

Optional meeting on Neutrality
If group wishes to discuss the question of Neutrality further, a meeting may be devoted to the subject using the enclosed leaflet, "Pros and Cons of Neutrality" as a basis for discussion. Have as many members of group as possible read the whole pamphlet while different persons should be ready to give the two different points of view. Use questions on last page of pamphlet for discussion.

IV

WHO DIRECTS THE ACTS OF THIS "GIANT?" (25 min.)

1. To whom does the Constitution give power to direct our relations with other countries?

2. Leader should ask different members to explain the powers of:
   A. The President
   B. The Department of State
   C. Congress
   D. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House
   E. The Senate
   F. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate

3. How much difference does what you think and what your friends think make to those directing our relations with other countries? Have you ever told any of them what you think?

V

CONCLUSION REACHED BY MAJORITY OF GROUP (15 min.)

What do you believe American Foreign Policy should aim to accomplish? As a citizen, what is your responsibility to help further these aims?

FOR THE NEXT MEETING

1. Leader should suggest that as many people as possible should read "Primer on Reciprocal Trade Aggreements" by Reeve, Hubbard and Valentin.

2. If group is interested in rural problems suggest that they read "The Reciprocal Trade Agreement and the Farmer" also in kit.

3. Members of group should ask at the stores they trade in what articles are sold that come from other countries. They should inquire what materials are imported for local manufacturing and what articles raised or manufactured in local community are sent to other countries.

4. A large copy of the enclosed map can be secured from Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D. C., price 15¢.

SECTION IV

TYING THE WORLD TOGETHER WITH TRADE ROUTES

I

OBJECT OF DISCUSSION

To understand the importance of trade to all nations and ways of improving exchange of goods which must continue even under present world conditions and be strengthened after conflict.

II

THE WORLD ON OUR DOORSTEP (10 min.)

1. What articles and supplies do you have in your home that your grandmother did not have? What has made possible our better ways of living?

2. From how many different countries do you find articles for sale in your local stores?

3. How necessary to your comfort is your car which has in it 300 vital materials which must be imported from 56 foreign countries? In addition to the coffee from Brazil which you had for breakfast and the varnish made from Chinese tung oil which decorates your home, what are some other imports that are important to you?

III

WANTED: MORE CUSTOMERS (15 min.)

1. What did America do with all the products she raised on her new lands and all the goods she was able to manufacture on her new machines? What proportion of our most important products are normally exported?

2. What measures have been passed to keep other countries from sending goods to us? What made us do this?

3. How can we expect other countries who have no farms to buy our farm products unless we are willing to buy some of the manufactured articles they have to sell?

4. What difference did the World War make to the amount of money we owed other countries and the amount of money they owed us? How did that new condition affect our trade?

IV

TIES THAT BIND (25 min.)

1. What world situation made the reciprocal trade agreements program necessary? How successful has it been in improving trade?

2. With how many countries have trade agreements been completed? Point out on map location of these countries. What kinds of governments do these countries have?

3. In what way has the reciprocal trade agreements program been of value to you?

V

KNOTS THAT MUST BE UNTANGLED (25 min.)

"In the peaceful and unhindered pursuit of trade rests the hope of mankind for progress and prosperity."
Examine reciprocal trade agreements map enclosed in kit.

1. What opposition is there to the reciprocal trade agreements program in your community? How is your community dependent upon world trade?

2. How is war affecting trade between nations? In what way has it disrupted the life of people in neutral countries?

3. What do you believe the desire for trade, raw materials and markets has had to do with the underlying causes for conflict in Europe and the Orient?

VI

CONCLUSION REACHED BY MAJORITY OF GROUP (15 min.)

In what way would you be willing to help further the free flow of goods in the world markets? How can America best help to revive trade between nations?

FOR THE NEXT MEETING

1. Leader should suggest that all members of the group find out all they can about Latin America from books in local library, magazines, histories, and encyclopedias.

2. As many members as possible should read "A Primer of Pan Americanism."

3. The excerpt from the speech by Sumner Welles gives recent information on Latin American relations.

SECTION V

OUR NEIGHBORS IN LATIN AMERICA

I

OBJECT OF DISCUSSION

To discover a genuine basis on which continental solidarity can be built.

II

WHO ARE OUR NEIGHBORS AND WHAT ARE THEY LIKE? (25 min.)

If possible, hang up a map of the Western Hemisphere where all can see. Leader should ask different members of the group to point out or describe the location of the 21 different Latin American republics.

1. In what way has the history of the different countries been affected by the climate and geography?

2. Which races and nationalities live in the different republics?

3. What opportunity do most of the Latin Americans have for travel and education? Compare the kind of home the average person in Latin America lives in with your own home.

4. How do most of the people in the different republics make a living?

III

ORGANIZING A WESTERN HEMISPHERE COMMUNITY (20 min.)

1. When did the nations of North and South America first meet together to talk over their common problems?

2. What facts helped to build a feeling of Pan Americanism?

3. What differences have made it difficult for the 21 republics to work together?

4. What has been the value of the Pan American Conferences?

5. Discuss the difference between the "Good Neighbor Policy" we are now following to guide our relations with the Latin American countries and the "Dollar Diplomacy" of earlier days.

IV

MAKING THE NEW COMMUNITY FUNCTION AS A UNIT (30 min.)

In the Economic Field

1. With how many Latin American countries have trade agreements been mado? (refer to Reciprocal Trade Agreements Map enclosed in kit)

2. What products are raised in Latin American countries that we need and what do we manufacture to send to them?

In the Cultural Field

1. What effort has been made to further the understanding between people of our country and our neighbors to the south?

2. How much information do you think people in your community have about the cultural accomplishments of the Latin Americans?

In the Political Field

1. What measures have been worked out to settle disputes peacefully?

2. What effort has been made for cooperation against foreign influences?

V

CONGLUSION SUPPORTED BY MAJORITY OF THE GROUP (15 min.)

What can be done in your community to help create a genuine Pan Americanism?

FOR THE NEXT MEETING

1. As many members of the group as possible should read "Bricks without Mortar" - Headline Book

2. Leader should suggest that one member read carefully the leaflets on the League of Nations so that she can answer the questions listed, while another person should be prepared to answer the questions listed in leaflet on the I. L. O.

3. The "Essential Facts" of the League of Nations is a valuable reference for more detailed information of the functioning of world organization.

SECTION VI

EXPERIMENTS ON COOPERATION

I

OBJECT OF DISCUSSION

To examine the efforts that have been made for world cooperation and observe where they have succeeded and where failed.

II

WHY COOPERATE (10 min.)

1. Why have individuals since the beginning of civilization cooperated in families, tribes, states and now nations?
2. What mechanical developments during the past 100 years have made cooperation easier?
3. How have you been benefited in the years past by cooperation between nations?

III

MILESTONES IN COOPERATION (10 min.)

1. What were the accomplishments of the first international conferences?
2. How did international conventions help cooperation between nations?
3. What problems have the international unions solved?
4. How was cooperation used during the World War?

IV

NEW ORGANIZATIONS DEPENDENT ON COOPERATION (30 min.)

A. League of Nations

1. What is the main purpose of the League and on what principles was it founded?
2. How many nations have been members of the League? How have the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat functioned?

3. What commissions were formed? How successful has their work been?

4. Why has the League failed in the political field?

B. International Labor Organization

1. What is the I.L.O. and for what purpose was it organized?

2. What have been the accomplishments to improve labor standards?

C. World Court

1. What kind of disputes does the World Court deal with?

2. How have their judgments and advisory opinions helped to build a world based on law and order?

V

TOGETHER WE STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL (25 min.)

1. If nations have been able to cooperate economically to promote trade and are cooperating to wage war, why do you think they have not been able to cooperate politically to promote peace?

2. If all the members had supported the League, how do you think the present conflicts in Europe and the Orient could have been prevented?

3. How important do you believe cooperation between nations is in an interdependent world? What can you do to help promote it?

VI

CONCLUSION SUPPORTED BY THE MAJORITY OF GROUP (15 min.)

On what basis do you think world peace must be reestablished? How can the United States help to build a world based on law and order?

NOTE TO LEADER

For further reading see suggestions listed in each of the pamphlets. "A Guide to World Affairs" by Rita Clark is especially recommended for use of groups. It can be secured from the Business & Professional Women's Clubs, 1819 Broadway, New York, price 30¢. It offers not only an excellent list of pamphlets and books which are each briefly described but also lists material for discussion leaders, aids in creating interest such as exhibits, movies, plays and program suggestions.

The enclosed sheet listing contents of Marathon kits is sent in the hope that groups may wish to consider further the issues and problems of American Foreign Policy.

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FORCE OR REASON: WHICH SHALL PREVAIL?

MARATHON ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION PROGRAM

THE LIBRARY OF THE
JUN 12 1945
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE CAUSE & CURE OF WAR

THE EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

172.4
N19m
No. 3

FORCE OR REASON
Which Shall Prevail?

Marathon Study Kit No. 3

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A Current Issues Folio Arranged by
Mrs. Howard G. Hymer, Chairman, Marathon Committee
National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War

Contents

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Recommended Program of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War

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A Guide to World Affairs - Pamphlet published by the Business and Professional Women's Clubs, is sent with the first section of folio. Remaining sections and new sheets on world events which affect the recommended program will be sent throughout the year.

PREFACE

By Carrie Chapman Catt

For twenty years, a great movement has been in progress, aiming to find the way to perpetual peace. The League of Nations, a marvellous ideal, was set up. The Pact of Locarno, the Naval Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, each bringing new faith and hope were compiled and signed. Bright expectations prevailed, but these treaties have all been violated; the League of Nations has not been able to fulfill its promises. For a decade the nations have lived under the shadow of a possible coming war and hope has turned to despair.

War has existed in the world for a possible million years; the only effort to bring war to an end covers a mere twenty years. Time is required to break down the war habit and to substitute the peace habit. There is no cause for pessimism.

Remember, that the people may have anything that they want and that they will want peace when they fully understand that peace builds up civilization and human welfare and that war tears them down.

Much has happened to disturb our minds, but during the same period an enormous number of peace workers have arisen - intelligent, brave, far-seeing and persistent. This great body is educating its neighbors struggling to find activities to bring the aim nearer.

Experiment must follow experiment until the straight road to peace is found and our feet are set upon it. The chief causes of failure are found in ignorance and doubt of success. Any Marathon may come to a clarity of understanding that will reveal the path and point the way that nations and cabinets are seeking to find.

Peace will not come until the masses of men and women understand the necessity for the abolition of war and produce a clamor for it so long and so loud it will echo around the world and compel nations to heed its call.

Marathons will help to find the way. Welcome to the advanced kit and the added intelligence it will bring to the world.

August 30, 1939

PROGRAM FOR 1939

Recommended to the Eleven Member Organizations
by the Fourteenth Conference on the Cause and Cure of War
(Washington, D. C., January 21-25, 1939)

FOR FOURTEEN YEARS the member organizations have been pursuing their search for the cause of war and its cure. Each succeeding year the Conference has witnessed a sharpening of its objective, until in 1938 it arrived at the conviction that whatever the cause, whatever the proposed remedies, there will be no elimination of war itself as an instrument of national policy until all nations unite in a co-operative endeavor to set up permanent machinery whereby the common concerns of national states can be dealt with on an orderly basis of law and justice.

The nature and form of this permanent peace machinery, into which the United States might enter whole-heartedly, should be the subject of a thorough consideration by the member organizations.

Coupled with this, there must be immediate action on specific issues growing out of the present world situation. Decisions by our government during the present session of Congress may accelerate or may curb the present disastrous trends in world affairs.

The program must therefore include immediate as well as far goals.

With this in mind, the Conference on the Cause and Cure of War recommends the following program, to be undertaken with continued *emphasis on the necessity for the cooperation of the United States with other nations to eliminate war and to establish and maintain peace with justice.**

**Adopted as major emphasis in 1938.*

PART I — FINDING A BASIS FOR THE RESPONSIBLE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN A PERMANENT WORLD SOCIETY

1. That the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War appoint a Commission, consisting of the chairman of international relations of each member organization, to study and report to the 1940 Conference on the essential elements which must go into the establishment of a permanent society of nations for the maintenance of peace with justice, and the steps to be taken in our own country to help toward this goal. Such a study would include consideration of past and present attempts to develop a world society; an analysis of the elements which apparently lead to success or failure; and a study of the possible basis on which the United States would agree to enter whole-heartedly into such a society.

2. That each member organization promote an intensive discussion of this subject among its own members, and that the findings of these discussions be made available promptly for the use of the Commission.

PART II — CURRENT ISSUES

That the member organizations support the following policies as furthering the spirit and practice of international cooperation, whether carried out independently by the United States government or together with other governments:

1. Positive action programs for cultural, economic and political cooperation among the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

2. Continuance of the present Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program.

3. Consultation, in the event of war or threat of war, with other signatories of anti-war treaties, to determine a basis for peaceful settlement; and provision for the adoption of financial and economic measures designed to withhold aid from treaty-violators.

4. Utilization of the conference method to deal with specific international questions, such as economic adjustments, reduction of armaments, protection of minorities.

5. Expansion of the cooperation of the United States with the League of Nations.

6. Increased appropriations for the Department of State to meet its growing responsibilties in the maintenance of peace.

7. A national defense policy which is correlated with a constructive foreign policy for peace and which recognizes both the economic wastefulness of armaments and the necessity for internal economic stability.

A CALL TO ACTION

The Neutrality Act has failed of its purpose. It was designed to keep the United States out of war and to prevent war. It has brought the United States nearer to involvement in war. It has served to give aid to treaty-breakers and war-makers.

We, the delegates at this conference, indict the Neutrality Act as a major contributing factor in the present strife and confusion of the world.

The Act must be amended to make it an instrument of peace and justice, through provisions which would preclude the sale of American primary and secondary war materials to nations waging war in violation of treaties.

Congress must be convinced of the existing wide-spread demand for such revision.

The 1939 Conference on the Cause and Cure of War therefore calls upon the eleven participating organizations to redouble their efforts to place before Congress incontrovertible testimony of the extent of this demand for revision of the Neutrality Act.

Such revision would make it possible at once to deny to our citizens the right to sell to Japan such war materials as are now being used by her in her military campaign in China.

A second method for controlling sales of war materials to Japan is that of a special legislative measure directed toward that purpose alone. To this possibility the eleven member organizations should also give consideration.

The 1939 Conference draws attention to the tragic result of the operation of the Neutrality Act in regard to Spain. The continuance of the embargo, in view of the failure of the non-intervention plan, which the United States action was intended to strengthen, has placed the United States in the position of discriminating against the legitimate government to the advantage of the opposition.

The 1939 Conference therefore calls upon the eleven participating organizations to give immediate consideration to the serious problems created by the Spanish embargo under the Neutrality Act, and to take such action as will help to remedy the injustices brought about by its application.

AFFIRMATION ON RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL PERSECUTION

Deeply moved by the tragedy of those who are suffering because of religious and racial persecution:

I. The delegates to the 1939 Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, in meeting assembled, on January 25, 1939, affirm their faith in the following declaration adopted at the Eighth Inter-American Conference of American States at Lima, in December, 1938:

"1. That in accordance with the fundamental principle of equality before the Law, any persecution on account of race or religion which makes it impossible for a group of human beings to live decently is contrary to the political and juridical systems of America;

"2. That the democratic conception of the State guarantees to all individuals the conditions essential for carrying on their legitimate activities with self-respect."

II. And they also affirm that stable international relations can be established only on the basis of universal recognition of these principles.

COMMITTEE ON TECHNIQUES

Inasmuch as there is imperative need for the member organizations to improve their techniques for securing more extensive support of the national program among their members, and for making their convictions carry more weight in the community and with those officially responsible for the foreign policy of the United States,

It is resolved: That the Conference authorize the Executive Committee to appoint a committee, chosen in consultation with the presidents of the member organizations, to review the techniques now being employed by the member organizations and to work out suggestions for more effective methods, such suggestions to be recommended to the member organizations as soon as possible.

Member Organizations

American Association of University Women
General Federation of Women's Clubs
National Board of the Young Women's Christian Associations
National Committee of Church Women
National Council of Jewish Women
National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs
National Home Demonstration Council
National League of Women Voters
National Woman's Christian Temperance Union
National Women's Conference of American Ethical Union
National Women's Trade Union League

NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE CAUSE AND CURE OF WAR
1622 Grand Central Terminal Building, 70 East 45th Street, New York, N. Y.

INTRODUCTION

Josephine Schain, Chairman
National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War

The front page news in your morning paper is proof of the importance of world affairs in the life of the average American today. If world events did not have importance this news would be relegated to a less significant place. As long as there is war in the world no nation is safe, no people secure. Conflict anywhere can spread rapidly and involve us along with the others. We should have learned from the World War and from the depression of 1929 that events in other parts of the globe have their repercussion here. Indeed, we have a stake in the organization of the world community on a basis of law and order.

This organization is not a simple task. It is the greatest one that has ever confronted human ingenuity. However, it can be done if we will it. The accomplishments of mankind bear witness to this. The history of civilization is the history of ever widening areas where law and order prevail. Man has learned how to live in a national society; he must now learn how to live in an international society. All nations are increasingly bound together through the developments of science, invention, commerce and transportation. A constructive foreign policy must use these for the advancement of peoples and not for their destruction.

The twentieth century demands ever broader cooperation than nations have given in the past. Our own national self-interest places emphasis on the necessity for the cooperation of the United States with others to eliminate war and to establish and maintain peace with justice. The United States has never stood aloof. A review of our foreign policy gives many striking instances of our need to work with others. The Monroe Doctrine, the Open Door Policy, the Kellogg Pact, the Nine Power Treaty, and a long series of other commitments testify to the fact that our interests are bound up with those of the rest of the world.

For fourteen years the member organizations of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War have been working together to develop a constructive program of study and action in the field of international affairs. In a democracy it is essential that the citizens as a whole understand problems relating to the foreign policy of the country. The government can proceed only in so far as the people give their consent. It is therefore imperative that they be informed and encouraged to become articulate.

Since the rapidly changing international conditions have made it difficult to secure up-to-date material, this folio is offered as a handbook to study the recommended program of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War. The "Guide to World Affairs" lists additional material so that a more detailed study can be made of each section. There should be free and full discussion before a conclusion on which to base action is reached. Accurate information and clear thinking are essential if women are to be a vital force in building a constructive foreign policy for peace.

SECTION I

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FAR EAST

During the summer of 1939, as the Sino-Japanese war entered its third year, new and significant developments were taking place in the Far Eastern situation. A glance at the headlines of American newspapers in June, July and August would tend to suggest that Japan was fighting a war against the Western democracies, rather than against China. The prolonged and bitter assault on the British position in China, particularly at Tientsin, had obviously opened a new phase in Japan's efforts to establish a "new order in East Asia." On the surface, this attack on Britain and the other Western powers might well foster the belief that Japan felt itself invincible, that the progress of its military operations in China was so favorable as to enable it to take on the additional task of clearing out the foreign enclaves lying within "occupied" territory. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The measures taken by Japan against the Western strongholds in China were measures of desperation, adopted to cope with the necessities of a situation that was turning steadily against the Tokyo war-makers.

The Military Status

At the root of Japan's difficulties lay its inability to bring the war in China to a decisive conclusion. After a two-year struggle, hostilities were clearly approaching a stalemate, i.e., a condition opening the way to victory for China and defeat for Japan. Hankow and Canton had been captured in October, 1938, but the hope of enforcing a dictated peace on the heels of these triumphs was not realized. Thereafter Japanese arms had made not one significant advance. Several additional military objectives beckoned Japan's high command. It might move (1) inland toward Sian or Ichang, (2) southward from the Yangtze River along the railway toward Canton, or (3) westward from the Canton region into Kwangsi province toward China's communication lines in the southwest. Attempts at (1) were made by forces moving from the south (the Hankow area) and from the north (Shansi province), but were repulsed. A large-scale drive for (2) achieved the minor success of occupying Nanchang, and was then brought to a dead stop by a vigorous Chinese counter-offensive. No move at all was made toward the last objective (3); in the Canton area, the Japanese forces were wholly occupied in efforts to maintain the positions already won.

But this is not all. Some of the heaviest fighting during the winter and spring of 1939 occurred in the "guerrilla" territory, especially Hopei province. In this region, large Japanese forces were attempting - and failing - to consolidate their control over territory nominally "occupied" in 1937. The firm connections which the Eighth Route Army had established with the local population enabled them to withstand successfully this first major effort to uproot them from the North China countryside. A similar story was being told in the Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow triangle, where the new Fourth Route Army under Yeh T'ing and Han Ying was duplicating the successes of the Eighth Route Army in the north. By the early summer of 1939, six divisions of Japanese troops were required to hold down this triangle - vital to the Japanese supply lines reaching into the interior from Shanghai.

On all fronts an equilibrium of military forces was developing in the spring of 1939. The frustration of the Japanese command was exhibited in the destructive bombardments of China's inland cities, carried out with an inhuman disregard of the losses inflicted on the civilian population. For a military stalemate necessarily worked to China's advantage; in the long run, it condemned Japan's conquest to futility and defeat. Large Chinese armies were under training in the interior, and the production of small arms and ammunition was steadily increasing. Growing numbers of mobile Chinese units were being put in the field against the Japanese forces scattered throughout the country. This pressure was bound to increase, and would ultimately take on the form of a counter-offensive designed to drive the Japanese troops from "occupied" areas. A dress rehearsal of such a counter-offensive actually occurred in April-May, 1939. The rapidity with which this maneuver threw the Japanese back on the defensive in several sectors was a significant omen of the future.

Japan's Dilemma

In the summer of 1937 Japan's leaders had envisaged a swift campaign in China, lasting six months at most. Two years later, after an expenditure of men and resources greater than that required by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, they were brought face to face with the realization that victory was still beyond their grasp. Approximately a million Japanese troops were still engaged in a wasting conflict spread over twelve or fifteen Chinese provinces. All chance of bringing a vast Chinese army into a single military engagement that would prove decisive had disappeared. The campaign was broken up into scores of local engagements - in many of which the Japanese were fighting to retain ground already won. The Japanese people had been promised a speedy triumph, yet after two years their armies were sinking into a morass from which it began to appear that they could not extricate themselves.

The economic cost of two years of warfare had been unexpectedly severe. All spheres of Japan's economy were being subjected to an unremitting strain. The national debt had doubled, currency inflation had begun, prices were rising, and production was no longer expanding. Japan's export trade, particularly to free exchange countries, had dropped well below the level of 1937. Three-fourths of the country's gold reserve had been shipped abroad, mainly to the United States, to cover purchases of war materials. Yet the expense of prosecuting the war in China was not declining. The same expenditure was being required to carry on a campaign that was approaching a stalemate, i.e., no end to the economic strain to which Japan was being subjected was in sight.

Early hopes that the exploitation of "occupied" regions of China would recoup the costs of the conquest had been disappointed. In North China, which had been overrun at the beginning of the war, the guerilla forces controlled most of the territory. Chinese magistrates were functioning in a majority of the county seats - and the economic resources of the area were feeding the Chinese resistance even more largely than the Japanese attack. On the currency front, the convertibility of the Chinese national dollar made it more attractive than the currencies which Japan sought to introduce. The premium thus placed

on the Chinese dollar bound the Chinese populations in Japanese-controlled areas to their national government. Japan found it impossible to establish an effective currency control - the prerequisite for a monopolistic exploitation of China's resources. The Western traders, dealing in the Chinese national currency through the foreign banks in the Concessions, partially forestalled Japan's efforts to squeeze them out of participation in China's foreign trade. In this sphere, too, Japan was unable to divert the full gains from China's foreign trade into its own coffers.

By the spring of 1939 Japan had reached an impasse. The hope of a decisive military victory was disappearing. The economic burden of the war was becoming insupportable. Indefinite continuance of the war and its cost had become a frightening spectre; even the disciplined Japanese people could not be expected to stand the strain forever. Some way to break the dilemma created by the miscalculations of Japan's military-fascist clique had to be discovered. Its leaders chose the path of an intensified assault on the position of the Western powers in China.

Japan's Attack on the West

This shift of emphasis in the Japanese campaign had begun early in 1939, with the seizure of Hainan Island (February) and occupation of the Spratley Islands (March). Two months later, the attack spread to the foreign centers along China's sea coast. The initial operations at Amoy and Shanghai were unsuccessful, mainly because the United States possessed jurisdictional rights at both places. The joint Anglo-American-French stand at Amoy and Shanghai was firm enough to give Japan pause. After a brief delay, Tokyo returned to the charge at Tientsin. The ground was deliberately chosen for this renewed assault. As the United States possessed no jurisdictional rights in the foreign Concessions at Tientsin, the chances of a joint Western stand were minimized. By singling out Britain for special attack, Japan hoped to fend off and neutralize American opposition. At the same time, it hoped to take advantage of Britain's preoccupation in Europe. To this extent, Japan and the Rome-Berlin axis showed perfect teamwork - irrespective of the existence or non-existence of a formal military alliance.

The campaign worked up against the British at Tientsin was intended to serve several distinct purposes. By fostering public sentiment at home against the Western powers, Japan's ruling forces were seeking to screen their military failure in China. The Western powers thus became the scapegoat for Japan's ignominious setback in China. The Japanese people were made to believe that China could have been easily defeated, had it not been for Western aid. These arguments contained but a modicum of truth. Western aid to China has been extremely limited - scandalously so, in view of the fact that China is fighting their battle as well as its own. The vast stocks of war materials placed at Japan's disposal by the democratic powers far outweigh their aid to China. Nevertheless, the arguments could be made to appear plausible to the Japanese people, and to this extent served to strengthen the home front of Japan's ruling bloc.

Much more far-reaching gains, however, were envisaged from the maneuver at Tientsin. If Britain could be split off from the United States, the menacing possibility of a joint Anglo-American opposition to Japan's activities could be removed. Under these conditions, it was further hoped that Britain might be induced to assist in the economic consolidation of Japan's conquests. British support of the Japanese-sponsored currency in China might turn defeat on the economic front into victory. Destruction of China's national currency would bring successful exploitation of Chinese economic resources that much closer. More even than this, however, was involved in Japan's new tactics. If Britain could assist in the destruction of Czechoslovakia, why could it not be brought to do the same in the case of China? Direct British pressure on China to meet Japan's terms could become a powerful means of "stabilizing" the Far East. Britain could threaten to close the Yunnan-Burma route, and could induce the French to block shipments on the railway from Indo-China. It might even give financial aid to Japan. These larger aims were concealed in the Japanese demands for British cooperation in establishing the "new order in East Asia."

The Current Position

In engaging on the Tientsin blockage, Japan was thus attempting a grand maneuver designed to achieve complete victory for its objectives in China. Success would, at one stroke, deliver Japan from its growing difficulties, and place it on the highroad to a full triumph. How far has this new strategy succeeded?

The Craigi-Arita "formula," by conferring virtual belligerent rights on Japan's military forces in China, constituted the first fruits of Japan's new strategy. It had salutary effects on the morale of the Japanese people, and tended to confirm the arguments of their military. Above all, it led to great hopes in Japan from the Tokyo negotiations, which were to be conducted on the basis of this "formula."

Two days after this first victory, however, Secretary Hull abruptly denounced the Japanese-American commercial treaty of 1911. As the net outcome of the recent Congressional session, this action left something to be desired. Congress adjourned without taking action to limit the huge shipments of American war materials that have been flowing to Japan. For the remainder of this year, the United States will probably continue to supply more than half of the war materials purchased abroad by Japan. Nevertheless, Secretary Hull's action had immediate effects of great significance. The Japanese people, who had been fed with statements of American "fairness" and "neutrality," learned unmistakably that the United States does not approve of the actions of their military in China. By January 26 next, all technical pretexts against severing America's partnership in Japanese aggression will have been swept away. American public opinion should then be able to force definite action, which has been delayed far too long. Finally, Secretary Hull's move is a strong invitation to Great Britain to stand its ground in the negotiations at Tokyo.

The ultimate results of these negotiations were still uncertain in the middle of August. Prime Minister Chamberlain's closing address to Parliament on August 4 had left much to be desired. Since then, the negotiations at Tokyo have resulted in further concessions to Japan. The four accused Chinese - original pretext for the blockade - will be surrendered to the Japanese authorities at Tientsin. It appears likely that Britain is also prepared to grant the Japanese military a share in the policing of the Tientsin Concession. This surrender may prove an entering wedge that will enable the Japanese to push for greater and greater control over the foreign settlements and concessions.

The major issues, however, were still unsettled in mid-August. Would Britain agree to hand over the Chinese national government's silver held in the Tientsin Concession? Would it support the Japanese-sponsored currency in North China? Above all, would the British government embark on a policy of coercing China into acceptance of Japanese terms? Will America continue to send war materials to Japan and buy Japanese goods? The answers to these questions should emerge during the next few months. They will go far to determine the fate of the Chinese people and the solution of the Far Eastern problem.

T. A. Bisson

Suggested Questions

A. Questions of Fact.

1. What underlying causes led to invasion of China?

2. How did our peace-time trade with China compare with trade with Japan?

3. What are some of the major difficulties that confront Japan today in its effort to subjugate China?

4. What aid have the Western democracies given to China?

5. What aid have the Western democracies given to Japan?

B. Questions of Opinion.

1. Should the United States withdraw from the Far East, or should it take positive action to restrain Japan?

2. What effect do you believe the termination of the 1911 Trade Treaty will have on the situation? Compare the effectiveness of this unilateral action with action supported by signatories of the Nine Power Treaty.

3. On what basis do you believe lasting peace could be made in the Orient?

Propaganda Analysis

A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze Propaganda

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War in China

JUST how much the Japanese are spending on propaganda in the United States is anybody's guess. One New York newspaperman, who used to cover Shanghai and Tokio and still keeps an eye on the Japanese propaganda mill, puts the figure at not less than $3,500,000 yearly. Another shrewd observer insists that it probably is closer to $5,000,000. Of course, both estimates are out-and-out guesswork; but they are guesswork based on fact — the fact that last year the Japanese Diet alone laid out $2,000,000 for propaganda in the U.S.A. Japanese businessmen are spending plenty, too. And since Japan is virtually totalitarian, with military, business, and government keeping in almost perfect step (and with the man in the street told what to say and do), official Japanese propaganda and the propaganda that Japanese businessmen put out are indistinguishable. This makes Japan's propaganda machine here the biggest, the most impressive, and by far the most expensive of any foreign power. Whether it gets results is another matter. Chances are that it doesn't: in fact, Henry Kinney, long-time publicity director of the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway, has said as much. Nevertheless, the Japanese keep trying; and they don't seem to care how much it costs them.

Although it may not always look that way, the Japanese want America's friendship: indeed, they need it desperately. They can't afford to have the United States clamp down on the sale of munitions and scrap iron, which is what Chinese sympathizers and Chinese propagandists are demanding (the Japanese buy 54.4 per cent of their war materials from us). Nor do they view with traditional Oriental equanimity the campaign to boycott Japanese goods, and particularly Japanese silk. Moreover, the Japanese well know that even if they win in China, even if they wipe out Chiang Kai-shek's government, they will still have tough sledding ahead. They will have to develop the war-devastated country, and that will take money. Japan hasn't got the money, but Wall Street has. And Wall Street is still in the United States.

So here is what the Japanese propagandists want: they want the United States to keep hands off the war, to buy Japanese goods, and to invest money in Manchukuo and Japanese-dominated China. They don't want the United States to build up its fleet because that will force Japan to build more ships, too, which Japan can't afford right now. They don't want the United States to revamp its foreign policy to provide for boycotting aggressor nations, as suggested (at times) by the President.

All this may not mean life or death to Japan. The Japanese insist that it doesn't. Nevertheless, it counts.

Head man in the Japanese propaganda mill is Count Aisuke Kabayama. He runs Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, the Society for International Cultural Relations, with headquarters in Tokio, and branch offices in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, and New York. Count Kabayama was in the United States recently, and with him was another Japanese nobleman, Kiyoshi Kroda. Together, Count Kabayama and Count Kroda took over the Japan Institute, made it Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai's "American correspondent," moved its offices to Rockefeller Center, where it now has an elaborate suite (10,000 square feet), elaborately furnished.

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In letters to hundreds of key educators, describing the activities of the Japan Institute, Tamon Mayeda, the present director, insists that it does not concern itself "with controversial politics or political ideology." He says that it was organized solely to furnish businessmen, publicists, journalists, and scholars with "materials concerning Japan, and especially in reference to her cultural, economic, social and civic life, and historical development." And this may very well be true — in theory. In plain fact, however, the way it works out is something like this: by making American school teachers more appreciative of Japanese culture, the Japan Institute makes them friendlier toward Japan; and it hopes, thereby, to make them more receptive to Japanese propaganda on the war in China. Quite naturally, too, whatever facts American businessmen may get from the Japan Institute about business conditions in Japan and Japanese-dominated China are not the kind of facts that would make them wary about investing money there.

A long article in the Japanese newspaper *Asahi* last summer admitted quite frankly that Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai was founded because the war in China had made Japan "keenly realize the urgent necessity of propaganda." *Asahi* said that officials in Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai's New York office (the Japan Institute) have the status of first secretaries of embassy, and that plans had been made to hire assistants for them who not only could speak English perfectly, but who knew American slang and could "wisecrack."

Paid Japanese Propagandists

All Japanese propaganda is not as subtle, as indirect as that of the Japan Institute. On the Japanese payroll today are several American press agents who talk, not blandly of Japanese culture, but of the menace of "Communism" in China. For this is the official Japanese lament: the United States doesn't understand Japan; the Japanese don't want to exploit China, they only want to stamp out "Communism" there; unselfish Japan is trying valiantly to save China from itself, and from the menace of the Soviet Union, which the Chinese are too innocent to comprehend; Japan is fighting Chiang Kai-shek because it loves the Chinese people.

Put thus, Japan's propaganda may sound ridiculous; but the Japanese propagandists, themselves, have so far been unable to state it more convincingly. The last Gallup poll showed that exactly 1 per cent of the American people were in sympathy with Japan, while 59 per cent were in sympathy with China. (The other 40 per cent had no opinion.) That doesn't stop the Japanese, however. On the contrary, it has made them redouble their efforts. Here are some of the men they are now employing:

Frederick J. Moore, Washington, D. C., who gets $500 monthly for advising the Japanese Embassy on public relations, and 10,000 yen annually from the South Manchuria Railway;

Wendell P. Colton, of New York, agent for the Japanese Tourist Bureau, most prolific of the Japanese propagandists;

Frederick V. Williams, of San Francisco, who lectures to promote good will for Japan (compensation, $300 monthly);

Herbert S. Houston, public relations counsel for the South Manchuria Railway ($6,000 annually);

Robert A. Wright, of Elmhurst, N. J., press agent for the Japanese Consulate-General in New York, at $200 per month;

Yaneo Aketa, of New York City, another press agent for the South Manchuria Railway, who receives $5,400 per year;

Helmut L. Ripperger, propagandist for Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai;

Vincent Paul Walsh, of New York, who is employed by the Japanese Consulate-General;

Dwight E. Haven, of Detroit, who is employed by the Japanese *Times* and the Japanese Trade Service Bureau;

Shojo Osato, press agent for the Japanese Government Railways.

These are only some of the most important of the paid Japanese propagandists in the United States, as listed by the State Department. There are others — small fry — like Dr. Alexander Cairns, of Bloomfield, N. J., who lectures on Japan, at $25 per lecture; and Franklin H. Chino, who combines his propaganda activities with law work for the Japanese Consulate in Chicago for only $20 per month. And there are still others, who, though not exactly on the Japanese payroll, are nevertheless getting money from Japan.

Take Ralph Townsend, for example. Mr. Townsend publishes his writings himself; and he insists that he isn't getting any money from Japan for them. Patriotism, not money is his inspiration, he says, pointing out that his name

can not be found on the official State Department list of foreign propagandists.

This is true. Actually, the Japanese aren't paying Mr. Townsend to write the pamphlets, and they aren't giving him money to publish them. However, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco buys the pamphlets and sends out thousands of them.

Another Japanese Propagandist

Arthur Donald Bate also used to insist that he wasn't connected with the Japanese propaganda machine; he was just lecturing on his own, under the auspices of Program Associates, of Utica, N. Y., before service clubs, women's clubs, normal schools, and similar groups. He said that he wasn't talking in behalf of Japan but was "only preaching withdrawal of American interests from China and 100 per cent Americanism." It turned out that he, too, was in the employ of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce.

The International Silk Guild is still not registered with the State Department, although it receives much of its money from Japan. Its largest contributor is the Central Raw Silk Association of Japan, which gave it $50,000 in 1933, and $250,000 more in 1934. On April 13, 1936, *Women's Wear Daily* of New York, reported from Yokohama that "Paulino Gerli [president of the International Silk Guild] sailed for home Friday and as a result of his efforts here a silk promotion campaign fund of 2,500,000 yen will probably be obtainable in Japan."

Several months ago, the New York *Journal of Commerce* issued an illustrated 100-page supplement on prospects for American trade with Manchukuo. The *Journal of Commerce* said that prospects for American trade were good, and getting better. Whether or not the State Department recognizes Manchukuo, said the *Journal of Commerce,* American business should.

One might not be justified in calling this supplement paid Japanese propaganda; still, the fact remains that 25 of its 100 pages were devoted to advertising, bought and paid for by Japanese businessmen. And it seems only reasonable to assume that before they bought the advertising the Japanese were fairly certain that whatever the *Journal of Commerce* said about Manchukuo would be favorable to Japan — else, why throw good money away? It should also be noted that Alexander R. Sharton, publisher of the *Journal of Commerce,* was in Japan and Manchukuo recently, where he was entertained by Japanese officials; and it was in Japan that he announced his decision to publish the supplement.

Incidentally, the Japanese have been entertaining Americans in Japan and Japanese-dominated China quite liberally, of late, paying their railroad fare and hotel bills, and wining and dining them. For example, several American school teachers were conducted through Japan and Manchukuo last summer as guests of the Culture Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office. The Minister of Railways gave an elaborate reception for them, and presented each with an embroidered Japanese kimono. After being photographed in these kimonos, the school teachers entertained the Minister of Railways with Japanese folk dances, which they had learned during their stay in the Land of the Rising Sun.

On their return to America, they sat down and wrote stories for their home-town papers on their experiences in Japan — on the hospitality of the Japanese people, the efficiency of the Japanese Government.

Another free junket was held last October, this one by the Japanese Army, for newspapermen and lecturers. The party was entertained first at the Broadway Mansions, in Shanghai, then it went out to visit the Japanese battle lines to see what the Japanese medical corps was doing for the Chinese. Visits to schools and hospitals followed, interspersed with parties and banquets.

Among the guests of the Japanese was Paul Dorsey, photographer on leave from *Time, Life,* and *Fortune* magazines. Some of the pictures that Mr. Dorsey took, showing the human side of the Japanese Army, have already been run in *Life.*

What the Chinese Do

The Chinese spend little to counteract the Japanese propaganda, in part because they have little to spend, in part because they don't need to spend much. On the whole, American people already sympathize with the Chinese people: China is the underdog in this war; and the American people usually favor the underdog. Moreover, the war is being fought on Chinese soil: Chinese towns have been destroyed, Chinese non-combatants have died, and the story of their suffering has touched American heart-

strings. Coupled with our traditional friendship and sympathy for China, with the interest that American church groups have always taken in China, and with Mme. Chiang Kai-shek's popularity in religious organizations and secular women's colleges, this has been enough to make the American people strongly pro-Chinese without being subjected to planned Chinese propaganda.

There has been *some* planned Chinese propaganda, of course. For several months, Carl Byoir and Associates, Inc. was retained by the Chinese Government to raise money to relieve the suffering of non-combatants. Earl H. Leaf, until recently with the United Press in China, is still on the Chinese payroll, and so, too, is Bruno Schwartz, who runs Trans-Pacific News Service. (The Japanese propagandists accuse him of sending out fake atrocity pictures, but he denies it.) For the most part, however, Chinese propaganda has been unpaid, conducted by Americans who feel strongly about the war. Church groups and vacationing missionaries have been particularly active; radical organizations, and especially those supported by the Communist Party, have also been active. Many of the pro-China groups have formed an organization called the China Aid Information Exchange to make their work more effective, and they publish a news bulletin, whose circulation is limited, but which nevertheless gets around.

A similar propaganda bulletin, published by Chinese sympathizers, is the China Information Service, of Washington, D. C.

News from China

One long-run difficulty which the Chinese propagandists are up against is the fact that practically every bit of news about the war must go through Japanese hands. The Japanese now control all the large coastal towns from which news is cabled or wirelessed to America: their censors blue-pencil copy freely. In addition, the Japanese control most of the sources of news. All the big Far Eastern news bureaus are located in towns now dominated by the Japanese, and most of the dispatches are, therefore, based upon Japanese Army communiqués. Japanese handouts, and stories which Domei, the official Japanese news agency, sends out, free of charge.

There is still another factor that serves, occasionally, to color the news: both the Associated Press and the United Press have lucrative contracts with Domei. On several occasions they have been forced to soften their dispatches to keep Domei from cancelling the contracts.

Still, the news does get out. American men-of-war in Far Eastern waters often will send dispatches, which Japanese censors have killed, over their short-wave radios. So, too, will American diplomats. Mail copy is uncensored, and background stories about the war can always be sent by mail. The Phillipine Islands aren't too far away, so that stories can be airmailed to Manila and wirelessed to San Francisco while they are still news.

One story that was stopped by the censor recently but still got to America came from the typewriter of Reginald Sweetland, of the Chicago *Daily News*. It was an obituary, the story of the suicide of Major General Tanehide Furujo, who had been chief Japanese censor. His successor refused to send it. Mr. Sweetland got it through anyway – by mail. "It is not often," he said, "that a correspondent has the opportunity of writing the obituary of a censor."

This was not Mr. Sweetland's first brush with the Japanese censor. Shortly before, the correspondent had complained to his paper that in Manchukuo even his incoming mail was read. In Manchukuo, he wrote, only the Japanese are permitted to give out information; "but try and get any information from them." Said Mr. Sweetland: "Propaganda, yes; information, distinctly no."

Correspondence

The Institute has received the following letter:

I again must protest that I consider it an insult to whatever intelligence I may have (for I cannot identify the quantity or quality or actuality of my intelligence by any test which the scientist would accept), to allow the further use of your emotion-word "intelligent" in your slogan. Each person who reads that, except of course the person who has what you MAY think of as intelligence, will consider *himself* to be intelligent, which I am sure is not your intention. Or, scratch my head, can you be resorting to a little propaganda yourself, to sell your paper?

Yours respectfully (except as above),

EDWARD HANNES

Propaganda Analysis Worksheet

Is the history of the growth of today's problem in the Far East a hodgepodge in the minds of your study group? Does your group's knowledge of America's past and present relations with China and Japan consist of scattered impressions they have gathered about this particular crisis, the war in China?

If such conditions exist in the classroom or in the study group the wisest course for the group leader to take may be for him to select incidents from history that will show how today's problem in the Far East developed. In such an approach to the study of propagandas flowing from the war in China, the wise group leader will try to keep the political, social, and economic forces at work in China and in Japan before the student.

At times in the study of Chinese and Japanese propagandas in America, the group may show need for further work in drawing together the scattered impressions he has acquired about the development of this particular crisis in China.

Suggestions for classroom and adult group study of the Far Eastern conflict and its propagandas follow. They should be adapted to the specific interests and needs of the group. In general, all of the discussion and work suggestions outlined are designed to equip young people and adults with background knowledge and pertinent information concerning economic, social, and political problems in China and in Japan, from which today's propagandas flow.

I. Group Work Project

America and the Far East

Any change in foreign policy, such as that suggested by the President when he speaks of boycotting aggressor nations, must have its basis partly in commercial interest, partly in political interest, partly in military interest, and partly in sentiment. Several questions arise: *One,* what is the extent of America's commercial interest in the Far East? *Two,* does Japanese aggression in China menace these interests? *Three,* would a Japanese victory in China menace the security of the United States or any of its possessions? *Four,* could America prevent such a victory through economic measures, such as a boycott of Japanese goods? *Five,* would such economic measures involve the United States in a military conflict with Japan?

1. Follow careful study of the reading references listed below with thorough-going group discussion of the foregoing questions.

   Farley, Miriam S., *America's Stake in the Far East,* American Council of The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1937.

   American Council of The Institute of Pacific Relations, *Far Eastern Survey,* a fortnightly publication dealing with many phases of the Sino-Japanese conflict and with such questions as that of America's trade relations with the Far East.

2. In order to understand the war in the Far East we must understand the social and military position of the Japanese government and the history of its relations with China. Consider the main theses of the following suggested references, reading each critically.

   Snow, Edgar, *Far Eastern Front,* Harrison Smith, New York. Tells about Japanese aggression. Frequently used for citation by Chinese sympathizers.

   Abend, Hallet, *Tortured China,* Ives Washburn, New York. Describes the civil wars that have been raging in China for years. Frequently cited by Japanese sympathizers.

   Hindmarsh, Albert E., *The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy,* Harvard University Press, 1937. Reference suggested by Japanese propagandists.

   Bisson, T. A., *Japan in China,* Macmillan, 1938. Authoritative, up-to-date discussion of the question.

II. Group Discussion and Reading

The Cry of 'Communism'

The Japanese assert that in fighting the Chinese government they are really fighting communism. They point out that Chiang Kai-shek's government is now supported by the Communist Party. Chinese sympathizers retort that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has long been an enemy of communism, that he fought communism for years. They say that he now cooperates with the communists only because he needs their assistance to drive out the Japanese. They point out that he used the communists once before, accepting money and munitions

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from them in the early 20's while he was fighting to gain supremacy in China, and they say that as soon as he gained supremacy he turned on his communist supporters and endeavored to wipe them out.

Snow, Edgar, *Red Star Over China,* Random House, New York. For the most authoritative description of the Chinese communists and their relations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Far Eastern Affairs Pamphlets, "Red Cloud Over China," August, 1938, 447 Sutter St., San Francisco, California. For the Japanese side of the question.

III. A Group Study Project

Forces Which Mold Public Opinion

Most Americans know the tabulations of public opinion made in nation-wide polls such as those of the Institute of Public Opinion, but little attention is given to *why* people believe and vote as they do on today's social, political, and economic issues. We know, for example, that in the present Far Eastern crisis most Americans are sympathetic with China. The question is, *why?*

Possibly the examination of certain specific factors which have linked the American people more closely in thought and feeling with the Chinese than with the Japanese will be revealing of some of the forces at work in the shaping of public opinion in the United States. In group discussion let us consider some of the possible factors, stated in the form of assumptions:

1. *"Americans are sympathetic to the underdog."* Effective war propaganda appeals in the past: during the Civil War it was "Uncle Tom"; during the Mexican war it was the alleged Mexican oppression of the Texans; during the Spanish-American war, Cuba "was under the heel of the Spanish oppressor"; during the World War it was "bleeding Belgium."
2. *"The activities of foreign missions conducted by many American churches in China and the interest of many American denominational colleges in the education of Chinese account for some of the United States' strong ties to China."* Study the activities of foreign missions in China. Get statistics of their schools, churches, hospitals. Study the life of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. She was graduated from Wellesley College. She herself is a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church. She converted Chiang Kai-shek to Methodism. Naturally, they have been working closely with American missionaries in China. Partly for these reasons many of our American church groups have strong emotional ties with China's armies.
3. *"America's 'Open Door' foreign policy in the Far East has created strong ties of friendship with China."* The United States has opposed territorial aggression in China since 1899. As part of this policy of friendship towards China, the United States following the Boxer Rebellion set aside the indemnity that it received to provide for the education of Chinese students in the United States.

Additional Reading Reference: Lasker, Bruno, and others, *Propaganda from China and Japan; A Case Study in Propaganda Analysis,* Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1938. Analysis of the purposeful propaganda which reached this country between July and December, 1937.

IV. Newspaper Study Project

In Your Own Community

Keep records of stories in your newspapers that come from China regarding the war: first, those that come directly from towns and cities dominated by the Chinese (see newspaper maps); second, those that come from cities dominated by the Japanese.

1. See how many stories, coming from Japanese sources, would be of the kind that would make the Japanese "lose face" with Americans.

On the other hand, see how many stories report Japanese victories and, even more important, dissension within the Chinese ranks.

2. Do the same with newspaper stories which come to you from Chinese sources.

THE NEW OUTLOOK IN ASIA

Conclusion of the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia had the immediate effect of weakening, if not breaking, all bonds between Japan and Germany. The anti-Comintern pact lost its meaning, and Japan was left without an important diplomatic or military ally, save possibly Italy which is not strong in the Far East.

Japan was also left more exposed to Russian power in the north. Apprehension on this score apparently coincided with a desire on the part of Soviet leaders to free their attention, at least for a time, for questions on their own western frontiers. It is still too early to appraise the significance of the Russo-Japanese border truce which followed. Certainly it is premature to assume, as some commentators did, that this presaged a far-reaching pact between Russia and Japan. To date (September 30), there is little evidence to indicate that Japan's fears vis-a-vis Russia have been allayed or that Russian help to China is to be suspended. While the further objectives of Russian policy remain enigmatic to most of the outside world, it is difficult to imagine that the Soviets could see any advantage in completely reversing their Far East policies and supporting Japanese expansion in China. Whether in time they will wish to divert Japanese attention to British interests in Asia is another question. For the present, it may be assumed that the Russo-German pact has isolated and weakened Japan diplomatically.

The outbreak of war in Europe has also isolated Japan from the benefits of European supplies and markets, increasing her dependence upon the United States. This is partly offset by the fact that China is also deprived of supplies from Western Europe and that Britain and France are at a greater disadvantage in any effort to obstruct the "New Order" in East Asia.

The effects of these changes upon Japanese policy are not yet fully apparent. Abandonment of the anti-Comintern alignment is reflected in the change of cabinet, and the declaration of Japanese neutrality in Europe. Premier Abe and his new cabinet, under the watchful eyes of the high army command, will undertake the further reorientation of Japan's foreign policy.

Two new powerful incentives toward some conclusion of the war in China now exist: desire to be prepared against a strategically stronger Russia, and desire to recoup economic losses through profits on European war-time trade. The appointment of General Hata as War Minister suggests a determination to intensify the campaign, particularly in Central China where General Hata has been in command. A quick victory, however, seems no more probable than at the outset of the war.

With the realization that an American embargo upon war trade with Japan would seriously cripple the China campaign, an active conciliatory policy towards the United States appears to be taking shape. Blandishments will follow. There is no reason to believe, however, that these shifts in diplomacy are more than opportunistic or to suppose that there is any fundamental change in the attempt to bring about the "New Order" in Asia with ultimate exclusion of Western (including American) interests and influences.

The Japanese Navy is quick to recognize, of course, the increased exposure of British and French interests in China as well as throughout their entire Asiatic empires. Removal of the tiny British and French defense forces in China has already been "requested." It seems likely that if and when opportunity permits (perhaps later in the European war), there will be further pressure - the chief deterrent to this being the fear of further alienating American sympathies.

Some apprehension has been expressed lest Britain make a "deal" with Japan involving complete cessation of aid to China, recognition of Japanese special influence there, and even positive aid to Japan in return for guaranties against attack upon Hongkong, Malaysis (including Singapore), the East Indies and Australasia. Britain's position in the Far East, however, may not be as weak as at first appears. Whether she is forced to yield ultimately to Japanese pressure probably depends upon three main factors. If Italy remains neutral in Europe, the German blockage may not require the full British and French fleets, in which case units of these fleets may be available for defense purposes in the far East. So long as Russia remains neutral, the Japanese may hesitate to undertake new commitments which would further lessen their potential strength against Russia. The degree of continued firmness in American policy will remain necessarily a major factor in Japanese calculations, especially in connection with any moves which might, directly or indirectly, further threaten American interests.

Probably no effect of the European war is more significant for the Far East than the increased importance which it gives to American influence in the Pacific. Until now, the dilemma of American Far Eastern policy continues. While public sentiment and diplomatic pronouncements are in thorough opposition to Japan's unprovoked attack upon China, our economic influence (which really counts in war) is very preponderantly on the side of Japan. It is now quite generally known that in 1937, Japan secured 54%; and in 1938, 56%, of her imports of essential war supplies from the United States, and that we afforded her greatest external market through which these purchases were financed.

The relative importance of the United States as Japan's chief armorer is greatly increased as a result of the European war. The announced transfer of a $10,000,000 machinery order from Germany to the United States is only one indication of an inevitable trend. For the obtaining of sinews of war which she cannot possibly produce in adequate quantity herself, Japan can no longer look to the British Empire, France or Germany. To a much greater degree even than before, whe will be dependent upon the United States.

More than ever, therefore, the United States holds the key to the Far Eastern situation and responsibility for its own part in that situation. The seriousness of this responsibility is apparent when it is realized that freedom or feudal servitude for one-fifth of the human race hinges upon the grim conflict now raging in China, and that the outcome of this struggle will determine whether there shall rise across the Pacific a peaceful, independent, friendly China or a vast, militaristic Japanese empire.

American Policy in the Far East

Some other formula than that embodied in the proposed revision of our neutrality law must be employed if our decisive support of Japan is to be ended. For this law, like basic international law, tends actually to favor the sea powers. This applies to Japan even more than to Great Britain and France. For the Pacific is wide open to Japanese commerce, with no submarines to interfere. Her large merchant marine can convey extensive war supplies from America while her naval forces can block China's direct trade with us.

If application of the present or the revised neutrality law will not serve the purpose, then what formula can be employed? Two approaches, both within the framework of recognized international law, are implicit in bills already introduced by Senators Pittman and Schwellenbach, and by Congressmen Eaton, Wallgren, Izac, Coffee and Voorhis.

The first provides for the protection and preservation of our rights under the Nine-Power Treaty. This treaty binds all signatories to maintain the "Open Door" principle of equal opportunity in their trade with China. Japan has not only violated this treaty by forcibly disrupting our China trade and that of other nations, imposing innumerable restrictions that have been fully enumerated by Secretary Hull; there are also on record hundreds of specific cases wherein American property has been deliberately confiscated or destroyed, or American citizens have been insulted or their lives endangered. We are not obligated under international law to continue exporting supplies for use in violation of our treaty rights.

The second approach also develops out of the Nine-Power Treaty, which lays upon us a specific obligation to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity, and to use our positive influence for the preservation of this principle. Our support to Japan's invasion of China is contrary to the obligations which we assumed under this treaty. For instead of using our influence to help preserve China's sovereignty and independence, we are actually aiding and abetting in their violation. We are, again, justified in refusing to export materials for use in violating the sovereignty of a nation whose sovereignty we are pledged to respect.

Neither approach is based on the legal taking of sides in the conflict. In the one case, we would move to preserve and protect our own treaty rights; in the other, we would regulate our own conduct in conformity with our treaty obligations.

On January 26th the abrogation of the 1911 Treaty with Japan will take effect. The decks will then be cleared for whatever action the American people may wish to take.

October 4, 1939. Harry B. Price

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Recent material on the Far East to be secured from

AMERICAN COUNCIL INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
129 East 52nd St., New York, N.Y. (all prices f.o.b. New York)

AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST by Miriam S. Farley. What is it? An up-to-date clear analysis of the present American stake in the Far East. Pamphlet, 10 cents.

BRITISH AND AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE FAR EAST by William W. Lockwood, Jr. What are the present relations of these two great Western powers in the Far East? What is their future likely to be? A timely and significant brief analysis. Pamphlet, 10 cents.

AMERICAN FAR EASTERN POLICY AND THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, Studies of the Pacific No. 1, edited by Miriam S. Farley. A report of the findings of seven discussion conferences held throughout the United States, under the auspices of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, March to May, 1938. Published October 15, Paper, 50 cents.

AMERICA AND THE PACIFIC, Pacific House Bibliography No. 3, 15 cents. Economic and political problems in Pacific area.

ABSTRACTS FROM CHINESE AND JAPANESE PERIODICALS, translated and compiled by the Research Staff of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1938. 50 pp. 15 cents. To supply Western readers with an insight into various Japanese and Chinese points of view on current economic and political problems during the period of crisis.

NOTE: For background material and contemporary interpretation of the Far Eastern situation, it is recommended that the following periodicals be regularly examined:

AMERASIA (125 East 52nd St., New York, subscription - $2.50), a monthly containing timely and vigorous articles by first-hand observers and competent students of the Far East.

ASIA (40 East 49th St., New York, subscription - $4.00), a monthly which, in addition to feature material, provides significant analyses of contemporary change.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS (129 East 52nd St., New York, subscription - $2.00), a scholarly quarterly published by the Institute of Pacific Relations; contains book reviews.

SECTION II

CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

Pattern of Aggression -- Pattern of Resistance

For seven years a deepening shadow has moved across the world, a slowly growing, intensifying fear has held ever greater numbers of its peoples. The events of those years are vastly multiple, increasingly swift, kaleidoscopic, but through them there have run certain patterns that are by now fairly clearly traceable. To understand them is at least to see paths in the forest, and perhaps to throw a certain light ahead. Chief among them, dominant and so far victorious, is the Pattern of Aggression.

Its major movements are fairly well known; it can only be glimpsed swiftly here: In 1931 agression, force as conqueror, broke sharply across the carefully planned post-war Pattern of Cooperation, and the international structure, or the statesmen in whose hands its fate rested, could not withstand the strain. At first it seemed to Europe a minor thing -- the Orient was quite different from the Continent of Europe; "only Manchuria" went over by force to a conqueror. But by that event it was demonstrated that the Pact of Paris could be violated with impunity and material gain, that the "public opinion of the world" realistically mattered little, that the Covenant pledges, on which the sense of collective security of Europe and beyond it rested, did not hold in critical practice. The Ethiopian conquest was Experiment 2, and evidence became cumulative. Still the moves of force were outside Europe. It was yellow men and black men who were conquered. It was possible to say, with that Fallacy of Division which has cost so dearly, "What is Ethiopia to me?" March 12, 1938 -- and Austria was taken.

The next three days in Europe were like something apart. In Jugoslovia, in Hungary, along the Baltic, there was fear -- and more, there was a sense of waiting. Just across the Austrian border in Slovenia one heard: "But the occupation cannot stand. This is what the treaties were for...This is what the League was for...Britain and France have pledged..." Three days, and nothing happened save the swift consolidation of gains. More than the independence of Austria had gone; with it the last of the carefully built, post-war sense of security, of the hope, toward the end desperately held, that force could not work its will against the weaker. That was Hitler's major victory.

The little states knew fully its implications. But others sought comfort--after all there was the race theory and the Austrians were related to the Germans; there were the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles to be undone.[1]

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1. Without underestimating the wrongs of the Treaty of Versailles, it is to be clearly realized that in only one case of aggression has Germany taken territory lost by her following the World War. For the fact that the far-reaching plan of domination and control which is being attempted now preceded that treaty, see John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Forgotten Peace (New York, William Morrow & Co. 1939) dealing with the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Berlin which Germany imposed upon a defeated Russia in March and August, 1918. The territorial pattern forced for the brief period when Germany thought herself victor, and the one sought now, are strikingly and thought-provokingly similar.

They gave, to some, excuse and comfort again in September at Munich. Then March, 1939: swiftly Czechoslovakia was crushed without the softening of rationalizations, with only the bitterly ironic half camouflage of the word "protectorate." No shade of race theory or rectified injustice there. Straight aggression had shown its uncovered face. Add the Memel Territory and Albania...It is, swiftly, the Pattern of Aggression story to the present, with Danzig, Jugoslav, Mediterranean and other chapters in the writing -- unless a Pattern of Resistance can develop, hold.

The methods of the Pattern of Aggression have now emerged and it is vital that they be clearly realized: "Blackmail or War" is the formula, "Yield what I demand or I will plunge you into war." It is strange and bitter that the horror of war has been the instrument of conquest probably far greater than war would have given, with suffering for some more heavily tragic than it would have brought, while each instance of yielding has actually brought the specter of war itself nearer. Objective analysis shows that an initial phase in each successive crisis is the "white war of nerves" which, unnamed, preceded Munich and in which Europe -- and the world -- again stand in a tensely waiting August-September 1939 period. It is a period of rumors, of threats and increased demands, of waiting on the part of the aggressor for the expected, and counted on, move of conciliation, adjustment, appeasement. This "war of nerves" is a powerful weapon against countries with a free press. Then the strange formula that demands negatives for positives, that one which says "Give me territories, peoples, economic concessions,....and I will refrain from doing this threatened thing against you; I will (for the moment) turn my guns away." It is, unless a counter force is built or there is a break within the ruthlessly held ranks of the aggressor, an infinitely repeatable procedure, slowly, steadily approaching the conciliators and gathering strength along the way. One cannot understand or appraise the Europe of today in its psychology and its action until this procedure, these facts are clearly seen.

There is another series of facts as difficult and as necessary to face: The history of Europe in the nineteen months from March, 1938, to September, 1939, has indelibly recorded that each instance of appeasement, of giving reality for promise under threat, has been followed by increasingly flagrant attack and demand. Current history in the Orient repeats the formula with deadly monotony. This by now must probably be realized and is suggested here for analysis and discussion: that adjustment and conference and arbitration -- belonging so finely to the post-war Pattern of Cooperation, of which the League of Nations and the World Court are the structural elements and to which, greatly strengthened, the world can and must return after the march of force has been halted -- presuppose bilaterial willingness to give and take and require good faith on both sides. One-sided cooperation is a contradiction in terms. Under the Pattern of Aggression there has been, and is, one side set plan of conquests,[2] a philosophy glorifying force and bound up

2. On the walls of the major schools of Germany there have hung for at least sixteen months two maps, one showing territorial intent, the other racial claims. Both include Danzig, the Corridor, a large share of Switzerland,

with the concept that to concede is weakness, and the elevation of the lie that serves the will of the all-powerful State to the status of a guiding principle. A part of the tragic time-lag, of which Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania have already been the victims has been due to the slowness of the realization that the piecemeal use of the conciliation phase of the Pattern of Cooperation without the sanctions phase is basically and fatally ineffective in meeting aggression.

Slowly, unwillingly in the main, forced by successive impacts, the non-axis states have reached the realization that a Pattern of Resistance[3] must be built, and have set about the difficult task of construction. The tautness in the present is due to the precarious balance between the two patterns; the outcome is as critically significant in the long run to America as to Europe. Nor (and this cannot be forgotten though the focus of these pages is on Europe) can America escape her destiny of deeply influencing that outcome, for both inaction and action are effective on one side or the other.

Again certain facts must be brought into alignment for an understanding of the potentialities and problems of the resistance pattern: initially, that there are many states which cannot, by the very force of geographic and economic situation, become part of a pre-arranged resistance. The stand of the Baltic States and Finland, for example, is bound up in the statement of the slight, scholarly president of little Lithuania at the time of his reelection ten months ago: "We little states must be very careful." It is held in the pronouncement by a foreign minister of a larger state: "The Baltic is our life. We have no choice but to be friends with the power that controls it." The German occupation of the port of Memel had significance far beyond its territorial scope, the denouncing of the naval pact with Great Britain and the announcing of submarines in the Baltic in fact, and necessarily, affected the

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part of Denmark, Alsace-Lorraine and a part of Jugoslavia, as well as the areas already taken, with the exception of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. The so-called Rosenberg map, held secret until a few years ago when it became known in London and it was ridiculed as a mad dream, goes much further, including all Northern Europe as the North Germanic Federation and the Baltic Dominion, then reaching down the map to the Black Sea by way of the South Germanic Section -- the territory of Czechoslovakia and Hungary -- the Ukrainian Dominion, and the Balkanic Protectorate, made up of the already economically controlled territories of Jugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria. See Query (London) August, 1938, p. 9

3. For clear understanding it must be noted that the post-war Pattern of Cooperation was only in small part one of resistance to aggression. It was born in hope and belief that the period of aggression was over; it charted well a cooperative way with minor stress on dealing with the law-breaker, should such a one arise. It was that resistance phase, sanctions, that broke under pressure. With it went security and the vitality of the whole structure was jeopardized. The rebuilding of the cooperative way now lies on the other side of the halting of aggression.

foreign policies of the Baltic States. When the economic life line is held there cannot be the "provocation" of commitment, or what might be claimed to be commitment, against the State holding that life-and-death power, any more than there can be announcement of fear of that State.

In any computation it must be realized, too, that the power of the conqueror reaches at least one country beyond military occupation. This has proved true in penetration for espionago, in press control, in pressure for anti-Jewish measures, as well as in economic stranglehold. A single instance must suffice as illustration: Austria was taken and within days Jugoslavia was drawn into a deeper economic tutelage. A government official explained by analogy: Suppose you had a store and many possible customers. Some would pay you well, some practically nothing. But one had the guns turned on you and that one had just taken by force the store next door with all that was in it. With whom would you trade?... It is a key to general understanding.

If a tentative but suggestive charting could be made for analysis and testing, the category of those states that must seek, at times with more desperation than hope, to maintain the narrow middle course of making alliances with no Great Powers and enemies of none, would include:

The traditional neutrals: Norway, Sweden, Holland, Denmark -- a part of the territory of the latter marked for taking on the German map -- and Switzerland, two-thirds of which is claimed for the Greater Germany on the official race map.

Those countries bound by geographic position and potential economic pressures to a policy of caution and non-antagonizing: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, already partitioned and under the shadow of the constant threat of occupation.

Those in economic tutelage and direct military encirclement or semi-encirclement by axis Powers, already yielding everything but sovereignty, resisting occasionally as shifting circumstances permit: Jugoslavia and Rumania.

Hungary, forced and purchased, has gone so far under control that it now stands for all practical purposes in the axis grouping; Bulgaria, by inclination and the lure of territorial promises, can probably be counted in the same category. Franco's Spain, in debt for long services rendered, economically held between the two axis partners, itself becoming a fascist, corporative state, is in puppet status.

All facts converge to make it clear that a Pattern of Resistance in Europe depends basically on Great Britain, France -- and Soviet Russia. Alliance is close and clear between the first two; assistance, if their sovereignty is threatened and if they ask help, is pledged in relation to Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey. The possibility that the Chamberlain

government in the face of a "white war of nerves," would bring heavy pressure on a threatened state to yield without resistance is not ruled out and is unquestionably a factor giving instability. The haunting fear of "another Munich" on the one side, and the gambler's expectation of it on the other, weigh in the balance. But Russia is the major problem. Russia facing two fronts; Russia which stood practically alone for collective resistance within the League pattern in September, 1938;[4] Russia ignored and pushed back at Munich. Russia the realist, determined to be perfectly sure that all loopholes to appeasement are closed before she commits herself; Russia disliked and distrusted by the statesmen who entice her, but whose known will to throw her strength on the side of resistance would go far to check without war. Russia whose economic life complements that of Germany to a striking degree and who could, if pushed too far, throw her strength to the German side to determine the balance in Europe and beyond it. There is the basic European situation and problem in the Pattern of Resistance quest.

And Poland taken as a testing ground of strength -- the threatener now threatened, the country that so recently joined with Germany in the initial dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. There is heavy irony in it. And yet it is evident that far more than Danzig, more than Poland stand in the balance. If after the clear demonstration of what happens following the handing over of a part of a country under threat and paper promise, if after the tragic lesson for which Czechoslovakia was the sacrifice, the Pattern of Aggression can again successfully repeat its "Blackmail or War," positives-for-withdrawn-threats formula, then the walls so far rebuilt will crumble and the probability of a cooperative structure strong enough to resist will be slight indeed.

Such are, too briefly sketched, the realistic patterns of the contemporary international scene. They have been analyzed for Europe; they reach beyond it. Around them new facts will gather to be evaluated and integrated, for understanding of Europe, with all its interrelated significance for life and security in the United States, is a continuingly earned increment. Problems must be worked through. That resistance would necessarily mean war all the events of these March of Force months tend to deny; that continuing capitulation does mean progressive subjugation and exploitation of peoples, with the specter of war dominating and distorting life and always just a little ahead, those same months make inescapably clear.

Before too long, surely, resistance must recognize and utilize its economic power. It can be used to halt and to prevent aggression. That is known, clearly verifiable, unpracticed. From the vantage point of an Olympian height could there be anything as strange and ironic as Great Britain selling munitions and war materials to a Germany constantly threatening to bomb London - unless it should be the United States protesting diplomatically the destruction of

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4. The Records of the 19th Assembly of the League of Nations are well worth study, both for Russia's stand, climaxed in the final speech of Litvinov, and for that of the neutrals.

American property and lives by Japanese planes and ships for which abundant fuel weekly leaves her shores, or a nation heavily sympathizing with the Chinese while supplying the cotton and scrapiron used for their destruction? That embargoes would mean sacrifice is true. Careful analysis seems to indicate that they require in fact, in the face of the present situation, only a clear weighing of sacrifices and the choice of the lesser. In this critically balanced, interrelated world economic pressure against an aggressor is a matter of long-run self-protection. When the Pattern of Resistance comes to include and utilize that fact, it will be immeasurably strengthened.

August 15, 1939 Gladys Murphy Graham

PROBLEMS FOR THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION

1. A map that keeps pace with events is a minimum requirement for a study of Europe in the present period.

   Get or make a large outline map of Europe. Fill in with red the Axis Powers; cross-hatch in red the territories taken by them, with the date of each occupation.

   Discuss the strategy and cause of each move. Did each one influence and prepare the way for the next? What important raw materials were added by each conquest? What major problems were taken over in each case?

   The map should be on hand for constant reference.

2. Test suggested plans for international realignment, such as Clarence Streit's Union Now, in relation to the possibility or impossibility of freedom of action on the part of the various countries of Europe, for example, the traditional neutrals, the states that are economically dependent, etc. Test international cooperation plans in relation to the requirement of an effective Pattern of Resistance. Could Russia be left out of such plans?

3. The discussion of the problem of security has been centered on Europe but with the underlying realization that the United States will, whatever stand is taken, influence and be deeply influenced. Test this by the repercussions in America of the various territorial changes in Europe; of the events in the Orient. Exactly what effect will American foreign policy, particularly neutrality policy, have on the building and the strength of the European Pattern of Resistance to further aggression? What countries are helped by the present neutrality law? By the policy of isolation? What countries would be helped by the changes in the neutrality law suggested by Secretary Hull in July, 1939? What policy serves the actual "best interests" of the United States?

CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

Pattern of Aggression -- Pattern of Resistance

August 15 -- October 15 phase

History and international tragedy have moved swiftly since August 15, when the first section of this continuing study was closed. A major Power has passed into the active Aggression column; war has been declared; a country has been attacked, conquered, partitioned. But throughout the Pattern of Aggression - Pattern of Resistance relationship has continued the dominant one. In late August Russia was the principal question mark; her support was the great hope on the Resistance side of the uneasy balance. To a world unprepared for such a complete reversal of all that had been said and held, the Russian turn to Germany, with all its significance, came in four stages marked by the German-Soviet trade agreement (August 19); the non-aggression pact (August 21); the far-reaching protocols fixing the frontiers of partitioned Poland (September 29); the swift enforced control of the Baltic countries. And the end is not yet. Russia has turned and become a major factor in aggression.

The change was an earthquake-like jarring, psychologically and in the shifting of the balance between forces. Hitler had prepared his people for it by a careful transfer of hate, through the controlled pressure agencies, to Britain, building fear of Britain, then announcing rapprochement with Bolshevik Russia as a method of saving Germany from the new foe. Stalin had carried on no such preparation. What has actually happened in the minds of the people of Russia is one of the new, important imponderables. The "Axis" relationships were altered in the abandonment of the now ironic Anti-Comintern Pact. That Italy recoiled there is no doubt, though the part she will eventually play is still disturbedly, perhaps purchasably uncertain. Franco's Spain found a reason to draw aside; Japan protested, then, under German blessing, made her own armistice with Russia on the Mongolian front, and today it is reported that Germany is to be given the right to use certain of her former colonies, islands in the Pacific mandated to Japan, as submarine bases. Japan, fellow aggressor in the Orient, still, though cautiously, seems to see reason for common cause. Russia's full intent in the Orient is as yet unrevealed. Turkey, counted fairly securely on the British-French, potentially Russian side, was startled and disturbed to find Russia in the other orbit. The long-drawn-out conferences at the Kremlin indicate the difficulties of the tight-rope on which she is attempting to balance. If Russian demands on the keepers of the vastly important Dardanelles are too heavy, it is probable that Turkey, having weighed alternatives, will refuse, and return to the projected mutual assistance pact with Britain and France.

A few basic facts now emerge clearly from the history-shifting Russian change. The Aggression side of the Aggression--Resistance balance was, and is for the immediate present at least, tremendously strengthened. The first general reaction was that Resistance must break. Russian support was the final "Blackmail or War" pressure. Hitler undoubtedly believed it would be enough. Even a considerable part of the American press initially held that

Britain and France could not stand against it. With such major reinforcement, threats to Poland were increased, sharpened. The alternatives for Britain and France were reduced to two: (1) return to the period of Munich-marked capitulation or (2) declaration of war. But the stark lesson of 1931-1939, that beyond each yielding to Force lay other, greater demands, that "if Title by Grab is to hold, then more and bigger grabs will come," had been learned. On September 3 Resistance faced the choice of yielding completely, with the implications involved for the future, or accepting the alternative. War was declared.

As Germany began the attack on Poland, Aggression turned back to the methods it had used in the early stages of the territorial steps to war, while international organization offered resistance: "Blackmail or War" changed, for the time being, to straight military conquest. For the whole picture of the movement of territorial aggression in the post-World War years, for the steps that lay behind the declaration of war, turn to the enclosed chart.[1] There, graphically and in their time setting, are the facts the years wrote. We will need to keep them before us throughout the continuing course of events. It will be basically important to come to know what could have been done, at each step, so that the day of inevitable capitulation-or-war choice need not have come. There is no more important study for the future of American foreign policy and the rebuilding, after the conflict, of a strain-enduring Structure of Peace.

But before turning to those larger problems, we must recall swiftly certain major movements in the Aggression--Resistance relationship following the declaration of war -- the continuing phase of the charting. Poland was attacked, devastated, partitioned between September 1 and September 28; Danzig, the Corridor, all Poland must be horizontally cross-hatched on the chart as taken by military conquest. A little less than half-way through that conquest the fuller outlines of the Russian plan began to emerge: Russian rapprochement with Germany, starting with the trade pact, was in fact a part of the deal for division of the spoils of conquest. Russia, with her vast lands, was not simply backing the aggression of Germany as such--she was herself on the march.

We had to wait for the end of September for the fuller pattern, as if light was slowly revealing a dark surface: Berchtesgaden methods were to be repeated in the Kremlin. The little nations of the Baltic were summoned to Moscow as Schuschnigg to Germany, to meet the demands of Force. The Dictator of the Left had learned the "Blackmail or War," for the unevenness in size "Blackmail or Devastation," technique. Two forces had come to be on the march, previously antagonistic to each other but, for the present, making common cause to accomplish each its own designed ends of aggression.

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1. Additional copies of the chart may be had for 10¢ each or $1.00 a dozen.

One after another Estonia, sturdy, literate, find little northern democracy; Latvia; Lithuania,[2] received the invitation that was a force-backed command. For Finland, holding courageously to her independence against tremendous odds, there must be some yielding or a country of 170 million against 3½ million.

The immediate internal incidence of the establishment of the Russian "protectorates" is far less violent than that of the German, in Czechoslovakia, for example. They are for strategic control of the region and beyond it, rather than for immediate conquest and repression. The internal life of the country will not be initially so distorted, but the compliance that must come from overshadowing Force usable at any moment is there -- grim control that can strike practically at will if its gloved dictates are ignored. It is the continuing blackmail backed by the power to occupy.[3] For the rest of the world there is as yet only the fact that Russia is entrenched and on the aggressive, working, though for the time being as sparingly as possible, with Germany. The blueprint for Eastern European control is increasingly clear; for the Balkans it is beginning to emerge but must wait to be fully read from the next swift pages of history.

And after the ruthless drive of Force in Poland, demonstrating the horror that had been threatened, accompanying the movement of Russian control along the Baltic, there came the return, in the joint action of Germany and Russia[4] to the "Blackmail or War" formula even in a period of declared war. If there is one thing the Steps to War chart shows, it is why what was offered as peace could not be accepted. In Hitler's offer there emerged again the recurrent Fallacy of Division, the "divide and rule" that had marked each one of the steps

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2. One piece of long-delayed justice came in the return of Vilna and the Vilna territory to Lithuania, but it was accompanied by a very great price.
3. I am remembering that in the Adriatic eighteen months ago a small ship, within a half hour of leaving the Albanian port of Valona, made an unscheduled and unmapped stop at a small, heavily fortified island at which it ran up the Italian flag. The then silent guns were ready for use; the actual taking over was a small matter on Good Friday of 1939.
4. One of the protocols signed at the time of the partition of Poland stated that the treaty just signed between Germany and Russia definitely settled the question of the Polish State and that, since a safe foundation for a lasting peace in Eastern Europe had been created, the two Governments believed that it would be to the interests of all people for the war between "Germany on the one hand and France and England on the other hand" to end. "Both Governments," the protocol reads, "if necessary in conjunction with one of the befriended nations, will direct their joint efforts towards seeking this aim as soon as possible." But should the efforts of both Governments fail, then the fact would be established that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, and in case of continuation of the war the Governments of Germany and Soviet Russia will consult each other regarding the necessary measures." Very shortly thereafter there was announced the "most gruesome bath of blood" alternative for which Hess was spokesman.

since the taking of Austria. "Poland gone...no further reason to fight".... but the war had not come to save Poland as such, rather in a desperate attempt to stop the march of Force as conqueror, to gain for harassed, arms-ridden Europe a peace that allows the security of free peoples to live without fear, to live constructively and productively. For a long time, since the fateful night of March 13, 1938, peace as a positive entity had not been in Europe, only its uneasy negative in the absence of active war. Promises of peace had accompanied the later steps to war, with each pledge used to gain concessions, then swiftly broken. All bases for confidence, for conference which can only be based on belief in the pledged word, were gone; shadow steps of future aggression reached beyong any such compromise.

The use of exactly the same method of threat marked the new "peace" gesture: "Yield -- validate the territory taken -- or worse will happen" showed that no change had taken place, only a slight variation on the repeated formula that had led from one conquest to another. And there is the foundational fact that a peace which will have any hope of permanence cannot be based on the validation of forceful conquest and suppression of nations. That is a lesson out of much of the history of the past. Under the surface of the pre-1914 map were shadow states that broke the empires. War aims will undoubtedly, because for future security as well as justice they must, include the reemergence of the Czech and Polish nations, each with people and territory now held by alien Powers; with exiled governments of shadow states recognized by the United States and other governments. Any cessation of war bought at the price of something as basic as the acceptance of the conquest of peoples could not be more than an interval between wars. These facts have been of the warp and woof of the September 28 to October 15 period while the "Blackmail or War" method once more sought its way.[5] Resistance has held. The issue is again drawn but on a larger scale. War had passed into its second phase.

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5. It is quite possible that this type of move for cessation of hostilities on the basis of the status quo of the moment will be a recurrent phenomenon if German victories continue. Always, and so easily, a buffer, and puppet, State in the central section of Poland could be offered as seeming concession. If this is to be the case, there is urgent need for clear and steady awareness of the essentials of peace.

PROBLEMS FOR THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION

The continuing moves in the war situation and the accompanying shifts in diplomacy and strategy will, and must, be carefully watched and evaluated. With that inevitable focus on the present in which we daily live, it is a basic task also to look back, and ahead; back to the past in order to see exactly where failure cut across the carefully laid plans for peace, so that the light of understood experience can be projected ahead: How, when war is ended, can a new, secure way to cooperative living be built? The question cannot be answered in a vacuum or on the basis of straight ideals. Rather it must meet the facts of the past years. The Steps to War chart covers one phase of that important background, the one concerned with territorial aggression. A pattern of international resistance had been set up. Why did it give way under pressure?

(1) Study and discuss in relation to each step set down on the chart -- from Manchuria, 1931, to Poland, 1939 -- what moves could have been made by International Organization to stop territorial aggression? Why, in each instance, were they not made? Cross-reference carefully to the diplomatic column, adding significant events not included there. What did the United States do in each case? What could it have done that would have been more effective? Why was it not done?

(Warning: There is danger here of a fallacy in thinking, born of a "sense of sin" that goes over into an odd type of superiority complex: that if the United States had just become a working partner in the peace maintenance machinery set up at the end of the World War, all would have been well. It is over-simplification. The United States would have been a great force and a powerful one, but still one among many.)

Discuss the statement: "Absence of war that is bought at the price of the validation of the conquest and suppression of peoples can never be more than the uneasy interval before another war."

(2) On the basis of the careful findings under (1) can you begin the work of setting down
A. Flaws in international organization, places where, in the rebuilding, the structure must be strengthened?
B. Definite directions that American Foreign Policy should take in the present, and in the peace-time future?
C. Minimum requisites for peace.

These problems are not merely of the moment or of the month. There is no assumption here that they can be fully solved at the end of any present study and discussion. They are of the whole period that seems to lie before us, and understanding will be an earned increment. It is suggested that each group, as the culmination of this phase of its study, start its file of recommendations in each of the three categories, A, B and C, keep it at hand, add to it, alter as situations throw new light, until a careful, comprehensive program emerges. It is a project in foundation building for a future positive peace.

GLADYS MURPHY GRAHAM

October 15, 1939.

THE TURKISH-BRITISH-FRENCH TREATY

The position of Turkey, key power of the Eastern Mediterranean, has been clarified by the signing of the Turkish-British-French Mutual Assistance Pact in Ankara on October 19th. The treaty which was ratified after the failure of Russia to secure an agreement with Turkey contains economic as well as military clauses which will continue for a period of 15 years. Turkey credited with being a strong military power, occupies a strategic geographic position and her neutrality or assistance will be of great importance to British and French sea power. Turkey through this treaty may determine the course and outcome of the war. It at least will be a decisive step to prevent the war from extending to the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

The pact promises that Great Britain, France and Turkey will come to each other's assistance if an act of aggression is committed by a European power or if aggression leads to war in the Mediterranean in which Great Britain, France or Turkey may be involved. Turkey will assist Great Britain and France if they become engaged in hostilities in virtue of their guarantees to Greece and Rumania. She will consult and at least observe benevolent neutrality if Britain or France are victims of aggression by a power outside the Mediterranean. Consultation will also take place if any other European nation is attacked whose security is essential to the safety of Great Britain, France or Turkey. A protocol which must not be overlooked is included providing that the obligations of this treaty cannot compel Turkey to action having as its consequence hostilities with the U.S.S.R.

While the Treaty is of assistance to the Allies, it was designed primarily by Turkey as a protective measure against Russia, Italy and Germany. The traditional imperialist tendencies of Russia have long been directed toward extension of her influence in Iran and a free access to the warm seas. Turkey has a long common frontier with Iran as well as a mutual assistance pact. Italy, who already has a base on the Dodecanese Islands close to the Turkish shores, has been demanding expansion in the eastern Mediterranean. The new agreement is an added assurance that Italy will stay neutral and perhaps lead in building up a bloc of Balkan and Danubian states which will concentrate on trade expansion. Germany has for some time worked for economic control as a prelude to political domination as part of her Drang nach Osten.

The Treaty also provides a definite measure of assurance for all the Balkan states. Great Britain now has access to the water route to eastern Europe by way of the Dardenelles and the Black Sea, necessary for her to back her guaranty to Rumania. She can help Rumania to resist territorial demands of Russia and Germany, as well as pressure for control of foodstuffs and raw materials. She can assist Greece and be able to act as a stabilizing influence to Yugoslavia. The Turkish stand it is believed will act as a barrier to extension of German as well as Russian influence in the Balkans.

While Germany won the first diplomatic victory of the war by an agreement with Russia, the Allies have won the second by their agreement with Turkey. The British-French-Turkish Treaty will be most effective if it does not become operative, since that will mean war will be confined to Germany, Great Britain and France. Turkey's dominant motive in negotiating this treaty is a determination to preserve her independence. It is significant that she feels her best hope of maintaining her independence is on the side of the democratic countries.

October 20, 1939 ESTHER WANNER HYMER

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Any period of swift events and great tension puts an added responsibility on the individual to weigh and evaluate sources of information. There is, by the very tempo and harshness of the times, little of the dispassionate. In all instances a check should be made concerning the background of the writer, his sources of information, the probabilities of prejudice. For the ways of such evaluation, the testing of news, and the propaganda pitfalls, the Bulletins of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, (130 Morningside Drive, New York City) are recommended.

The following books concerning Europe in crisis are suggested as outstanding among the first-hand accounts by journalists, each with the advantages and disadvantages of that perspective:

GUNTHER, JOHN, Inside Europe. (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1936).

GEDYE, G. E. R., Betrayal in Central Europe.(New York, Harper and Brothers, 1939).

SHEEAN, VINCENT, Not Peace But a Sword.(New York, Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1939)

TABOUIS, GENEVIEVE,Blackmail or War. a 6d. "Penguin Special," widely read in England and on the Continent in the late summer and fall of 1938, written by the brilliant diplomatic correspondent of the Paris L'Oeuvre.

With the scholar's approach:

EMENY, BROOKS, The Strategy of Raw Materials.(New York, Macmillan,1936) and

STALEY, EUGENE, Raw Materials in Peace and War.(New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1937) both studies basic to the problem of embargoes.

Foreign Policies of the Great Powers (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1939), seven lectures just off the press, important in subject matter and, in the main, measured in treatment.

GATHORNE-HARDY, G.M., A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938 (London, Oxford University Press, 1939), an accurate and objective amassing of facts in the background of the present.

And with these

LOW, DAVID, A Cartoon History of Our Times (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1939), the most articulate expression of the opposition to Chamberlain in England and as thought-compelling a presentation of the events that have led to the present as could be found. Low's is a bitter, brilliant, informed pen.

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE GERMAN REICH

Soviet Russia was definitely removed from the "Pattern of Resistance" by conclusion of a trade agreement and a non-aggression pact with Germany. When Premier Molotoff replaced Maxim Litvinoff as foreign minister last June, a possible shift in foreign policy was indicated. The first official statement to that effect was noted in Premier Molotoff's speech before the August session of the Supreme Soviet when he said that the Soviet was ready to conclude normal trade agreements with any countries, irrespective of their political line. It is believed that the new realignment was motivated by distrust of the French and British foreign policy and a wish to remain aloof from European affairs, securing in return a free hand to dominate the Orient.

The trade agreement was signed Saturday, August 19th, by representatives of Soviet Russia and Germany in Berlin. It provides for a German credit to the Soviet Union of 200,000,000 marks over 7 years at 5 per cent interest to permit the purchase of German goods ordered in the next two years. It further provides for the purchase of Soviet goods by Germany also ordered during the next two years to the value of 180,000,000 marks. It is believed that Russia will purchase armaments and machinery from Germany, sending in return wheat, timber, iron ore and petroleum.

The ten year non-aggression pact was signed Thursday, August 24th, in Moscow by Premier Molotoff for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop for the German Reich Government. The pact prohibits attack by either party against the other, forbids either to join any association of other powers aimed at the other and provides that if one party is the "object of warlike acts," the other will in no way support those acts. Article III provides constant consultation to inform each other regarding questions of common interest, while Article V promised that any conflict between the two countries will be adjusted by friendly exchange of opinions or by an arbitration commission. There is no escape clause in the treaty so that the neutrality of Russia is assured in any European conflict in which Germany might be engaged.

The Russian-German agreement will affect the position of both Japan and Spain in European affairs. Japan signed the anti-comintern pact in November, 1936, which Germany and Italy had created to curtail the spread of communism. The provisions of the new agreement fail to recognize Japan's interests in the Orient and preclude any military alliance that Japan might make with Germany and Italy. Since General Franco's avowed purpose in the civil war was to save Spain from Communism, it is believed that he could not now assist Germany but would remain neutral in any conflict in Europe.

The non-aggression treaty was signed while the French-British military mission was in Moscow. The position of the Baltic states and Soviet soldiers in Poland were items that stalemated discussions. The mission left after the signing of the Russo-German non-aggression pact because no French-British-Russian military alliance seemed probable.

Esther Wanner Hymer

August 30, 1939

SECTION III

LATIN AMERICA SINCE THE LIMA CONFERENCE

The importance of the Western Hemisphere is magnified by a comparison of the peaceful conditions which exist in this hemisphere with the strife and conflict in Europe and Asia. Here nations gather around a conference table to discuss and settle their problems and differences because they feel a common responsibility to make continuing peace effective and practicable. The Declaration of Solidarity unanimously proclaimed at Lima implies that the nations will cooperate to meet a threat to the vital interests of any one of them because they recognize that such a threat will affect the vital interest of all.

The principles of Pan Americanism which the countries in North and South America are following today are: 1. Proscription of territorial conquest; 2. Condemnation of intervention; 3. Illegality of forceful collection of debt; 4. Settlement of all Inter-American disputes by peaceful means. These principles guiding affairs in the Western Hemisphere offer a definite challenge to the struggling world.

In a republic no government can evolve its foreign policy much further than its public opinion warrants. Since methods have been evolved in this hemisphere for approaching practical questions, the need for more intimate knowledge on the part of the individual looms in importance if these methods are to be utilized. The perfection of Inter-American relations and the development of Pan Americanism depends in the last analysis on the people within each country.

Problems of Trade

Post Lima Conference activity has been watched with interest, not only by the countries of the Western Hemisphere, but by other countries who have direct or indirect interests in Latin America. Because trade has become vital to all countries today, progress in the field of economics is of primary importance. Reduction of trade barriers was unanimously agreed upon at Lima, and efforts have been made to increase trade by following the general Hull principles of reduced tariffs. This past year our trade with Latin America represented 23% of our total world trade. Trade with Latin America is especially important because Latin America is the richest raw material producing section of the world not under domination of one or more great powers. Because only 6% of the population of the world live there on 16% of the world's surface, there is a large export surplus. The commodities exported represent only 10% of the total world trade, but these exports represent a large proportion of the world's supply of certain by-products. Recent figures listed in the Foreign Policy Report of August 1st, by Howard Trueblood indicate that about four-fifths of the world's supply of coffee, bananas, linseed and corn come from Latin America, as well as three-fifths of the nitrates, one-half of the sugar, two-fifths of the hides, one-third of the wheat, one-fourth of the copper, one-fifth of the lead and bauxite and one-sixth of the tin. Last year the United States remained Latin

America's best customer, taking 31% of her goods, while 17% went to Great Britain, 8% to Germany, 4% to France and 3% to Italy. While the United States looks to Latin America for many products that make living more pleasant, the strategic materials, such as tin, maganese, chromium, bauxite, antimony and tungsten are essential to our economic structure.

The barter system set up under recent totalitarian philosophy has seriously disturbed the flow of world trade and has been a direct challenge to the Hull trade principles. Germany has vastly increased her trade with Latin America. The United States sales to Latin America in 1937 were 75% of what they were in 1929, while Germany's sales were 115% of the 1937 figures. She has traded "Made-in-Germany" goods for Brazil's coffee and cotton and Argentina's meat and wheat. Last year goods from this country represented 34% of all Latin America's imports while Germany furnished only 14%, Great Britain 12%, Japan 2.7% and Italy 2.6%. These barters have considerably narrowed the market in those nations for United States goods and permit neither of these important South American nations to obtain cash with which to purchase North American products.

Brazil, who last year bought $61,955,000 worth of goods from the United States and sent up $97,937,000, finds herself in the advantageous position of an export trade balance. Argentina, on the other hand, is at a disadvantage, last year receiving only $40,707,000 from the United States while buying $86,772,000. In February her government announced that under the circumstances she would cut her imports from the United States by 40% this year to keep her foreign exchange in balance. This three-cornered trade situation between Brazil, Argentina and the United States is typical of the trade problems of most of the Latin American countries.

Until the World War Great Britain ranked first in Brazil's foreign trade. Until 1936 the United States held that position. Today Germany holds first place, while the United States has lost about 10% of her trade. It was found that unless the trade agreement was backed by financial assistance we could not meet the competition of the subsidized German goods. Dr. Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil came to this country in February. Through the Import-Export Bank 50 million dollars worth of gold was sent to Brazil, a short-term credit of 20 million dollars and long-term credit to buy railroad equipment. This loan has opened up a considerable increase in trade. Another result of this agreement was the announcement on August 15th that hereafter German marks will fluctuate according to United States dollar fluctuations in Brazilian foreign exchange. This releases the rigidity of the "compensated" currency trade transactions and no longer binds Brazil to pay more than the "market value" for German goods.

Dr. Aranha's visit has been followed by President Somoza of Nicaragua in May and Alfonso Lopez, former President of Colombia in July who have come to seek financial aid. The elaborate military display and pageantry of the

reception marked a new chapter in American diplomacy. The visit to Brazil of General Marshall showed a new technique being used to strengthen trade and friendly relations.

When Dr. Aranha, Brazil's Foreign Minister, conferred with Secretary of Agriculture Wallace in Washington, a new $23,000,000 a year customer for middle western farmers seemed possible. It is necessary for Brazil to import practically all the wheat her 40,000,000 eat. Most of the wheat she buys comes from Argentina. In 1938, she paid about $22,200,000 to Argentina for wheat and $900,000 more for flour - taking care of almost all the Argentine crop surplus. As a result of recent developments in international trade and following Dr. Aranha's visit it seemed possible that Brazil might decide to buy her wheat in the United States instead of Argentina. Official Argentine statistics indicate that Brazil last year bought from Argentina 37,000,000 bushels of wheat, something more than one-third the United States surplus. At this point, however, the picture of any contemplated shift is faced with the quandary that Brazil annually sells more goods to the United States than she buys, while the United States sells more to Argentina than Argentina buys. The United States must decide whether it is best to follow a long time goal and make a triangular agreement with Brazil and Argentine in an effort to reduce German trade with those countries or reap immediate benefits by securing the Brazil wheat market.

Announcement has just been made that negotiations for a trade treaty with Argentina has been initiated to be completed in October. This treaty will be difficult to negotiate because agricultural products are Argentina's chief exports. Corn, linseed, wheat, beef, wool and hides represent 95% of her export trade. Most of these items compete with our own products. Because the United States has not ratified the Convention of 1935, allowing entrance of beef from disease-free areas, all beef is excluded, a fact sorely resented by the Argentineans. The recent controversy over purchase of a small quantity of canned beef for the army and navy at a price below American canned beef did not add to friendly trade relations. Last spring there was a debate in Congress over purchase by our War Department of a small quantity of canned beef from Argentina. American beef is too high quality to can and what is available is very much higher in price, yet Congress asked that the War Department buy only American beef. This controversy has not led to the furthering of friendly trade relations. In spite of the many difficulties, it is expected that a mutually beneficial agreement will be reached.

Pecuniary Claims

The refusal of the Mexican Government and representatives of the confiscated oil properties to consider the proposal of the United States Government for settlement of the oil controversy marks another episode in the story of the Mexican oil dispute. The Mexican Government continues to insist that settlement be made according to principles she has laid down

which regard only equipment, buildings and improvements basis of settlement, claiming that the oil is national property. The stiffened attitude of the Mexican Government seems to have the support of the people. On August 12th Under Secretary Sumner Welles sent a note asking that "prompt and adequate payment" be made because "a continuance of the dispute will dislocate still further beneficial commercial relations between the United States and Mexico."

In the face of depreciation and deflation of foreign bonds, the United States is faced with the question of whether to extend more credit to Latin American countries. Loans seem to be the only way of saving present investments and of furthering future economic progress with countries to the south of us whose natural wealth is obviously still in infancy of development. Stretches of country everywhere are still in primitive undeveloped state. South America still awaits the building of her railroads and transportation facilities, her industrial development and the tappings of immeasurable unexplored wealth. Until satisfactory adjustment of expropriations of oil wells and properties of foreign capitalists in Mexico and Bolivia is made, further private investments are unlikely. The present agitation over national rights and national sub-soil wealth points to the prophecy that the days of unrestricted investment of foreign capital in Central and South America are past.

Codification of International Law

Methods for the codification of International Law were increasingly provided for at Lima. The four co-ordinating agencies now are: 1) The National Committee in each of the American countries; 2) The three Permanent Committee of Jurists, established in Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo and Havana, respectively; 3) The Committee of Experts at Washington; and 4) The Permanent International Commission of American Jurists which in future shall be known as the International Conference of American Jurists (detailed procedure may be found in Resolution XVII approved at Lima).

The Lima Conference referred the question of pecuniary claims to the Committee of Experts who were ordered to invite the various National Committees of Jurists and the Permanent Committee on Codification to express their views. Upon completion of a detailed report to the Pan-American Union, "at least one year prior to the next and 9th International Conference of American States at Bogota, Colombia, shall submit these findings to the American governments. The findings thus prepared by the Committee of Experts and the opinions of the American governments together with all documents shall be referred in turn to the International Conference together with all documents shall be referred in turn to the International Conference of Jurists to be acted upon at a meeting which shall be held six months prior to the convening of the 9th International Conference." (Detailed subjects to be treated are found in Resolution XIX adopted at Lima.) The interim between conferences is thus to be utilized for implementing future adjudications.

United States Ratifies 1936 Treaty with Panama

On July 25, 1939 the United States Senate ratified two treaties with the Republic of Panama designed to settle outstanding grievances and to assure Panamanian cooperation in defense of the Panama Canal. Panama always claimed that the 1903 Treaty infringed on its sovereignty. After the United States devalued the gold content of the dollar, Panama contended it was entitled to the original gold value for canal transit rental agreed upon in 1903 under which the United States acquired the right to construct a canal across the isthmus, and refused to accept the $250,000 annual rental stipend in the original compact. An amended treaty signed March 2, 1936 and ratified by Panama within a fortnight of that date, was ratified by our Senate just prior to adjournment of Congress. The understanding was established that in the event of war this country may defend the canal in any manner necessary without first considering the red tape of diplomatic negotiation. Under the general treaty the United States agrees to pay the Republic of Panama from whom we leased the Canal Zone $430,000 annually for transit rights, the equivalent of the original gold value. The second treaty just ratified provides for construction of a trans-isthmian highway, part of which will be built by the United States.

Defense of Canal Zone

With conflicts in the Pacific and threatened ones in the Atlantic, the question of defense of the Panama Canal, upon which the United States is dependent to expedite the passage of its fleet from one ocean to the other, assumes practical significance. Also in August, 1939, Congress passed a bill authorizing the construction of a third set of locks for the Panama Canal, at a total expenditure of $277,000,000, designed to strengthen the national defense and ultimately to benefit commercial vessels.

Inter-American Commission of Women

In the field of civil and political rights for women initiated at the 6th International American Conference at Havana in 1928 the Lima Conference agreed: 1) to political treatment on the basis of equality with men; 2) to enjoyment of equality as to civil status; 3) to full protection in and opportunity for work; and 4) to the most ample protection as mothers. The Lima Conference also voted methods for reorganization of the Inter-American Commission of Women. Each of the American governments is to appoint its official representative on the commission which shall act in an advisory capacity and report to the Pan American Union before each Conference. The Pan American Union is to designate the Chairman of the Commission from these official appointees to preside over it until the next International Conference (The Pan American Conference at Montevideo in 1933 through a resolution adopted by the official delegates expressed its desire for rotation in the office of Chairman). The Pan American Union is also entrusted

with the study of an organic statute for the Commission to be submitted at the next Conference. Pursuant to the resolution adopted at Lima, the United States government appointed Miss Mary Winslow of Washington as its official representative. Up to July, only nine countries had consummated their appointments and the designation of a Chairman by the Pan American Union awaited additional appointees from the other countries.

Peace Machinery

The instrumentality of peace machinery is embodied in nine treaties, beginning with the Gondra Treaty in 1923, through the Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies in 1936, and head up in the following three stages:

1. Diplomatic negotiations
2. Bilateral settlement through mixed commissions
3. Multilateral or general consultation and common action by third states.

In detailed summary the various means available to the American States for dealing with a controversy are:

I. Diplomatic Negotiations

II. Preventive Action (Treaty for Prevention of Controversies)

III. Remedial Action Bilateral
- A. Mediation and good offices (Inter-American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation)
- B. Investigation (Gondra Treaty)
- C. Conciliation (Conciliation Convention of 1929 and the Treaty of Non-aggression and Conciliation of 1933)
- D. Arbitration (Arbitration Treaty of 1929

IV. Remedial Action Multilateral
- A. Anti-war Treaty of Non-aggression and Conciliation)
- B. Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace
- C. Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties between the American States.

With the more recent evolution of the Monroe Doctrine into a multilateral instrument; with consultation on the part of foreign ministers of American States easily available; with the Declaration of Lima announcing not only a solidary stand on this hemisphere against physical aggression from without or from within but against infiltration of men or ideas inimical to republican institutions, the "Good Neighbor" policy growing with the years since the United States withdrew armed forces from Central American countries, seems at last to be sincerely flowing in both directions.

Intellectual and Cultural Cooperation

Without the supplementation of diplomatic relations by the understanding and good will of the peoples of contracting nations, the enthusiastic will for peace will not be made effective. In July, 1938 a new Division, that of Cultural Relations, was established by our Department of State. Mr. Ben Cherrington, the chief of this division, states that the department is not engaging in propaganda activities but is using every available means for correlating and furthering activities that will lead to better understanding. As world events throw nations of this hemisphere into closer interdependence we should acquire the understanding of the Spanish language and make the study of it available to all high school and college students. The improvement and broadening of the scope of our cultural relations and the development of our Inter-American consciousness are very necessary for a foundation on which to build a lasting Pan Americanism.

August 24, 1939

Mrs. William Dick Sporborg, Chairman
Pan American Commission
National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War

Discussion Subjects

1. Compare the circumstances under which the Treaty with Panama of 1903 was signed with the circumstances surrounding negotiations for present treaty. What indications are there that firmer relationship have been established and new attitudes developed that will strengthen Pan Americanism.

2. Discuss our triangular trade with most of the Latin American countries. Compare importance in our national economy of our imports from Latin America with our exports to Latin America. How do you think we can maintain and improve our trade position in South America?

3. How do you believe the Mexican oil dispute can be settled without jeopardizing our Good Neighbor Policy?

4. Question you meet about Latin America. Do they seem to be interested? Have they much information? Do they teach Spanish in the public schools? What can you do to motivate the Good Neighbor Policy so that reason instead of force will control affairs in this hemisphere?

New Material Available for Study

1. "Imaginary Visits on a Good Neighbor Tour" by Mrs. Frederic Beggs. General Federation of Women's Clubs, 1734 N Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C. $2 for complete study guide and kit.

2. The Other Americas, by Swiggett, Rippy and Wilgus, American Association of University Women, 1634 I St. NW, Washington, D. C. Study Guide 40¢

3. The Good Neighbors - Headline Book, Foreign Policy Association 25¢; Study kit 25¢

4. Pan Americanism - Can We Win It? by Herbert Herring, Council for Social Action, 289 Fourth Ave., New York, N. Y. 15¢

5. Latin America by F. A. Kirkpatrick, Macmillan Co. 1939 a brief history of Latin America.

6. South American Primer, by Katherine Carr, Reynold and Hitchcock. An account of the history, politics and resources written in a very interesting style.

EUROPEAN WAR BRINGS NEW PAN AMERICAN UNITY

Continental Defense

European conditions are forcing the closest kind of cooperation between the Americas. "Continental Defense" has recently become a commonly accepted term by the United States government. Following the Munich Conference in September, 1938, the defense of the American Continent assumed a more serious aspect. The United States fleet has been kept largely in the Pacific with a tacit understanding that we would defend the Pacific and Britain would defend the Atlantic. But the Munich meeting raised the question in the minds of American statesmen as to the present power of the British fleet and the necessity of this continent's enlarging its own military forces for its protection.

The United States government recently declared that its enlarged naval and air forces were based on the need of defending the whole continent, including Canada and South America. Interestingly enough, Latin America seems to recognize the danger of the world situation and approves the offer of such help. The development of Puerto Rico into a powerful naval and air base was begun as a part of the defense from the French and British Islands in the West Indies. For if Germany should secure bases in the Spanish Azores or want such islands as Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad or Martinique from their present owners, she would then be in easy striking distance of the North or South American mainland. The enlarged defense of the Panama Canal has been undertaken, with plans for building a third series of locks. Military experts have discussed the advisability of the United States securing, probably in payment of war debts, some of the strategic Caribbean territory now belonging to England and France.

The United States has also extended offers to aid in the arming of Latin American countries in their own defense. An offer, disapproved by Congress, was made in 1936 to loan Brazil a half dozen of our old cruisers. More recently Senator Pittman proposed a bill, not yet passed, to offer the United States shipping yards to Latin American governments for building at cost their naval vessels. In the summer of 1939, the United States Government proposed to loan money to Brazil and Chili for the purpose of buying some of the old ships of our merchant marine. United States naval missions or advisors are now stationed in Brazil, Argentina and Peru, with army missions in Colombia. The maneuvers of the United States fleet were held this year, contrary to custom, several hundred miles out in the Atlantic, to experiment with the question of defending, not simply the Panama Canal, but the whole Caribbean and southern Atlantic. Since those maneuvers, an Atlantic scouting fleet has been established to patrol the outskirts of the Caribbean and waters nearer the European continent.

Two important developments recently have completely changed the problem of protecting the American continent from outside invasion, as envisioned by the Monroe Doctrine. The first development is the enormous cruising range of the submarine and the airplane, aided by the airplane carrier. The second important change is that the old understanding, tacit but very real, that the United States would police the Pacific, the British fleet would take care of the Atlantic, can no longer be counted.

Changes Brought by the War in Europe

The declaration of war in Europe on September 3, 1939, no doubt marked an important advance in the unity and the development of the American continent. While Europe destroys itself, America will multiply its resources and man power. Even if American nations should be drawn into the war, this continent is not likely to become the field of battle nor cease to profit from the markets of the Old World.

Recently the United States has been excited about the great trade and propaganda drive being made by Germany and the other Axis powers in Latin America. Many speakers saw in Nazi activities both a threat to democracy and to Pan American unity. Two weeks later the picture was complete changed. First came the announcement of the non-aggressive pact between Germany and Russia. Nothing could have been a greater blow to German prestige in Latin America. Not a single government in Latin America had for some time maintained diplomatic relations with Communist Russia. On the other hand, German diplomats - because for one reason they opposed communism - often seemed to be especially favored in some of the southern foreign offices. By making a treaty with the detested and much feared Stalin government, the Nazis exploded themselves out of a favored seat in various Latin American capitals.

Then came the march of Hitler into a weak neighbor country, Poland. Every small country that must depend on peaceful settlement of disputes rather than see itself crushed by an overwhelming military neighbor, naturally opposes the tactics which attacked Poland - for this same power politics might reach to South America some day. Thus the Nazis lost again.

War Emphasizes Inter-American Trade

German shipments to Latin America were, of course, suddenly cut off. The millions of marks, which by barter agreement were owed in merchandise to Latin American countries, could not now be paid. The fallacy of such barter arrangements was shown in a way that no one can fail to understand. But Latin America did not cry over these losses. She, on the other hand, prepared to reap a rich harvest by selling her stored-up raw materials to England and France. The first order given in Brazil on the fateful September 3rd was to stop the burning of coffee. It would soon be needed for the men in the trenches! Cuba, suffering from an overproduction of sugar, rejoiced to see the prices soar. Argentina wheat, Chilean nitrate, Peruvian copper, Ecuadorian cocoa began to be in great demand by the fighting forces.

In Washington, the Department of Commerce called into conference leaders of the export and import trade, and several days in October were spent in studying the Inter-American trade situation. This group stressed the fact that trade between the two Americas is a two-way proposition and that for the United States to find new markets for its productions, it must stimulate exports into this country. It recommended that the United States imitate other countries by appointing financial attaches in important southern capitals. During the war period United States exports will necessarily increase and the problem of paying for these goods will need much study.

Neutrality

At the Pan American Conference held in Lima in December, 1938, neutrality as a technical question received very little attention. The Conference was dominated by the idea of further development of "Continental Solidarity." After three weeks of debate, a unanimous endorsement of the republican system of government, the condemnation of racial or religious persecution and the agreement to stand together in the defense of the Continent against any encroachments from non-American powers. These general agreements were implemented by a promise to consult, at any time the Continent might seem to be threatened. The "Declaration of Lima" is a continental declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, which heretofore had been a unilateral declaration by the United States.

There was a disposition on the part of a disillusioned public, fed up by worthy but useless resolutions of international conferences to gibe at the Lima gathering as just one more junket of the diplomats. But those who were present felt that this declaration meant the dawning of a new day in Pan American relations. Proof of this was found when the first international crisis called for action by the American governments. The Declaration of War in Europe was made on September 3, 1939. On September 4th, President Santos of Colombia sent a message advocating "Continental Solidarity" to the presidents of all American republics. On September 6th, President Arosamena of Panama, backed by President Roosevelt and other executives, invited the American nations to send to Panama their Ministers of Foreign Affairs or other representatives to consult concerning the neutrality and other common interests in view of the European war.

Recent Panama Conference

The Panama Conference organized itself into three commissions, one on neutrality, one on economic cooperation and one on the maintenance of peace. Its sessions lasted from September 23 to October 3, 1939. All of the discussions proceeded on the firm and unanimous conviction that the twenty-one American republics must keep out of the present war. Before the Conference assembled all these nations had officially declared their neutrality.

The first commission made a careful study of the many intricate and difficult problems involved in neutrality. It reported on the rights that the American countries consider neutrals have to trade during war time, the rules that should apply to neutral shipping and the restrictions neutrals would impose on themselves to see that neither side among the belligerents were aided. The desire for effective unified action was so great that the Conference set up a Special Commission of Neutrals composed of seven experts on International Law to sit continuously at Washington to advise the American governments on neutrality problems as they arise during the war.

The Committee on Economic Cooperation, after a study of many problems involved in enlarged trade and finance, asked for the setting up of another permanent body in Washington. The Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee consists of 21 experts in economic problems. This body is for the consideration of problems of monetary relationships, foreign exchange management, or balance of international payments situations which may be presented to it by the cooperating governments.

The third Commission brought to the fore the Declaration of Panama, the most discussed of all decisions. It established a "Safety Zone" that would average about three hundred miles from the shores of the American nations. Within this zone, corresponding roughly with the steamship lanes followed by the vessels in Inter-American commerce, the belligerents are requested not to perform hostile attacks or exercise the right of search or seizure of neutral vessels. Important questions raised were: Would the belligerents accept this fundamental shift from three or twelve mile limit, to one of hundreds of miles, could the American Continent muster ships to enforce the zone, and would it be helpful to peace and justice to do so? What would Germany, who has both scouting naval vessels and interned ships in this area say? What would Great Britain and France, who have not only ships but numerous land possessions in the territory say?

As a measure to banish war from this hemisphere, isolation might easily result in the opposite effect. Some delegations felt that any such departure from international law would tend to provide a sheltered area within which hard-pressed belligerent merchant ships or war vessels might seek refuge and rely upon Pan-American enforcement of a demilitarized sea zone for their safety. It was foreseen that such a situation might result in the Pan-American patrol becoming a protective force for one side or the other, with consequent loss of neutrality.

Skepticism as to the wisdom and feasibility of a Western Hemisphere "safety belt" characterized British reaction. An editorial in the Manchester Guardian said "If in these (sea) tracts, so hard to oversee, raiders or submarines should still hide, should destroy and not be discovered, could she (Britain) resist the call to defend the shipping with her own warships - that is to say, of course, if the American States did not enforce their edict?"

The issue of German shipping in the Western Hemisphere might also become a major problem. Some eighty German vessels are listed as having found refuge at the outbreak of the war in neutral ports of North America and South America. The largest congregation of German ships was reported at the Dutch West Indies port of Curacao. Others are in Mexican harbors and in most of the principal South American ports, while only one is in a United States port. Under terms of the Declaration of Panama, it appeared that these German vessels would be free to ply North and South American waters within the protective neutrality zone extending roughly three hundred miles from Western Hemisphere shores.

Under-Secretary Sumner Welles and other members of the United States delegation made it clear that they realized the uncharted and exploratory nature of the conference's security zone venture. It is not proposed to enforce it by belligerent measures. It is only one more effort to emphasize in a peaceful, diplomatic way, the desire of the American Continent to separate itself from war in Europe. It is also one more evidence that the old jealousies and divisions between the American countries are giving away, in this world crisis, to a spirit of cooperation. For that all of us should be most grateful and work to advance this spirit more and more into the realm of the practical.

SAMUEL GUY INMAN

October 25, 1939

SECTION IV

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

On Tuesday, September 5, two days after Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, the government of the United States issued two Neutrality Proclamations. The first one brought into force the rights and duties of the United States as a neutral, as they have been defined by international practice and by American law up to 1917. The recruiting of soldiers and the sojourn of belligerent vessels in American ports were thus regulated with great care. The second proclamation invoked the Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937, laying an embargo on the shipment of munitions to belligerents, restricting the travel of American citizens, and limiting the solicitation of funds for belligerents to medical aid and civilian relief.

The Neutrality Issue

The definition of American neutrality did not end with these proclamations, however. For more than half a year there had been public discussion and official consideration of proposals to revise or repeal the Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937, and the outbreak of war in Europe brought the controversy into sharp focus. Congress was called to convene in special session on September 21 and at present the Senate is still debating the resolution reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee on September 28. In July the House of Representatives had voted to permit belligerents to buy "implements of war" but not arms and ammunition. However, it is expected that instead of sending the two bills (House and Senate) to Conference, whatever amendments to the Act are passed by the Senate will be sent directly to the House for consideration. It is predicted that Congress will finish its work on the Neutrality Act between the middle and end of November.

The resolution now being debated is intended to amend the Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937 along the following lines: (1) to repeal the embargo on the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, (2) to put all trade with belligerents on a cash-and-carry basis, and (3) to tighten up other provisions of the present Act so as to prevent even more effectively any involuntary involvement with either side of the war.

The controversy about revision has brought on an intensive public discussion of the whole range of American foreign policy. The tendencies toward isolation at one end and international cooperation at the other, besides all the modifications and combinations of these tendencies in between, are operating freely and vigorously.

The Neutrality Act and the proposals to revise it actually affect only a part of the foreign policy of the United States, and only a part of our relationship to the European war. Mediation efforts, attitudes of the American people about the issues of the conflict in Europe, and our policies toward South America may in the long run prove to be more important and more decisive than the form of the Neutrality Act.

American Mediation Efforts

Before war actually started, President Roosevelt took all the steps the head of a great neutral state could properly take to avert a resort to arms. On August 24 he appealed to Hitler and to President Moscicki of Poland to agree "to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable and stipulated period" and then to undertake to settle their controversy by direct negotiation, arbitration, or conciliation. On the same day a note was delivered to the King of Italy by the American Ambassador in Rome, suggesting that the Italian Government formulate proposals for a peaceful settlement of the conflict along the lines of the President's message of April 14, 1939.*

Upon receiving from the President of Poland a declaration that his government was willing to resort to either direct negotiation or conciliation by a disinterested third party, on August 25 President Roosevelt again addressed the German Chancellor, sending him a copy of the Polish note. On the same day, he undertook to reinforce the appeal for the maintenance of peace which had been made on August 23 by King Leopold of Belgium, speaking in the name of the Oslo Powers.

When the German Army began to move against Poland, on September 1, President Roosevelt addressed the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, Germany and Poland, as "governments which may be engaged in hostilities" asking them to undertake a reciprocal obligation not to bombard civilian populations or unfortified cities from the air. Each government replied that it intended to attack only military objectives from the air, but reserved its freedom of action in case the enemy commenced to bomb non-combatants.

Since the outbreak of the war the question of mediation by the United States has come up twice. The major occasion was the "unofficial opinion" transmitted in press dispatches from Berlin, that the good offices of President Roosevelt would be welcomed to bring about a discussion of peace terms along the lines of Hitler's last speech to the Reichstag. (October 3). For a few days there was a good deal of agitation in Congress to urge the President to follow up the suggestions, but it died down after Daladier and Chamberlain replied to Hitler. The obvious disinclination of France and Great Britain to negotiate on the basis of abandoning Eastern Europe to Germany and Russia would have doomed any mediation to failure from the start, and if Mr. Roosevelt had followed the German suggestion the usefulness of the United States at a more propitious moment might have been seriously jeopardized. However, the German "trial balloon" was released in such a very off-hand and tentative way that President Roosevelt could ignore it and just let it soar off into empty space.

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*As paraphrased for the appeal to the King of Italy, this message urged "an understanding that no armed forces should attack or invade the territory of any independent nation, and that this being assured, discussions be undertaken to seek progressive relief from the burden of armaments and to open avenues of international trade including sources of raw materials necessary to peaceful economic life of each nation."

The United States has intervened diplomatically in another phase of the European crisis, namely, the negotiations to which the Soviet government invited the government of Finland. While the Scandinavian countries prepared to strengthen Finland's position by calling a conference between their three kings and the Finnish President, the American Ambassador called upon Premier Molotoff, to remind him that the American people have a strong bond of sympathy with the Finnish people and to urge the Russians to be moderate in their demands. Molotoff's reply indicated that the fact that the United States was interested in the fate of Finland was not lost on the Soviet Government.

The decision to regard the Polish Government as still in existence, announced on October 2, is another official act which bears directly upon the situation in Europe. The statement of Secretary Hull, "Poland is now the victim of force used as an instrument of national policy," is a reminder that the government of the United States considers the Pact of Paris universal in application and binding on the signatories. The doctrine of non-recognition of territorial gains made as a result of treaty violations, which had its active beginning during the Manchurian crisis of 1931-32, has since been applied to Czechoslovakia and now to Poland. It may become an important consideration in the peace settlement.

1914 and 1939

The extent and character of American mediation efforts to date constitute one of the important differences between this war and the early stages of the war of 1914. In 1914 the American people and the American government were really remote from the European scene. President Wilson's note of August 4, 1914, which compares with President Roosevelt's note of August 24, 1939 was equally earnest, but it was nothing more than a rather formal offer of good offices in bringing about a settlement* Although Wilson continued to watch for an opportunity to mediate the conflict, and from time to time reminded the belligerent countries of his readiness to act, it was not until 1916 that the United States became a serious factor in the behind-the-scenes peace diplomacy that went on all during the war.

Among the causes that work together to bring the United States closer to events in Europe than in 1914 are some that arise out of the conditions of our own development, and some that lie in the very nature of the present conflict.

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*The following communication was sent by President Wilson to the Emperors of Austria, Russia, and Germany, the King of England and the President of France: "As official head of one of the signatories to the Hague Convention, I feel it to be my privilege and my duty under Article 3 of that convention to say to you in a spirit of most earnest friendship that I should welcome an opportunity to act in the interest of European peace, either now or at any time that might be thought more suitable, as an occasion to serve you and all concerned in a way that would afford me lasting cause for gratitude and happiness." (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement, p.42.)

Even if there had been no war in 1914-18, the natural evolution of our economy would have made us more intimately concerned with conditions in Europe. than we were a generation ago. With the rapid improvement of means of travel and communication, our cultural and social relations with Europe would also have increased. The war accelerated these processes. The United States became a creditor nation almost over-night. Our participation in the war sent Americans to Europe in large numbers and many of them were in close and constant touch with people of the allied countries. American relief work before 1917 and after the war broadened these contacts to include the neutrals and the people of Central Europe. After the war many new international organizations came into existence, for all sorts of purposes. Old ones were revived and extended. Machinery was set up to further educational exchanges. Every summer saw large numbers of Americans flocking to Europe, not only for travel and recreation but to attend international conferences on all conceivable subjects. For these Americans Europe ceased to be just a multicolored spot on the map, and many close friendships were formed among individuals when they discovered mutual interests. News reels and the radio have given a sense of actuality to what happens across the Atlantic that even the most expert journalism cannot achieve. It is thus inevitable that Americans should feel deeply the tragedies and triumphs of people in Europe.

The immigrant groups in the United States have always set up echoes of European conflicts on this side of the war. But the post-war ties, which have nothing to do with ethnic origins, are contemporaneous rather than nostalgic, and they are bound to have a more positive effect upon our national policies toward Europe.

As has already been suggested, there are important differences between the war in 1914 and 1939 that have something to do with the differences in our reactions then and now. The preliminaries of 1914 were obscure and few Americans had any idea that a war might be brewing or any notion of how it might come about. The Balkan wars were far away. The dynastic and administrative problems of Austria-Hungary meant little except that to a red-blooded democratic American the whole Hapsburg regime seemed decadent or at best a romantic anachronism. The imperialistic rivalries of the great powers were to us just another evidence of the inherent wickedness of Europe. For a number of years before 1914 there had been no repercussions of these rivalries in the western hemisphere and it was thought that threats to the Monroe Doctrine were pretty well wiped out. The violation of Belgium neutrality was the only thing that happened in the early stages of the war that shocked American sensibilities. The actual fighting was confined to Europe except for the activities of two German commerce raiders and the speedy occupation of German holdings in Africa and China.

In the section on Contemporary Europe some of the underlying issues of the present conflict have already been discussed, so that it is not necessary to go into the European situation in any detail here. It is sufficient to note points of contrast with 1914. The preliminaries of this war have absorbed our attention for three years. The arguments of all sides have been shouted from the house-

tops and there can be no doubt who attacked whom and why. In the economic and cultural spheres the war has actually been going on for a long time, and the Danzig crisis merely brought on its military phase. Some of the fundamental issues of this war come very close to America. The existence of a totalitarian dictatorship in any country where it has arisen out of internal conditions and has been established by a native movement is no concern of ours. It is only when such a dictatorship advances aggressively that the security of all other nations is threatened. Since the annexation of Austria Nazi Germany has advanced aggressively and by means of political penetration even more than by frontal attack. By reaching into the western hemisphere this penetration has threatened the Monroe Doctrine, which is an essential part of the national defense system of the United States. Moreover, the diplomatic revolution which turned the Axis toward Moscow signalized the rebirth of Russian Communist aggressiveness, and it is still not clear how far or in what directions that movement will extend.

The conquest of Austria, the destruction of Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Poland have already aroused feeling in America. We felt strongly enough about the threat to Finland to exert diplomatic pressure in Moscow. Submarine warfare on commerce is starting at just about the point it had reached in 1917, and there is now much more activity of naval vessels in the waters of the western hemisphere than there was in the early months of the last great war.

In observing that the United States is much closer to the European conflict now than in 1914 - or rather that the conflict is closer to us than it was then - we are not attempting to form any judgment as to whether the United States will or should become a belligerent. Our opinion on this point depends upon many factors that are now obscure and unpredictable, including the future behavior of the nations now at war. It should also be noted that being deeply concerned with a war does not necessarily mean participation, as the history of Switzerland, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries demonstrated in the last war. Moreover, the question of American participation is not an issue. What we are doing now is trying to decide what policies we should pursue as a non-belligerent nation. We are trying to gauge the possible long-time consequences of the European war for our national life, as well as its immediate effects. Our behavior as a non-belligerent may make some difference in the course of the war and its final outcome, and we are trying to regulate that behavior in such a way that its ultimate results will be for our own good.

One aspect of the controversy about America's relation to the war, which is significant as an illustration of popular psychology as well as for its possible effects is the growth of a powerful legend about the experiences of America in the last war. That such a thing can happen now in modern, sophisticated America where we are equipped with all means of disseminating accurate information and our people are supposedly literate indicates that

folkways may still be stronger than technology.

Like all legends this one is based to some extent upon facts, but the chosen facts have grown considerably in the telling and other facts have almost entirely dropped out of the picture. Endless books and articles are being written in terms of the legend. Briefly, it is that economic interests, particularly those of munitions-makers and bankers, reinforced by British propaganda, inexorably drew the United States into the World War against its will, and that the American people, who gave their blood and treasure in a war to make the world safe for democracy, were tricked and duped by the scheming European statesmen who made the Treaty of Versailles. Like all legends, it teaches a lesson, which is that the United States should suspend its economic relations with Europe during the war - particularly those of munitions-makers and bankers - that we should not believe anything said by the British because what they say is only propaganda, and that any effort to defend democracy outside of our own borders is sure to lead in the opposite direction.

This legend recalls two other legends that have had great political effect. One was the Napoleonic legend, which produced the Second Empire in France, and the other is Hitler's legend about the history of Germany during the World War and afterward, which has had a powerful influence on German opinion, an influence that has grown as the real facts recede further and further into the past.

The real story of how America went to war and what happened afterward is too long and complex to outline here, and in any case the conditions of the present war are so different that the experiences of the past war may prove to be an insufficient guide for our behavior this time. One thing that is completely left out of the legend, but which should be mentioned here is that the actions of Germany not only in Europe but against the United States had something to do with our finally entering the war on the side of the western powers. It is important to keep this fact in mind in the present and future controversies about American policy; because in spite of all our discussion, we may yet find that we cannot decide on policies in a vacuum, with no reference to anything except our own wishes.

Domestic Aspects of our Foreign Policy

The domestic repercussions of the war should be noted in passing. There have not been as many changes in administration as seemed likely during the first days of September. The work of the War Resources Board, for example, terminated sooner than expected. The increase in the armed forces goes on under the President's declaration of September 8 that "a national emergency exists in connection with and to the extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding, and enforcing of the neutrality of the United States and the strengthening of our national defense within the limits of peace-time authorizations." Steps have also been taken to protect the Panama Canal,

and naval convoys have been provided in two or three instances for American ships bringing American passengers home from Europe.

In the Western Hemisphere

Latin America

In times of serious disturbance in Europe the United States has always drawn closer to Latin America. This process was already well under way before war actually broke out in Europe. Nobody was surprised or particularly excited when it was announced on September 7 that the Consultative Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics would meet in Panama City toward the end of the month. The conference was called under the agreements of Buenos Aires and Lima, and was intended partly as a demonstration of inter-American solidarity at a moment of crisis.

The Conference adjourned on October 3 after having reached agreement on measures designed to guarantee the neutrality of the Americas, to minimize the bad effects of the war on the economic life of the American republics, and to outlaw belligerent activities from waters adjacent to the coasts of these countries.

It is too soon to tell what will be the fate of the protective zone, but it is significant that the Declaration of Panama, which defines this zone, also indicates the possibility of patrolling American waters and consulting further if more drastic measures should be required.

The problem of cushioning the economic effects of the war on the American republics raises many questions for the United States, and may involve some important changes in our trade and fiscal policies. Independently of the Panama Conference reciprocal trade agreements are being negotiated with Argentine and Chile, and soon will be with Uruguay. Some of the American meat producers are already protesting against making an agreement with Argentina, and it remains to be seen whether the political importance of friendlier relations with that country will be sufficient to outweigh the fears of American cattle-raisers as to the effects of a trade treaty on their business.

In the field of cultural relations there is a good deal of activity. The United States is now ready to carry out its part of the arrangements for exchanges of professors and students among the American republics, which were made at Buenos Aires. This plan envisages the sending of one professor and two teachers or graduate students from each country to every other country each year. So far Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominical Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela have ratified the treaty and the exchanges will be undertaken with those countries. Another project is a series of conferences on various aspects of cultural relations with Latin

America, covering the subjects of art, music, education, and libraries. They are being organized by the Division of Cultural Relations of the Dept. of State.

Canada

The mention of Canada reminds us that the war is not exclusively a European affair. Canada declared war on Germany as did the other British Dominions, and the Neutrality Act was promptly invoked. Hostilities have not yet extended to Canada or its adjacent waters, so that Canadian participation has not yet raised problems of immediate involvement for the United States. Long before the outbreak of war in Europe President Roosevelt interpreted the Monroe Doctrine to include protection of Canada against territorial invasion. This interpretation was recently reaffirmed in a press conference. Considering that the Monroe Doctrine is in part a means of keeping potential enemies far away from American soil, this interpretation is inevitable and self-evident. It serves to remind us, however, that even geography may not always provide the protection to America that it has provided up to now.

The reminder has had the curious effect of stirring up some sentiment in this country for demanding that Canada secede from the British Commonwealth and follow the dictation of the United States as to the foreign policy which it should pursue. The strangest feature of this demand is that it comes from people who profess to be champions of peace and who insist that the United States should not copy the tactics of European nations. Yet such a demand on a neighboring country bears a striking similarity to the methods Russia tried to use on Finland and Turkey and that Germany already used on Czechoslovakia and tried to use on Poland.

Conclusion

The foreign policy of the United States is by no means a neat, finished article, but is dynamic, ragged around the edges, and at the moment subjected to too many contending forces to permit definitive comment. Traditional attitudes are contending with opinions that developed during the past twenty years concerning the place of the United States in a world community. There is a strong feeling among the American people that their own future security demands some assurance of stability in other parts of the world, but they are not sure how high a price they are willing to pay to obtain the basic conditions of stability. To an alarming extent they are thinking only in terms of a choice between going to war and doing nothing. It may be futile to think now of the opportunities we have lost, but we may at least have learned in the last few years that a "peace" in which force runs riot is hardly better than war, and that if we are ever to control that force and make it serve instead of destroy we shall have to do more than merely prevent armed troops from clashing on the field of battle.

October 24, 1939 Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer

SUGGESTIONS FOR REPORTS AND DISCUSSIONS

I. The Neutrality Issue

A. Write to your Congressman for the following:

1. A copy of the Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937
2. S.J.Res. 306, the proposed amendments now under discussion
3. Copies of speeches made in the Senate - later in the House, also - which seem to him to be the best presentation of the opposing views on revision

B. Whether or not the matter is settled by the time this study is made, it would be useful to compare the provisions of the Act of May 1, 1937 and the amendments, using parallel columns for the comparison.

C. Analyze and discuss the speeches. Compare them with opinions expressed outside of Congress in newspaper editorials, the writings of political columnists, club lecturers, radio broadcasts, and sermons.

II. Mediation Efforts

A. Read the following documents (published in the press at the time of appearance, and available in the Press Releases of the Department of Department of State, now the Department of State Bulletin.):

1. Description of activities of the government of the United States to help prevent war at the time of the Munich crisis in September 1938 - given in a radio address by Undersecretary of State Welles on October 3, 1938.

2. Message of President Roosevelt to Germany and Italy, April 14, 1939.

3. Appeals to Germany and Poland for peace, end of August 1939, and replies.

B. In analyzing these documents, what conclusions do you reach about the policy of President Roosevelt toward Europe?

C. Should the United States exert its influence to restore peace in Europe? If not, why? If so, should this country lay down any conditions of its own?

III. American Attitudes Toward the European War

A. Throughout the year keep a record, in the form of brief notes or clippings, of the shifts and developments of American attitudes toward the war.

B. Watch the effect of the legend of American participation in the last war on the formation of opinion and policy in the present situation.

IV Relations with Latin America

A. Read the Final Act of the Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics. (in The Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1939) On a map of the Western Hemisphere trace the boundaries of the protected zone which is to be kept free of belligerent activities.

B. Watch for challenges to the Declaration of Panama and attempts to enforce its provisions.

C. Follow the development of efforts to promote economic and cultural relations with Latin America.

NOTE ON REFERENCES

For a study of the evolving foreign policy of the United States current publications are the best references. Many books are being published on various aspects of the subject, particularly the neutrality issue - your local bookstores probably have them on display. The series, "The United States in World Affairs," edited by Walter Lippman, W. O. Scrogg and W. H. Shepardson, Harpers, New York, published annually under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, as a good reference for events before 1939. "Documents on American Foreign Relations," January 1938 - June 1939, edited by O. P. Myers and S. S. Jones, published by World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts.

The Foreign Policy Reports and such pamphlet series as Headline Books, World Affairs Pamphlets, and International Conciliation, frequently include studies of American foreign policy - likewise the quarterly magazine, Foreign Affairs. The Department of State Bulletin (formerly Press Releases of the State Department) is the most useful publication for following pronouncements of American foreign policy as they are made. News magazines like Time and News-week are valuable references; also the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, and Christian Science Monitor, and any other newspaper that gives good space to national and international affairs.

THE TOWN HALL ADVISORY SERVICE
Town Hall, 123 West 43rd Street
New York, N.Y.

BACKGROUND AND ISSUES OF TOPIC
14th Meeting, January 11, 1940
Service #1

SHOULD WE EXTEND THE RECIPROCAL TRADE ACT?

Nature of World Trade. No two nations have the same natural resources, the same climate, or citizens of the same sort of ability. Every nation, therefore, has more than it can use of some goods while lacking others. World trade results from this fact. The use of money aids the process by making possible not only direct two-way trades but also three and four-way deals. The existence of money, however, should not be allowed to hide the fact that a nation can export only if it imports and can import only if it exports.

America's Stake in World Trade. The United States regularly imports from abroad such raw materials and food-stuffs as tin, rubber, nitrates, bananas, and coffee. These things we cannot very well produce at home. We also import a number of articles which we can produce at home such as cosmetics, wines, and sugar. In such cases either home production is inadequate or many people prefer the foreign products. In turn, we export certain agricultural products like cotton and wheat which we constantly produce in greater quantities than we consume, and some products of our mass-production industries, such as automobiles or typewriters.

The United States might be able to become self-sufficient and get along entirely without world trade. But such a course would call for extensive internal readjustments and an unheard-of concentration of Federal political control. It might at the same time materially lower the American standard of living. At present, between 5% and 10% of our national income is dependent upon trade abroad. This percentage is small but many experts insist that our foreign trade is of crucial importance to our national economic life.

Like other countries the United States imports articles because it can thus get them at a lower cost than that at which it can manufacture them. Obviously, this benefits the consumer. It will at the same time deprive the domestic producer of such articles of customers. Ultimately, it may drive him out of business and leave his workers unemployed. People who believe in protective tariffs insist that this is the crucial fact. At a time when we are trying to force wages up and increase employment it is foolish, they say, to permit foreign goods to compete advantageously with American-made products here in our own market. Tariffs are necessary to protect American business and the high wages of the American worker. On the other hand, it is asserted that most American industries can meet such foreign competition unaided. It is only the ineffficient and the poorly managed firms, most of them paying low wages anyway, which need such tariff protection in order to do business.

America's Tariff Policy. A tariff is a duty collected when articles are imported into a country. Up to the time of the Civil War, the agricultural interests of the South and West kept American tariffs low, but since then, the United States has given a constantly increasing amount of tariff protection to her industries. These tariffs reached an all-time high in the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, and many feel that this Act, by stopping up world trade, is partly responsible for world conditions today.

The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Program. Secretary of State Cordell Hull has long believed that lower tariffs would increase American imports and American exports, thus creating prosperity, and at the same time help to bring about world conditions in which permanent peace was possible. In 1934 Congress, at his suggestion, passed the

(MORE)

Reciprocal Tariff Act. This legislation gave the President power to bargain with foreign countries and reach trade agreements with them in which he could alter our tariffs on specific products by not more than 50%. Such reductions as were mutually agreed upon were to be extended to all countries that did not discriminate against American goods. In 1937 Congress renewed the Act for three more years.

Under this Act eighteen reciprocal trade agreements are now in effect. The amount of our foreign trade has increased in the last few years and figures indicate that it has increased to a greater extent with countries with whom we have treaties than with those with which we have none. However, the industrial and agricultural interests that fear the competition of foreign goods which enter our market at rates that have been reduced through the trade agreements are now assailing the whole program. They want the American market preserved for the American producer.

If the Trade Agreements program is to continue, the Act must be renewed before June, 1940. Some national leaders are willing to renew it, provided each trade agreement is considered as a treaty, subject to the approval of a two-thirds majority in the Senate before it becomes effective. Some farm leaders want agricultural products given specific protection from reduction in duty via the trade agreement route. Some Congressmen would like to see us cease to extend to all nations automatically the concessions we give to one nation in a particular trade agreement. And others would like to see our whole tariff policy put on the basis of the difference in "cost of production" here and abroad. How this difference is to be found has not yet been clearly indicated. Secretary Hull is sticking to his guns and seems to have the President's support, as well as the support of a section of the business community. America must choose.

Questions for Group Discussion

1. To what extent do high wages in American industry depend upon the protection given by tariffs?

2. Should we permit industries that are unable to meet foreign competition in the American market to be forced out of business?

3. How have the reciprocal trade agreements affected your community?

Questions for Individual Study

1. Argue the point briefly that trade agreements should be considered as "treaties between nations."

2. Secure figures from the World Almanac for per capita United States imports and exports over a period of years before and after the Reciprocal Tariff Act of 1934. Comment on the meaning of these figures.

. State four reasons why Congress should renew (or not renew) the Reciprocal Tariff Act.

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THE TOWN HALL ADVISORY SERVICE
Town Hall, 123 West 43rd Street
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SUGGESTED READINGS ON THE TOPIC
14th Meeting, January 11, 1940
Service #2

SHOULD WE EXTEND THE RECIPROCAL TRADE ACT?

Current Articles:

SHOULD CONGRESS CONTINUE THE PRESIDENT'S RECIPROCAL TARIFF MAKING POWERS? (Topic of December, 1939, Congressional Digest, Washington, D. C.-- not a Government publication.) Speeches and writings pro and con, an article on "Free Trade vs. Protectionism" from a United States Government source, a glossary of terms, and other material.

FREE TRADE BEGINS AT HOME by John Chamberlain. (In Harper's, September, 1939, pp. 352-359.) Holds that domestic economic adjustments have to be made for any international-trade policy to be really effective.

Pamphlets:

A PRIMER ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS by Ursula P. Hubbard, Arthur D. Reeve, Jr. and Phyllis I. Valentin. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 405 West 117th Street, 1939.) Explains "one of the most scientific tariff programs ever undertaken."

THE INCONSISTENCIES OF OUR TRADE AGREEMENT POLICY by William L. Monro. (New York, American Tariff League, 25 West 43rd Street, 1938. Free for postage.) Favors instead a protective tariff which distinguishes between high- and low-wage countries exporting goods to the United States.

THE HULL TRADE PROGRAM AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM by Raymond L. Buell. (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 8 West 40th Street, revised edition, March, 1939. 25¢) Weighing the good and the bad, this World Affairs Pamphlet concludes that the Hull program for reducing trade barriers is a force for both peace and prosperity.

BATTLES WITHOUT BULLETS by Thomas Brockway. (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1939. 25¢) A Headline Book giving "the story of economic warfare" and favoring an "open, international economy."

REPORT OF THE TARIFF COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS. (New York: National Association of Manufacturers, 14 West 49th Street, to appear about January 1, 1940. Free.) A report devoted to the reciprocal trade-agreements program, and criticising it largely from a protectionist viewpoint.

Books:

THE WAY FORWARD by Francis B. Sayre. (New York: Macmillan, 1939.) The State Department official formerly in charge discusses the American trade-agreements program.

THE INVISIBLE TARIFF by Percy W. Bidwell. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1939.) How about the dangers, especially political, of restrictions on import trade which are not found in the tariff itself?

GIDDY MINDS AND FOREIGN QUARRELS by Charles A. Beard. (New York: Macmillan, 1939.) Contains an isolationist's viewpoint on foreign trade.

See also the Chapters on Tariff in any reliable textbook of economics.

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THE RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM

SHALL IT BE CONTINUED?

Of tho many issues in the field of foreign relations which will come before the 3rd Session of 76th Congress, none will be more bitterly contested than the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which will lapse in June unless it is reenacted. The debate on this issue will equal the Neutrality Debate in importance, although it will not be so generally understood.

A concerted drive to discredit the entire program of Reciprocal Trade Agreements has been under way for some time and seems to be gathering momentum. Although leadership for this attack is to be found in the Republican party, it is by no means confined there.

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program puts into effect a truly bi-partisan policy and it is unfortunate that its continuation should have to be determined during an election year. Tariff has always been a good vote-getting issue and the opposition party may not resist the inclination to use it in the 1940 campaign, even though the principle of Reciprocal Tariff pacts was first attempted by a Republican administration under President McKinley.

The following quotation from the Republican party platform in 1932 will surprise many who have come to regard the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program as belonging to the "New Deal":

> "The historic American policy known as the most-favored-nation-principle, has been our guiding program, and we believe that policy to be the only one consistent with a full development of international trade, the only one suitable for a country having as wide and diverse a commerce as America, and the one most appropriate for us in view of the great variety of our industrial, agricultural, and mineral products, and the traditions of our people. Any other plan involves bargains and partnerships with other nations and as a permament policy is unsuited to America's position."

The unconditional most-favored-nation-principle, the only effective means we have discovered of ensuring non-discriminatory treatment for our exports has been employed by this country since 1923. It was first adopted by the Republicans in 1922 after having been announced as the policy of the United States by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who was then Secretary of State.

Under the operation of this principle, concessions granted by the other country to any third country must be immediately and automatically extended to American products. We in turn extend nondiscriminatory treatment to all nations by generalizing the tariff adjustments made in individual trade agreements to all countries whose trade practices do not discriminate against us. Import quotas on certain commodities, limiting the amount which may come in under the terms of the trade agreement to a small percentage of domestic production, protect our markets from being flooded.

One of the principal charges against the Trade Agreements program is that it is unconstitutional. Proponents of this point of view say that the trade pacts are treaties and should be ratified by the Senate. Experience indicates the impracticability of this plan. The Senate failed to ratify 13 McKinley Reciprocal Trade Treaties.

Moreover, trade agreements are not treaties in the constitutional sense, because

the Constitution differentiates between treaties which do require Senate ratification and agreements which do not. Also, the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of such international agreements many times.

Our foreign trade would find itself in a disastrous position if the rules under which it must be carried on today were dependent on legislative action. So much pressure would be exerted on members of Congress that it is doubtful whether any agreement could ever be ratified.

The method by which the trade agreements are negotiated is essentially democratic. The Inter-Departmental Committee on Reciprocity Information (composed of experts from each of the governmental departments having an interest in foreign trade and commerce) conducts public hearings, pools information available in each department and submits its findings to the Tariff Commission. Three Republicans and three Democrats sit on this Commission. It is strictly bi-partisan and probably as free from politics as any government agency can be. The possible scope of the agreement and the commodities to be considered having been determined in this manner, the State Department proceeds with negotiations, and the final agreement goes to the President for his signature. The interest of the nation as a whole is the main concern of tariff negotiations and regulations under the Trade Agreements Act.

Opponents of the program are calling for an "exhaustive investigation" before the vote on renewal is taken. An editorial in the Christian Science Monitor for July 31, 1939 said "The Hull Trade Program, it would seem, does not need so much to be defended as it does to be understood." So perhaps the opponents of the program will render it a service by their study. Secretary Hull, at his Press conference on December 26th welcomed the suggestion. He said "The more comprehensive and searching an examination is made, the more pleasing it will be to the friends and supporters of this program of restoration of our agriculture, commerce and industry - provided it is undertaken in an earnest desire to secure information."

The campaign to discredit the program charges that the trade agreements have damaged the farmer and worked hardships on the American business man and industrialist alike. In considering this charge, let us admit that undoubtedly some special interests have been hurt. It is perfectly natural for those bearing the brunt to object. The fact that an expanding home market, i.e., greater purchasing power for the American consumer may be expected to cancel out their losses will not deter them from preventing the immediate losses if they can. The obvious way to do this is to convince the general public that the public good is not being served. An informed public opinion, therefore, is the only answer. Otherwise, pressure on Congress by special groups will succeed in submerging the general good for the benefit of the few.

Let us examine the Trade Agreements Program in relation to the Home Market and the American Consumer. Here are four self-evident propositions:

(1) Agriculture and Industry are of equal value to the internal economy of the United States.
(2) Both Agriculture and Industry are dependent in part on the foreign market, to dispose of their surplus products.
(3) The home market for the farmer depends on the ability of those employed by industry to buy food and shoes and clothing.
(4) The home market for industry depends on the ability of all our people, the farmer included, to buy the commodities produced.

(5) The ability of our people to buy depends on whether or not they have jobs, and whether they are reasonably sure of steady jobs.

When the vast industrial plants of our country are producing and selling, they are employing men. There is an up-turn in trade all along the line, - increased buying, increased selling, and most important of all, increased public confidence.

Those who visited the Ford Exhibit at the New York World's Fair learned to their amazement that one out of every seven employed persons in the United States traced his or her job to the automobile industry. Through mass production methods and modern efficiency the United States automobile industry produces the best automobiles in the world at the lowest prices. It is geared to produce many more automobiles than the home market can possibly absorb. Therefore, it must sell in the foreign markets. The demand is there, people in other countries want to buy, but if they buy from us we must also buy from them that which they have to sell.

There are other major industries equally dependent on the foreign market. By major industries we mean those upon which other industries (such as textiles, glass, metals, rubber, and so on) are partly dependent. When these major industries are at a standstill or operating only periodically, vast numbers of people are thrown out of employment and many others are fearful that their jobs may vanish over night. They are not, therefore, buying the things they need. They cut down on meat and butter; they do without shoes and hats, and woolen and cotton clothes. Manufacturers of these commodities close down their shops. More people are thrown out of work. In the meantime surpluses pile up in the agricultural parts of the country, the farmer cannot buy, and the vicious circle is complete.

Price-fixing, government subsidies, crop limitations and control do not offer the solution of this problem. They only postpone the ultimate reckoning, keep the living costs at an abnormally high level, and serve to deprive many of our people of the necessities of life.

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements program on the other hand, is gradually removing the log that has caused the jam. Our foreign trade has steadily increased since 1934. It is true that imports have increased more rapidly than exports, but here are the figures:

In 1938 the excess of United States exports over imports amounted to more than $1,100,000,000.

Comparing our foreign trade of 1937-38 with that of 1934-35:

EXPORTS have increased

To Trade Agreements countries, 61% To all other countries, 35%

IMPORTS have increased

From Trade Agreements countries, 35% From all other countries, 37%

(It must be remembered also that our imports include many commodities on the free list, such as rubber, silk, coffee and bananas.)

This trend in our trade is significant because -

(1) It reflects the direct benefits which domestic producers are receiving through larger exports to Trade Agreement countries, and
(2) It illustrates clearly the care which has been exercised in making concessions on commodities imported into the United States and disproves the Contention that Trade Agreements have occasioned a flood of imports.

The records show that the foreign markets for United States Agricultural Products have been enlarged in every trade agreement which has been negotiated. Foreign tariff rates on agricultural commodities, as well as quota restrictions, have been removed or improved in favor of American products. United States exports of farm products have increased substantially since 1932. The increase in agricultural imports was mainly the result of drought conditions in 1934 and 1936, the program of crop control and limitation, and increased demand by industry for agricultural raw materials.

A brief analysis of United States imports and exports at this point may be helpful. Imports to the United States fall under six classifications:

(1) Products not produced in the U.S. (coffee, rubber, tin, nickel, mahogany, bananas, silk)
(2) Products produced in the U.S. but in insufficient quantities to supply the demand (aluminum, manganese, sugar)
(3) Products, certain types of which are not produced in the United States or if produced are manufactured in small quantities (fine cotton and wool textiles, lace, gloves, wool)
(4) Products produced in the U.S. but at high prices under excessive tariff protection (sugar, rayon - over 100% duty)
(5) Products produced in the U.S. with which imports are directly competitive, protected by tariff quotas, reduced rates applying only to limited quantity of imports (cattle, cream, fish, shoes)
(6) Products produced in the U.S. which need no protection (automobiles, tires)

Any attempt, therefore, to determine the effect of imports on either agriculture or industry must take these factors into account and in the interest of fairness the total import figure must be broken down into its component parts.

Only four per cent of our agricultural imports in 1936-37, excluding sugar, consisted of items covered by Trade Agreements; the others came in at rates imposed by the Smoot-Hawley tariff.

Exports from the United States may be classified as follows:

A. Agricultural Products - which must find an outlet in the foreign market.
(1) Cotton (50% must be exported)
(2) Tobacco
(3) Wheat
(4) Fruit (apples, pears, prunes, citrus fruits, canned fruits)
(5) Hog products (lard, bacon, ham)

B. Timber and Lumber
C. Industrial Products surplus of which must be sold abroad
(1) Automobiles
(2) Radios
(3) Electric refrigerators
(4) Machinery, farm and industrial
(5) Iron and steel products

A nation must buy if it wishes to sell. Particularly is this true of our trade relations with Latin-America.

Attacks on the Trade Agreements program will probably center around the three agreements now under negotiation with Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Their individual importance to the United States must be understood and they must be considered

also in the light of our continental policy. Tariff regulation is not a purely domestic matter, but must be considered in relation to their probable effect on the economies of other countries and their psychological reaction to us. The international implications of all tariff regulations must be frankly faced. The failure to renew the Trade Agreements Act would be interpreted abroad as a major reversal in American Foreign Policy. It would deal a vital blow to the possibility of continental solidarity.

It is claimed that the products of the two American continents are not complementary, but are almost entirely competitive. The reverse is true. Individual countries may produce certain commodities which we produce, but because of the triangular character of international trade, the interdependence of the economies of the Latin-American states, and the widespread demand for products from the United States - it is necessary to consider the Trade Agreements program as a whole.

The war has made it necessary for all of the 21 republics of the Western Hemisphere, including ourselves, to protect our internal economies as much as possible from the dislocations of a world at war and to think in terms of continental defense and solidarity. The last few months have demonstrated that modern wars are fought on four fronts - military, diplomatic, economic and psychological. Continental solidarity, if it is to hold, must be constructed in the same way. Should it break down at any one of these four points, it will be useless. The scuttling of the Trade Agreements program would constitute such a breakdown. It would destroy the fabric of the Good Neighbor Policy and be ruinous to us. The Trade Agreements program offers the hope that continental solidarity can be achieved and that at the end of the war there may be an area in the Western Hemisphere where economic and political stability prevail.

Trade statistics compiled from official statistics of U.S. Dept. of Commerce.

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1938 Results Under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program an article in Commerce Reports, Feb. 18, 1939.

A pamphlet — A Primer on the Trade Agreements

Hubbard, Reeve, Valentin — National Peace Conference, 8 W. 40th St., N.Y.C. 1939. 5¢

The following material may be obtained by writing to the Trade Agreements Division of the United States Department of State:

States Stories - A series of documents giving facts about the Reciprocal Trade Agreements as they have affected the interests of the various states.

Secretary Hull's Speech before the American Farm Bureau Federation, Dec. 5, 1939
See also daily newspapers of that date.

Present Status of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program. Dec. 1939.

Detailed information about the proposed agreements with Uruguay, Chile and Argentina. Lists of commodities to be considered or any other details in which you may be interested may be secured from the United States Department of Commerce.

Questions to Test Your Understanding

1. What are the two fundamental objectives of the American Trade Agreements program?
2. Review the method by which a Reciprocal Trade Agreement is negotiated.
3. Describe the triangular character of international trade.
4. What is the method of payment between nations?
5. Why is the most-favored-nation clause considered so important?

Questions to be used as a basis for discussion

1. Do you consider that the high standard of living in the United States was induced by protected tariff, by free trade between states, or by mass production methods and specialization of labor?

2. Considering the comparatively high wage rate in the U.S., how has it been possible for our industries to compete successfully in the foreign market against the products of low wage countries?

3. Who is the American consumer? the laborer? the farmer? the industrialist? the small businessman? the housewife?

4. List five industries which might be considered major industries of the U.S. Considering each of these industries separately, list other industries which are partly or wholly dependent upon them for their continued operation.

   In your opinion is the market for agricultural products dependent to any extent upon the continued operation of these industries? If so, in what way or ways?

5. In your opinion what would be the alternative to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program?
   Would you favor a return to the policy of embargo tariffs enacted by Congress? Should the Trade Agreements program be abrogated or curtailed? What would be the alternative? What would be the effect on
   (1) continental solidarity?
   (2) the organization of peace and economic reconstruction which must follow the cessation of war?

6. Do you know whether the trade agreements affect the interests of your state or of your community? (facts and figures may be obtained from the U.S. Dept. of Commerce or the State Department. See Bibliography)

7. Do you think that the people in your community understand the Trade Agreements program? If not, is there anything you can and will do about it?

Note: Watch your daily papers for developments in the negotiations now under way with Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Read the speeches and statements of the opponents of the Trade Agreements program. Determine whether in your opinion they are presenting the whole picture; whether their conclusions tally with the facts and whether their criticisms are justified. Determine also whether they are thinking in terms of the nation as a whole.

VERA W. BEGGS
Chairman International Relations
General Federation of Women's Clubs

(Not printed at Government expense)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 76th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Why the Old Discredited Embargo Tariff Policy Hurt the American Farmer and the New Hull Trade Agreements Help Him

TEXT OF LETTER
OF
HON. CORDELL HULL
SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. President, under permission granted me on November 3, 1939, I wish to have inserted in the RECORD Secretary of State Hull's letter to Senator ARTHUR CAPPER relative to the proposed trade agreement dealing with agriculture. The letter is as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
November 7, 1939.

The Honorable ARTHUR CAPPER,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR CAPPER: I have received your letter of October 17, 1939, in which you comment further upon the proposed trade agreement with Argentina. Elaborating the expressions of apprehension concerning the possible effects of this agreement upon agriculture which were contained in your previous letter, you discuss at some length certain of the agricultural items which were listed in our public announcement as being open to consideration for the granting of possible concessions to Argentina.

It would manifestly be improper for me, while the negotiations are in progress and before any decisions have been reached concerning these and other pending items, to attempt to anticipate the results of the very careful study which will be given to all such items by the best practical experts from the various departments of the Government which are collaborating in this work, including, of course, the Department of Agriculture. I note that you have sent a copy of your letter to the Committee for Reciprocity Information with a request that it be made a part of the statement which you submitted to the committee at the hearings on October 16. You may be assured that this additional expression of your views will be carefully considered by the interdepartmental trade-agreements organization.

Your views appear to be broadly similar to those expressed before the Committee for Reciprocity Information at the recent hearings on the Argentine agreement by various other Members of Congress, and also by representatives of certain organizations speaking, or purporting to speak, for the farmer. Hence I should like—speaking also for the farmer as well as for the rest of the country—to take this opportunity to point out some of the salient facts which should be borne in mind in connection with this whole matter.

First of all, I want to emphasize that attempts to prejudge the case by forecasting all sorts of dire happenings to agriculture, in consequence of an agreement with Argentina which has not yet been negotiated, are wholly premature, and are in no sense justified by the experience in connection with earlier agreements. Expressions of fear and sweeping assertions of this type have been heard every time trade-agreement negotiations have been undertaken with another country. Invariably this occurred before the negotiation of the particular trade agreement had been completed. Invariably the clamor subsided as soon as the actual terms of the agreement were made public and the moderate and careful nature of the tariff adjustments made by us was revealed.

Second, I want to emphasize that neither you, yourself, nor any of the others who have expressed opposition to the negotiation of a trade agreement with Argentina, on the ground of alleged injury to agriculture, can possibly have more at heart than I do the interests of the farmers of this country. There cannot be any question of that. The point at issue is wholly different. I am convinced that the trade-agreements program has been highly beneficial to our farmers and to the Nation as a whole. You, apparently, are not. I am confident that the proposed trade agreement with Argentina, which is a part of the program, will not be injurious to our farmers, but, on the contrary, will be helpful both to our agriculture and to the economic well-being of the Nation as a whole. You, apparently, are not. Let us look at the facts.

In most of the recent discussions of the proposed agreement with Argentina, including your own observations, I note a decided tendency not only to prejudge this prospective agreement in the absence of any knowledge of what its actual terms will be, but also to weigh it solely by itself, entirely separate and apart from the remainder of the trade-agreements program. That, I submit, is wholly untenable and unfair. I recognize, of course, that each agreement must be appraised, in the first instance, on its own merits; but I cannot, in fairness to the interests of the farmers themselves or the Nation as a whole, agree that responsible consideration of the matter can stop at that point.

As regards the prospective agreement with Argentina, obviously it cannot be appraised on its own merits until its actual terms are determined. At the present stage of the negotiations, neither I nor any one else concerned with the negotiations can possibly know precisely what commodities will be affected and in what measure—except that, as was invariably the case in all previous negotiations, the well-being of our farmers, as well as of all other groups of the population, will be fully and carefully taken into account.

As to the wisdom of negotiating an agreement with a country like Argentina, it should be noted, first of all, that during the past 15 years our sales to Argentina amounted to $1,543,000,000, which was $487,000,000 in excess of our purchases from Argentina. The agreement now under negotiation is necessary in order to safeguard and expand this important foreign market for American products as a necessary means of expanding our domestic market as well. Shall we throw away this mutually beneficial trade relationship and the increased purchasing power for both agriculture and industry resulting from it, simply because of exaggerated fears—entirely unwarranted and, in too many instances, unfairly fostered—that American farmers might be injured by an agreement containing, among its other features, limited adjustments of tariffs on a few agricultural products, some of them largely or wholly non-competitive and all of them supplementary to our own production?

The whole question of negotiating a trade agreement with Argentina or any other country is one which can be fully and properly evaluated only in conjunction with the entire program. In the conduct of trade negotiations there is neither justification in principle nor authority in law for deliberately discriminating between agricultural and non-agricultural countries in choosing the field for negotiation. If we are to proceed seriously with this broad program for the reopening of the channels of trade, we must be prepared to negotiate either limited or comprehensive agreements—as circumstances warrant—with all countries whose trade policies are such as to afford a basis for negotiation under principles laid down in the Trade Agreements Act.

Almost without exception, opponents of this agreement—even those who, in all sincerity, have been making public statements in opposition to it—have failed to grasp the fundamentals of the issue. The problem is one of promoting the economic welfare of the entire Nation through increase of purchasing power and expansion of markets, at home and abroad, to the benefit of American agriculture, industry, and labor. To do this requires that we exert every effort—without materially impairing, even temporarily, the interests of any established and reasonably efficient domestic industry—to lower or remove excessive barriers to international trade. Agriculture, dependent as it is not only upon foreign markets but also upon the general prosperity of the Nation, has probably more to gain from such a program of trade liberalization than any other major branch of the Nation's economic life.

This is the central problem which we have been seeking to solve through trade agreements. It is because of the vital bearing of a constructive foreign-trade policy on our national prosperity that the President and his entire administration have made the trade-agreements program an essential part of their unceasing effort to rehabilitate our agriculture and our whole economic life.

The trade-agreements program has had, and now has, no purpose more essential than that of benefiting American agriculture. Notwithstanding reckless and grossly unfair assertions to the contrary, we have made great headway in the face of difficulties of the most serious character. Now, however, as we enter upon negotiations with Argentina, it is violently asserted in certain quarters that we should forego the unquestionable advantages of a trade agreement with Argentina on the spurious and unsupported plea that certain branches of American agriculture would be injured in the process. It is even sweepingly alleged, without one scintilla of supporting evidence, that agriculture as a whole will suffer from this agreement.

However sincerely such feelings may be held, they are not, I repeat, founded upon a full understanding of the facts. They rest upon premises which are so erroneous or so narrow that the entire picture is distorted. The allegation that the Argentine agreement will be injurious to certain branches of American agriculture is based upon two false assumptions: (1) That whatever tariff adjustments are made will not be as carefully considered and as adequately safeguarded as those made in agreements already negotiated; and (2) that every additional pound or bushel or other unit that is imported deprives the domestic producers of that much business. This second assumption entirely overlooks the fact that the domestic market is not a fixed or a static market but, on the contrary, expands or contracts under the influence, among other factors, of a prosperous or a depressed foreign trade.

The inherent fallacy involved in the assumption that the domestic market is a static one is nowhere better demonstrated than by our own experience under embargo tariffs. I have discussed that experience so often and so fully in the past that it is surely unnecessary to repeat it here. The essential facts are, as our Hawley-Smoot experience painfully demonstrated: First, that it is impossible to grant embargo tariffs to some groups and withhold them from others, and that, once political trading of this sort gets under way, there is no stopping short of prohibitive tariffs all along the line; and second, that the net result of such an embargo tariff policy is a disastrous decline in our foreign trade which leaves in its wake a prostrate agriculture and a prostrate nation.

Far from being preserved, the farmer's home market—as well as his foreign—is drastically reduced as a result of embargo tariffs. We have learned from experience that to embark upon such a policy is ruinous. For well-meaning persons assuming to speak for agriculture still to cling, despite all that happened after 1930, to the delusion that the farmer has something to gain from embargo tariffs, or from resisting a program for adjusting such tariffs below the embargo level while still providing thoroughly adequate safeguards, is folly compounded. Most of those who are today attempting to destroy our trade program by making insupportable charges that it is injuring agriculture are the same false prophets who solemnly assured the farmers that the Hawley-Smoot embargoes would guarantee to them full and permanent prosperity; whereas, in actual fact, within 2 years from the enactment of the 1930 tariff, millions of farmers found themselves in, or on the verge of, bankruptcy.

The plain truth is that farmers in this country have everything to gain and nothing to lose from a carefully administered program for the reestablishment of our foreign trade to the fullest extent that international conditions will permit. It is either such a course of moderation, with expanding markets for American products at home and abroad; or else it is embargo tariffs all around, with consequences that we have already seen.

Moreover, there is no basis in fact for truly astounding statements that the program in actual operation has injured American farmers. The very reverse is the case.

The facts are that we have secured extremely valuable benefits for agriculture through the safeguarding and expanding of foreign markets for our farm surpluses. The improved facilities for the marketing abroad of the products of our farms were one of the major factors responsible for the rise in our agricultural exports from $662,000,000 in 1932 and $694,000,000 in 1933 to $828,000,000 in 1938, as contrasted with their drastic decline from a level of $1,693,000,000 in 1929. In addition, of course, the farmer's home market has expanded in consequence of increased domestic employment and purchasing power for farm products, partly brought about by trade-agreement concessions obtained for American exports of both agricultural and nonagricultural commodities.

The trade agreements thus far concluded are with countries which take about 60 percent of our total exports. In these agreements we have obtained valuable concessions, including binding of duty-free entry, for 47 percent of our exports of farm products to all countries. These concessions cover about three-fourths of our exports of farm products to the trade-agreement countries themselves. Old markets have been safeguarded and new markets have been opened up for all surplus-producing branches of our agriculture. A few illustrations will suffice.

After a prolonged period of domestic shortage, the corn-hog industry is again becoming heavily dependent upon export outlets. Reduction of barriers against our exports of pork, ham, or bacon has been obtained in 10 countries. On lard 9 countries have reduced barriers, while 3 others have agreed not to impose new restrictions.

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Of special significance is the removal in the agreement with Great Britain of a burdensome preferential duty on lard, originally imposed in retaliation for some of the superprotectionist provisions of the Smoot-Hawley tariff.

On grains and grain products, foreign-trade barriers have been lowered in all but five of the agreements now in effect, and in three of the remaining five agreements the foreign countries concerned have bound existing favorable duties against increase. Great Britain has removed its duty on wheat, also originally imposed in retaliation for our action under the Smoot-Hawley tariff, and has bound corn and cotton on the free list.

Fruits, vegetables, and a long list of other farm products have benefited from the concessions obtained in the trade agreements.

Analysis of the results obtained under the trade-agreements program reveals that between 1935 and 1938 our exports of farm products to trade-agreement countries increased by nearly 50 percent, whereas to other countries they actually declined slightly. It is a stupendous fact that this progress in reopening market outlets was attained in the face of such formidable obstacles as the continuation in many countries of exorbitantly high trade barriers, the existence abroad of an extraordinarily low level of purchasing power, the increasing diversion of purchasing power to the procurement of commodities needed for the construction of armaments, and the disastrous effects of unprecedented droughts upon our own exporting capacity.

One would look in vain, in the mass of statements and appeals with which those who seek to destroy the trade-agreements program have flooded the farmers, for any reference to these undisputed and important benefits secured, through trade agreements, for the farmers themselves and for the Nation as a whole. In their unholy zeal, they deliberately suppress and withhold all material facts favorable to the trade-agreements program. It is high time for the farmers of our Corn-Hog Belt, our Wheat Belt, our Cotton Belt to ask why such opponents of the trade-agreements program—professing, as they do, to have the interests of the farmers at heart—do not give them all of the facts essential for informed judgment on this issue, which is so crucial to their welfare.

The agreements we have concluded are with countries which account for a little over 60 percent of our total imports. Among these are such important agricultural producers as Canada and some of the Latin American republics. To these countries we have granted carefully considered and carefully safeguarded tariff adjustments on some of their characteristic products, designed to permit a moderate increase of their sales to us in exchange for increased outlets for our products.

Much has been said in recent years about imports of agricultural products, by persons who have sought to persuade farmers that such imports are highly detrimental; and efforts have been unceasing to make it appear that trade-agreement concessions have been seriously harmful in this connection. It has even been falsely asserted that the bulk of the concessions granted by us in trade agreements have been on farm products. Repeated exposure of the utter hollowness of such unfounded assertions has not prevented their endless repetition.

The facts with regard to concessions on farm products are that, while duties have been adjusted on more than a fifth of our nonagricultural imports, in the case of agricultural imports the tariff adjustments now in effect apply to only about 8 percent of the total. It is clear that these adjustments in duties on farm products could not possibly have been a factor of any considerable importance in the recent situation as regards imports of agricultural products.

It needs to be understood just what these agricultural imports are and what is the true explanation of the changes in their volume in recent years. In all of the vast array of misleading literature put out on this subject, there is not the slightest suggestion as to the true character or the true significance of these imports.

For example, if we examine the figures for 1938—the last full year available, and a year in which most of the abnormality in the import figures arising from the cumulative effects of the droughts of 1934 and 1936 had disappeared—what do we find? We find that, of the total imports of agricultural, or so-called agricultural, products, amounting to $956,000,000, more than half consisted of things like rubber, coffee, silk, etc., which are not even produced in the United States. Among these items were $138,000,000 worth of coffee; $130,000,000 of crude rubber; $89,000,000 of raw silk; $29,000,000 of bananas; $20,000,000 of cocoa beans; $18,000,000 of tea; $13,000,000 of carpet wool; and $10,000,000 of sisal and henequen (mostly for the farmer's binder twine). This was the situation, notwithstanding that the relatively low business and industrial activity in the United States in 1938 resulted in much smaller importation of industrial raw materials than takes place in more prosperous years. For example, in 1937 our imports of products of this type, not produced in the United States, amounted to $711,000,000.

With respect to the remainder of our 1938 imports of agricultural products (amounting to slightly less than half of the total), we find that sugar alone accounted for $130,000,000, or well over a fourth; and sugar imports have been regulated by quota restriction until quite recently when the quotas were removed and the tariff duty on Cuban sugar reverted to the pre-Cuban-trade-agreement rate. So far as concerns the rest of these imports, two things are to be noted: First, that they consist—as in the case of sugar—of commodities of a type which we do not produce in sufficient quantities, despite high tariffs on most of them, to meet our own requirements; and second, that, in very considerable part, they consist of products imported because of seasonal, quality, or other special factors.

The significance of changes in the volume of imports of agricultural, or so-called agricultural, products from year to year is equally in need of clarification. It is easy to attach a completely false significance to the rise of such imports from $668,000,000 in 1932 to $956,000,000 in 1938, meanwhile conveniently ignoring the fact that farm income, after reaching its lowest ebb in 1932, had increased between 1932 and 1938 by almost $3,000,000,000. It is easy to neglect pointing out that in 1929 we brought in from abroad $2,218,000,000 of such products, so that, on the theory that the volume of farm imports governs farm prosperity, agriculture should have reached the very bottom of depression in 1929, instead of which—after 2 years of Hawley-Smoot embargoes—it reached bottom in 1932. It is easy to make utterly false use of import figures which are, in a large degree, abnormal. For example, a large part of the greatly increased volume of agricultural imports in 1937 was, as every informed person should have known, the direct result of severe domestic shortages caused by the droughts of 1934 and 1936. A considerable part of the increase was also, of course, the result of the marked economic improvement in 1937, which led to increased imports of agricultural and other raw materials, in large part noncompetitive and essential for the operation of our industries.

That our agriculture has not been injured by these imports of agricultural products may be clearly seen from an examination of the income received by farmers in recent years and from the movement of prices of the principal agricultural commodities. What the figures show, on the contrary, is that agricultural imports and farm income have tended generally in the past to move up and down together.

The total cash income from the marketing of all farm products, exclusive of Government payments, was $4,606,000,000 in 1932, $5,248,000,000 in 1933, $8,621,000,000 in 1937, and $7,538,000,000 in 1938. The latest estimated income for 1939 is $7,600,000,000. All major groups of producers participated in these increases, just as in the preceding 3 years they all shared in the calamitous decline of farm income from the level of $11,221,000,000 which was received in 1929.

The contrast between the two periods is striking. During the first, the Hawley-Smoot tariff was in full operation; during the second, the trade-agreements program was increasingly being put into effect.

When the Hawley-Smoot tariff was enacted in 1930 the farmers were promised a period of great prosperity, under the slogan "the American market for the American farmer." Instead, during the 3 years which followed, the cash income from the marketing of crops fell by $1,355,000,000, while the income from the marketing of livestock and livestock products dropped by $2,338,000,000. This latter figure included a decline of $1,252,000,000 in the income from meat animals alone and a decline of $641,000,000 in the income from dairy products.

When the Trade Agreements Act was passed, and periodically since then, as trade agreements were negotiated, irresponsible and terrifying predictions were made in some quarters that the effect would be to "ruin" our agriculture. Yet between 1933 and 1938 the income received from the marketing of crops increased by $716,000,000, and the income received from the marketing of livestock and livestock products increased by $1,574,000,000. This latter figure includes an increase of $952,000,000 in the income from meat animals and of $408,000,000 in the income from dairy products.

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The movement of prices of farm products since 1932 tells essentially the same story. In 1932 the average index of farm prices (1909–14=100) was 65; in 1938 it was 95. In 1932 the average farm price of wheat was 38.8 cents a bushel; in 1938, 66.1 cents; and on September 15, 1939, 72.7 cents. For corn the figures for these same respective dates were 28.1, 49.0, and 56.2 cents a bushel. For hogs, the figures were $3.34, $7.74, and $7.06 a hundred, respectively. For beef cattle the figures were $4.25, $6.53, and $7.07 a hundred. For butterfat the figures were 17.9, 26.3, and 24.7 cents a pound. For wool the figures were 8.6, 19.1, and 24.3 cents a pound.

While there was a considerable rise in prices of some of these products after the recent outbreak of war in Europe, inspection of the earlier figures reveals that, before that time, the prices received by farmers for beef cattle, hogs, corn, and wheat had risen one and one-half times as compared with 1932; those for butterfat, by nearly one-third; and those for wool, to three times their 1932 level.

The data for income and prices with respect to beef cattle and dairy products are particularly significant. It is in connection with these commodities that the loudest prophecies of doom and the most reckless claims of injury have been occasioned by the tariff adjustments made in the trade agreements. Yet both of these branches of our agriculture have shown substantial improvement during recent years. It is in the face of such facts as these that some lobbyists in and out of Washington purporting to speak for dairy and livestock interests carry on their unceasing efforts to mislead not only the public but the very industries for whom they pretend to speak.

The record recited above shows all too clearly that the whole idea that farmers have anything to gain by supporting a policy of air-tight embargo tariffs on farm products is shot through with fallacy. It shows, as already stated, that this leads to embargo tariffs all around, destroying both foreign and domestic markets and resulting in disaster to agriculture, as to other branches of our economic life. It proves conclusively that statements to the effect that our farmers are being injured by the trade agreements can only be based either upon ignorance of the facts, for which there is little excuse, since all of the data given above are regularly published and are easily available; or else upon a deliberate attempt to mislead the farmers and the public in general. It is an incontrovertible fact that no agricultural tariff adjustments have been made in our trade agreements without the utmost care to see to it that those branches of our agriculture affected were left with ample safeguards.

I feel that I must emphasize once more the point that those who now attack the trade-agreements program on the alleged ground that the proposed Argentine agreement will injure our agriculture assume that this agreement, or any single agreement, can be weighed in complete dissociation from the remainder of the entire program. They would have us ignore completely the moderate nature of the concessions made in other trade agreements and the beneficial effects of other agreements upon agriculture, through expansion of market outlets for farm products both at home and abroad. They even assume that the tariff adjustments which we may make in the Argentine agreement can be appraised independently of the benefits obtained in the way of safeguarding and expanding our exports to Argentina.

Far from injuring farmers, the trade agreements have made a twofold contribution to their economic welfare. Increased foreign markets for agricultural products have eased the burden of our surpluses and have placed greater purchasing power in the hands of the producers. Increased foreign markets for industrial, as well as agricultural, products—and in the trade agreements negotiated to date valuable concessions were secured from foreign countries for one-quarter of our nonagricultural exports—have expanded domestic demand for all types of farm products.

The accomplishment of both of these aims—that is, expansion of both the domestic and the foreign demand for our products at fair prices—is among the paramount purposes of the trade-agreements program. Neither is possible in a satisfactory measure without the establishment throughout the world of conditions under which mutually profitable trade, based upon the essential principle of equal treatment, can be given the greatest practicable scope of operation. And experience has shown that no more effective method of promoting such conditions of trade has been devised than that embodied in our trade-agreements program.

We have taken a position of leadership in this field, not only because a healthy development of foreign trade is necessary to the economic stability and welfare of this country and is an indispensable foundation of enduring peace, but also because the alternative to the type of policy which we pursue is a growth of national economic isolation, with all its disastrous results for the peace and prosperity of nations. That alternative means, within nations, increasing regimentation in all phases of economic life, beginning with the surplus-producing industries and steadily extending to all other branches of production and distribution. It means the dole in an expanding and more and more aggravated form, and a decline in the general standard of national well-being. Even before the outbreak of the present war, excessive trade barriers were predominantly responsible for the piling up of huge surpluses in some countries, while millions of people throughout the world were compelled to subsist on short rations. Internationally it means growing animosities, bitter resentments, and, in the end, the anarchy of violence through the unbridled use of armed force.

When the present unfortunate period of hostilities is over, this and other important nations will be confronted with the choice of either furnishing an increased measure of leadership in bringing the world back to a sane and healthy economy, both domestically and internationally, and thus in building the foundation of enduring peace; or of undergoing a steady deterioration in their economic life, with all the evil consequences of such a downward course for stability and prosperity within nations and for peace among nations.

At the present time, the best interests of this Nation require the greatest possible effort in the direction of maintaining the results of our unremitting work in the field of trade-agreement negotiations during the past 5 years and of extending the area of negotiations wherever possible. The negotiations now in progress with such countries as Argentina are a part of this vital effort. Here we have an opportunity to place the trade relations between this country and the nations to the south of us on a basis of greater mutual advantage, to the benefit of both sides, and at the same time to strengthen the ties of friendship and solidarity in the Western Hemisphere, which are so vitally important to our common security in a world harassed by war.

In view of all these circumstances, I earnestly hope that those, like yourself, who have been apprehensive concerning the pending negotiations will give the whole matter further thought. It seems to me that it is due the Nation, and the farmers themselves, that premature judgments with respect to these negotiations be suspended and that, when the negotiations are completed, appraisal of the results be based upon all of the relevant facts. I am confident that, if this is done, the only reasonable verdict will be that the interests of the farmers will have been promoted, rather than hurt. I am confident that, in consequence of both direct and indirect benefits arising from the Argentine agreement itself and of the further impetus that conclusion of this agreement will give to a program which is basically in their interest, farmers will share with the rest of the Nation the manifest advantages to be gained from the improvement of our trade relations with an influential and a friendly nation in the Western Hemisphere.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL.

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SECTION V

THE CONFERENCE METHOD AND WORLD PROBLEMS

"Come, let us reason together"

War ends not on the battle field but at the conference table. Why not omit the war stage and go direct to the conference table? As it is difficult to extricate the causes of controversy from their political effect and to dissociate feeling from fact, every dispute has in it potentialities for war or for peace. It seems highly desirable, therefore, for nations to submit all disputes to the combined consideration of all interested groups for settlement. This was the plan evolved at the Peace Conference of 1919 where efforts were made to provide for periodic conferences covering almost every subject of international concern. It was hoped that use of the conference method would prevent war.

Advocacy of the conference method was an outgrowth of experience during the World War. From 1917 on, the Allies had found it desirable to confer through the Supreme War Council and subsidiary councilar bodies on a variety of topics such as transportation, food, nitrates, blockade, etc. If the conference method was successful during the war, why shouldn't it be during peace?

Another reason for setting up the conference system was to give substance to the war promise that henceforth the affairs of the world would be run by "open diplomacy openly arrived at." As conferences are public occasions, attended by the people and the press, they offer the best medium for public participation in the conduct of international affairs. Delegates to a conference speak not only to their colleagues but to the world. The ubiquitous press carries not only the words but also interpretations of all important speeches. An international conference can be used as a sounding board for public opinion. Even when a conference may seem ineffective as a peace-making agency it retains its value as a public rostrum. This was shown by the constant appeals made to the League of Nations by Spain, China and now Finland.

Still another reason for the post-war system of conferences was the desire to extend the use of democratic methods. In an international conference all nations sit as equals, with the same opportunities to propose and dispose of international problems. Some conferences (i.e., International Labor Organization) make decisions by the democratic method of majority rule, others (Assembly of the League of Nations) to avoid dissension, insist upon unanimity.

The conference method is an effort by a group of nations to do in a multilateral way, what has always been attempted by the bi-lateral method of diplomacy. The difference is not one of kind but of degree. More people are involved, more questions discussed and more solutions advanced at international conferences than in diplomatic conversations.

The development of conferences has been a natural one. As the international horizon has widened, the generalizing of problems has become inevitable. There has been increasing necessity for the consideration of common problems in a large representative gathering. Scientific developments have made the holding

of conferences possible. Through the telegraph, cable, telephone and radio, it is possible for members of a conference to consult easily with the home government thereby keeping the discussions vital. The airplane has made travel to conferences easy and quick. This was vividly demonstrated in September 1939 when a Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics was proposed September 4, assembled September 23 and adjourned with important resolutions adopted on October 3. In the space of a month, the representatives of the twenty-one republics had packed their bags, arrived at Panama City and reached an agreement. A few years ago it would have taken almost that long for the conferences to reach the city designated.

According to Sir Maurice Hankey, "diplomacy by conference has come to stay." He drew this conclusion from his experience of attending four hundred eighty-eight international conferences between 1914-21.

Conferences can be separated according to subject matter, into political, economic and technical conferences. Judged by their purpose, however, they have only one, that of promoting the understanding and working relationships of nations. From the point of view of technique, therefore, there are certain essentials which are necessary for all conferences.

The first essential is the preparation of the political ground. It is necessary for the nations who are to participate in an international conference to have national policies which can be harmonized with an agreed international policy. Otherwise, the "time is not ripe" for a conference on the subject. To illustrate, it would be useless to call a disarmament conference if the important nations had an avowed policy of military aggression; to call an economic conference if the major nations were committed to a policy of complete self-sufficiency; to call a peace conference if the belligerents were convinced that more is to be gained by force than by compromise. A striking example of a conference which failed because the domestic policy was not in tune with the foreign policy is that of the London Economic Conference of 1933 at which the United States refused to be a party to an international agreement for stabilizing money, because it wanted to be free to manipulate its own currency. The conference had to adjourn.

There is next the question of personnel. The representatives of each nation must be informed, responsible people, capable of carrying the results of the conference through the proper channels to the government and the public. The group must also include experts who can differentiate a fact from an emotion. If the subject of the conference is one which needs public support, then the personnel should include adequate representation of public opinion. All members of a delegation must, of course, be sympathetic with the purpose of the conference, patient with its personnel, and persistent in working for agreements satisfactory to all.

The technical preparation for the discussions at the conference must be carefully made. The assembling of facts is relatively simple if sufficient time is given beforehand. The possession of special information not only puts the discussion upon solid ground but greatly expedites the deliberations of the

conference. This work of preparation for a conference has been worked out in detail in recent years so that there is a special technique called "documentation," meaning the forseeing and the preparing of material which will be useful for the discussion of the subjects on the agenda. Other important preparation details are those of physical arrangements which can make or break a conference.

Another essential of a conference is that it make provision for following up the plans made at the conference. It should not be a "conference to end conferences" but a conference to begin conferences. This was illustrated by the Lima conference. Among the many resolutions passed were several looking forward to the development of plans which were only suggested at Lima. As a result, there were in less than a year, conferences of the Foreign Ministers and of Treasury representatives.

Provision should be made for the future reconsideration of the plans adopted at conferences so that progressive modification of the existing status can be assured. This has been done by providing for a definite time limit on treaties or agreements, or for the reconvening of the conference. In the post-war system of conferences, the value of continuity was recognized and definite dates were set for the annual conferences of the League of Nations and International Labor Organization. This regularization of conferences has many advantages. It affords an opportunity for the conferees to become acquainted with each other and to meet in succeeding conferences not as strangers but as friends. The same people gradually accumulate a body of common knowledge. Most important of all, the existence of a regular system assures the members of the conference who may be dissatisfied at any one time with the results, that there will be another opportunity for them to present their case.

Some of the essentials of a conference have been listed. These do not, however, guarantee the success of the conference. That, in turn, must depend upon the atmosphere in which the conference is held, the scope which is attempted, and the will to succeed. The fewer the subjects, the smaller the group, the greater the chance of the agreement. But, on the other hand, the results may be less far-reaching. It is difficult to deal with limited subject matter in conferences in these interdependent days. Even conferences on narcotic drugs which would seem to be a subject that could be dissociated from the rest of the international welter, can not be satisfactorily discussed without taking into consideration Japan's political policy which invalidates much that has been accomplished through international restriction and regulation of traffic in opium and narcotics.

It is also difficult to restrict the invitations to a conference. If some nations with a real interest are omitted, they may frustrate the results. The Washington Disarmament Conference added four nations to the original five when the armament discussion turned to the political situation in the Far East but even then Russia, a Pacific power, was not invited. The results of the Locarno Conference also suffered from the absence of Russia. The voluntary absence of the United States from some important conferences has been used as an explanation for the failure to achieve substantial results.

A superb example of the will to succeed is the conference of six nations which met continuously for three years in order to evolve a plan which would settle the fifty-year-old dispute over the Chaco territory which had led to war between Bolivia and Paraguay. The almost insuperable difficulties were met with a corresponding amount of ingenuity and patience. The story has been dramatically told by Spemille Braden, the United States member of the peace commission.

Even in these chaotic days, when human ingenuity seems concentrated on destruction instead of construction, it is still true that some creative energy is being used in handling international problems by the conference method. The most heartening system is the Pan-American one. For fifty years the twenty-one American republics have met in periodic conferences for general discussion of the whole field of inter-American relationships. These big conferonces have been supplemented by many of a restricted and technical character. In recent years there has been rapid acceleration of Pan-Americanism because of the United States positive policy of the good neighbor. The recent Panama Conference demonstrated the solidarity of the American republics and their ability to think in concrete terms of implementing this solidarity. It provided for two more small conferences - one in Washington to be composed of economic experts and one in Rio de Janeiro of international lawyers. In November,1939, there was a conference of Treasury representatives in Guatemala.

Another series of conferences which has continued in spite of the disturbed condition of the world has been those of the International Labor Organization. In addition to the big annual conferences, there have been many small technical conferences which prepare the subject for later discussion at the full conference. There have also been some regional conferences, such as the one held on labor legislation in Havana in November,1939, and one on nutrition in Buenos Aires in October, 1939.

Although the League of Nations has had to hold some political questions in abeyance, it has continued to prepare to assist conferences on technical and humanitarian questions. Its recent decisive action in expelling Russia has given proof of the power of international cooperation.

The United States recognizes the importance and frequency of international conferences. There is a special division of "International Conferences and Commissions" in the Department of State. This division handles the details involved in the sending of delegations to from fifty to one hundred conferences a year. Sometimes the United States is an "observer." As Clemenceau once said the United States has "an ear but not a mouth." More often the United States is a participant, occasionally a vigorous one. These conferences are on a great variety of subjects but all international in character. In practically every field of knowledge it is considered desirable nowadays to confer with other nations, pool the knowledge of all and evolve standards or formulas to apply to as large a group as possible.

The conference method has a long and honorable history which has been greatly accelerated in the last twenty years. During this time new skills have been developed. There is now a technique for preparing agendas, compiling documents, presenting a problem to the public and there is a trained personnel competent to conduct conferences. Those who recognize that peace as well as war must have its strategy will keep these tools sharp, ready to carve a pattern for peace when the peoples of the world demand it.

December 28, 1939

LOUISE LEONARD WRIGHT
Chairman International Relations
National League of Women Voters

THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

The State Department, persisting in the idea of promoting friendship and co-operation among nations, has put in its budget an item of about $1,000,000 for international conferences in the fiscal year 1940-41, despite two wars raging in Europe and conflict in the Far East. Nearly that much was appropriated by Congress for the current year.

An increase in funds for this purpose is being asked in the face of the fact that the war has brought about the indefinite postponement of fifteen conferences, and cancellation of another and the postponement of an international exposition. The Administration believes that wartime is no time to abandon the idea of international conferences. Officials argue like this:

"The international conferences generally bring together technical men. They represent their governments, organizations or just themselves.

"They have ideas to give and ideas to receive. Through contact and conversation with the technical men of other countries they tend toward an international understanding.

"Wartime will prevent the attendance of many men, no doubt. But there are scores of nations remaining outside the conflict.

"Since the announced policy of Secretary Hull is to prevent the spread of the European conflicts, it is well to continue the meetings for the nations that have remained neutral. Delegates from belligerent countries can still attend, of course."

Forty-eight such conferences were held from January 1 to November 15. They ran the whole gamut of the sciences and professions, and brought together many thousands of men.

Sixteen conferences already are scheduled for 1940. There will be an agricultural meeting in Rome, an architects' gathering in Montevideo, a copyright conference in Brussels, a congress for rheumatic diseases in New York, an open-air school congress in Rome, a geological congress in Great Britain, a conference on Indian life at La Paz, Bolivia, and a meeting of linguists at Brussels.

Among the scheduled meetings are two which may have to be postponed or shifted, the forestry and forest research conferences arranged to be held at Helsinki,Finland.

The United States Government has accepted the invitation of the Chilean Government to participate in the Second Inter-American Radio Conference which is scheduled to be held at Santiago, Chili, January 17--23. The Conference will consider problems arising in the field of radio communications on the American continent. The conference to which the State Department is devoting most energy at the moment is the eighth American Scientific Congress to be held in the United States in May. This will bring together hundreds of scientists of the twenty-one American republics. They will be taken on tour, as guests of the government, to visit industrial and scientific establishments.

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As an example of accomplishment of the conference method to promote understanding, read Department of State Press Releases (free) on findings of Conference on Inter-American Relations in the Field of Education held in Washington, November 9--11, and Press Releases on Conference on Inter-American Relations in the Field of Publications and Libraries held at Library of Congress in Washington, November 18--20.

The conference method used to promote solution of international labor problems and improvement of social conditions is exemplified in Report of International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 8-28, when four draft conventions and ten recommendations were passed (Dept. of State Bulletin Nov. 18-19, 1939. 10¢).

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION

1. What methods are there of solving local problems of common concern on which there is a difference of opinion?

2. What problems are there in your community which you believe could be solved by the conference method? Why? What factors do you believe are necessary if a conference is to be successful?

3. How would a local conference to secure an adequate water supply differ from an international conference to secure equal access to necessary raw materials?

4. How do you account for the failure of the Conference to Control Armaments and the success of the Conference to Control Opium?

5. In what way do you believe the Conference method could be used in working out a solution for the problems of the present conflicts?

6. What could be done in your community to further understanding of an support for the conference method to settle world problems?

THE TOWN HALL ADVISORY SERVICE
Town Hall, 123 West 43rd Street
New York, N.Y.

BACKGROUND AND ISSUES OF TOPIC
8th Meeting, November 30, 1939
Service #1

WHAT KIND OF PEACE CAN EUROPE MAKE?

No war in history has been less desired than this one. Almost no nation, belligerent or neutral, expects really to gain anything from it, whatever the outcome. All realize that its effects will be ruinous. Yet it goes on. And statements of war aims are still so vague and contradictory that it is difficult to visualize the type of agreement that might bring peace. The problem being grappled with on this broadcast, therefore, is an exceedingly difficult one, but one of the most vital importance to all of us.

Immediate peace seems out of the question. Hitler's word would be the sole guarantee of its permanence, and the Allies, like the burnt child who fears the fire, will not trust his word again. Having successfully mobilized, they cannot safely go back to a peace footing until they are sure that war or the threat of war will not recur.

They have announced the end of Hitler and Hitlerism as their primary war aim. This is a fine slogan, but a bit indefinite as a basis for negotiation. How do they propose to get rid of Hitler short of securing complete military victory? Some of their actions indicate that they hope for revolution within Germany, but most observers feel that such revolution is a long way off. Even if a revolution were successful, the more difficult problem of re-establishing order and security within Germany would remain.

The Allies also demand the restoration of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Germany defeated, the restoration of the latter nation might be easy. But with Russia occupying much Polish soil, and showing no disposition for cooperation with the Allies, the restoration of Poland would entail great difficulty.

Hitler, immediately after his conquest of Poland, asked for peace on the basis of the status quo, his status quo. He also threw out feelers for a general settlement of Europe's problems. More recently other German leaders have indicated their desire for a European commonwealth. If Germany won the war, some sort of German empire might well be established. Whether it would resemble more closely a tyranny or a commonwealth remains to be seen.

The fact is that the way in which Europe has been organized for the past twenty years is highly unsatisfactory and conducive to wars. The existence of many small states, each with its own tariff and trade restrictions, has served to depress the standard of living for them all. In a peace that is to last, such economic problems must be solved. Racial problems exist now that defy the principle of self-determination. No matter how the races are divided among national states, there always will be racial minorities, potential sore spots. Finally, no way has been found as yet to give a feeling of security to the smaller states.

A peace that is to last must solve these problems. Some of Europe's leading minds are beginning to think in terms of a Federation of European States, modeled somewhat after the United States, with a federation of central European states as a beginning. There is a bare chance that with enlightened leadership a just and workable peace settlement might be arranged. But to keep one's head while engaged in a death struggle is not easy. Before hostilities cease, extremists may be in control in the Allied countries. Already men rise in France to say that the trouble with the Versailles Treaty was that it was too lenient and to ask that this time Germany be pulverized. Meanwhile Russia the unpredictable pursues her lone course. The Allied powers are as conscious as she is of the fact that a defeated Germany may be ripe for communism.

These are the elements of a possible peace.

(OVER)

Questions for Group Discussion

1. If Hitler and Stalin really begin to cooperate as "international revolutionaries," what peace can Europe make?

2. What part should the United States play in the formulation of a European Peace?

3. Can a "United States of Europe" ever be guaranteed by the peoples of Europe? Would this lead to lasting peace?

Questions for Individual Study

1. Define the war aims which to you justify the present war. If you don't believe the present war is justifiable, tell why.

2. In a book listed among the Suggested Readings, C. Hartley Grattan writes:

> "Peace is unquestionably the true objective of any war. Peace terms are the final judgment on the purpose of a war."

Comment on this statement.

3. Write a short essay stating briefly the elements of a European peace settlement that you think would endure.

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THE TOWN HALL ADVISORY SERVICE
Town Hall, 123 West 43rd Street
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SUGGESTED READINGS ON THE TOPIC
8th Meeting, November 30, 1939
Service #2

WHAT KIND OF PEACE CAN EUROPE MAKE?

Current Articles:

WHAT HINDERS PEACE? (In Christian Century, October 18, 1939, pp. 1263-65.) Conflicting peace-aims as obstacles.

BLACKMAILER'S PEACE. (In The Nation, October 14, 1939, p.401.) Interesting for its consideration of the economics of reconstruction after war.

ANOTHER VERSAILLES? by Freda Kirchwey. (In The Nation, October 14, 1939, p.402.) Holds that it is insufficient to offer Europe the abolition of Hitlerism and a return to the past in Germany.

HITLER PROPOSES. (In The New Republic, October 18, 1939, pp. 283-84.) "Creating an enduring order" requires a "fresh approach."

THE NEXT PEACE, by Graham Hutton. (In The Atlantic Monthly, August, 1939, pp.219-31.) Social, economic and political consequences of the war which will affect the building of the new order.

UNITED STATES OF THE WORLD. (In Life, October 23, 1939, pp. 14-15.) Concise, graphic account of Clarence Streit's famous plan for a world of peace through "Union Now."

FOR A PEACE TREATY NOW, by Samuel Grafton. (In Current History, November, 1939, p.44.) If this is a "different" war, what must the "different" peace-terms be?

DESIGN FOR PEACE, by Norman Angell. (In Living Age, November, 1939, pp. 252-54.) Famous English adherent to the Union Now idea warns of the possible misuse of victory, once it is finally attained.

NOTE: It is recommended that the daily newspapers be watched for new developments and for such speeches as those of the German diplomat Von Papen and of the two British statesmen, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill and Opposition Leader Clement Atlee. The semi-monthly Vital Speeches and Current History's monthly "Notes and Documents" furnish whole or partial reprints of important peace-aim utterances.

Pamphlet:

HUMAN DYNAMITE, by Henry C. Wolfe. (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Book No.20, 25¢.) Minorities as an important factor in any peace settlement.

Books:

THE DEADLY PARALLEL, by C. Hartley Grattan. (New York: Stackpole, 1939.) The chapter "When Peace Breaks Out" lists the kinds of peace we want Europe to avoid.

HITLER IS NO FOOL, by Karl Billinger. (New York: Modern Age, 1939, 50¢.) "A new Versailles imposed by British and French imperialism upon a defeated Germany would overthrow Hitler only to create a new Hitler."

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SECTION VI

POSSIBLE BASES FOR A WORLD SOCIETY

The Commission on a Permanent World Society was appointed at the Fourteenth Conference on the Cause and Cure of War to study the essential elements which must go into the establishment of a permanent world society of nations for the maintenance of peace with justice and steps to be taken in our own country toward this goal. Such a study would include consideration of past and present attempts to develop a world society; an analysis of the elements which apparently lead to success or failure and a study of the possible bases on which the United States would agree to enter wholeheartedly into such a society.

The Commission submits the following study project on Inter-American Cooperation and gives the following reasons for studying Inter-American relations first. In the present crisis in world affairs when European and Asiatic nations are at war or are immediate neighbors of belligerents and when the League of Nations is greatly restricted in its activities, the Western Hemisphere is almost the only part of the world where peaceful international relations exist and where better relationships may be established. Until the war is over, this congeries of states has the opportunity as well as the necessity of finding the best possible bases for preserving and promoting their own national and international well-being. These states actively supported by the Government of the United States of America are endeavoring to find good working bases for improving their relations to the mutual advantage of them all. Therefore, the Commission on a Permanent World Society recommends the study of Inter-American relations in the hope of ascertaining and defining principles for the maintenance of peace among nations, and the establishment of workable methods of permanent association for the constant adjustment of their problems. If we can ascertain the bases of a better society of nations in the Western Hemisphere, perhaps we will have clarified our thinking for the task ahead, after peace shall have been made in Europe and Asia, of building world relations for the maintenance of peace and for the well-being of all nations and peoples.

Instructions for Study

This outline for study of Inter-American cooperation is Unit I of the study of a Permanent World Society. Unit II will be concerned with the character of international society centering in Europe before 1939, with the reasons for its breakdown. The first part of the study outline is designed to help you reconstruct the historical background of contemporary Inter-American relations. It is important to understand the functioning of the Consultative Conference and to know the basic conventions and resolutions upon which the peace structure of the Western Hemisphere is being built. While reading suggested pamphlets and books and discussing points of outline, keep a list of principles and methods that are working for peace in the Western Hemisphere and another of principles and methods working against peace in the Western Hemisphere. It must be kept in mind that this study is for the purpose of finding principles and methods which will be useful in meeting world problems and building a permanent world society.

OUTLINE FOR THE STUDY OF INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION

I. INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS

A. Background of Inter-American Relations

1. Organizational Background

a. Inter-American Conferences
   1) Origin of the Conference: Bolivar's ideals
   2) Policy of the United States of America toward the Conferences
   3) Reasons for the changed character of the Conferences since 1933
      Crisis of 1929 — Threats of Aggression
      Revolutional Ideologies — Changed concept of foreign policy

b. Pan American Union
   1) Origin
   2) Membership
   3) Board of Directors
   4) Organization
   5) Functions

c. Other Inter-American Organizations
   1) Official
      a) Pan American Sanitary Bureau
      b) Pan American Scientific Congress
      c) International American Institute for the Protection of Childhood
      d) Inter-American Commission of Women
      e) Pan American Institute of Geography and History
      f) American Institute of International Law
      g) International Commission of Jurists
      h) Pan American Railway Committee
      i) Inter-American Trade Mark Bureau
      j) Pan American Confederation for Highway Education
   2) Unofficial
      a) Inter-American Arbitration Association
      b) Chile American Association
      c) Pan American Medical Association

2. Policy and Practice

a. Monroe Doctrine before 1933
   1) Origin
   2) Various interpretations: Olney Doctrine: Theodore Roosevelt Doctrine: Coolidge Doctrine, etc.
   3) Intervention Policy
      Platt Amendment
      Intervention in Nicaragua
      Marines in Haiti

b. Monroe Doctrine since 1933, Good Neighbor Policy
   1) Foreshadowed by withdrawal of Marines under Hoover
   2) Repeal of the Platt Amendment

3) Transition from a unilateral to continental doctrine
4) Canadian status in relation to the present interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine

c. Present United States Policy as reflected in speeches of Cordell Hull, Secretary of State

What fundamental problems are noted?
What solutions proposed?
What bases of peace are suggested?
Are any general principles for international cooperation set forth in these speeches? If you find any, list them.
Are these principles applicable to relations beyond the Western Hemisphere?

B. Lines of Development in Inter-American Relations

1. Organization of Peace

a. Instruments: Treaties and Conventions
1) During the 19th Century
a) Arbitration Treaties
b) Other Early Treaties

2) 1923-1933 Inter-American Treaties and Conventions:
a) Gondra Treaty, 1923, called "Treaty to Avoid Conflicts between American States"
b) Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, 1929
c) Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, 1929
d) Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (Lamas Treaty), 1933

3) Pact of Paris, 1928

4) Buenos Aires and Lima Conventions

5) Panama Agreements
a) Declaration of Neutrality and the institution of an Inter-American Neutrality Committee for the duration of the present European war.

b) Economic Cooperation and the institution of an Inter-American Advisory Financial and Economic Committee

c) Declaration of Panama establishing territorial waters

What is the relation of these agreements to the continental interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine?

b. Proposed Inter-American Institutions
1) Inter-American Court of Justice
What proposals have been made?
What are the arguments for and against?

2) League or Association of American Nations
What proposals have been made
What are the arguments for and against?

c. Underlying Doctrines
1) Non-Intervention
a) Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933
b) Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention, 1936

2) Non-Recognition of Territory Acquired by Force

3) Continental Monroe Doctrine, exemplified in Declarations of Lima and Panama

4) Neutrality, especially at Panama, 1939

5) Solidarity: Doctrine of Lima and Declaration of Principles

d. Mexican Peace Proposals

e. Codification of Inter-American Law

2. Economic Policies
a. Trade Relations before 1933
b. Trade Relations after 1933
1) Reduction of Trade Barriers
2) Equality of Treatment
3) Economic Non-Aggression
4) Commercial Arbitration

c. Monetary Matters
1) Monetary Conference - Proposed at Buenos Aires
2) Creation of an Inter-American Institute of Economics and Finance - Proposed at Lima
3) Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee Proposed at Panama

d. Highway and Communication

3. Labor and Social Relations

4. Intellectual Cooperation

5. United States institutions created to deal with the above problems
a. Division of Cultural Relations
b. Import-Export Bank
c. Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics

C. Underlying Factors in Inter-American Cooperation

1. Methods and machinery of Inter-American Cooperation
a. Conferences: Membership and Procedure
b. Consultative Pacts
c. Expert Commissions
d. Permanent institutions
e. Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American Republics

D. Present Problems Confronting Inter-American Cooperation

1. Continuity of Policies. Effect of change of Administrations.
2. Relations with Revolutionary Governments
3. International Exchange
   a. Stabilization of Currencies
   b. Debts
4. Expropriation of foreign properties
5. Foreign Investments and Foreign Markets
6. Adjustment of Competing Industries
7. Reduction of Tariffs; Commercial Agreements
8. Aggressive policies of Totalitarian States
9. Regulation of Communications
10. Problems arising from the European War

II. RELATION OF AMERICAN STATES TO WORLD ORGANIZATION

A. History of Relations of the States in Inter-American Conference in World Organizations
   1. League of Nations
   2. Permanent Court of International Justice
   3. I.L.O.
   4. Other international organizations: e.g., International Postal Union

B. Comparison of the present methods of dealing with Inter-American Relations with the methods used by the League in Normal Times: e.g., compare:
   1. Pan American Union and Secretariat of the League of Nations
   2. Consultative Conference and the Assembly of the League
   3. Declaration of Principles and a Covenant
   4. Expert Committees and Permanent Organizations
   5. Proposed Permanent Advisory Committees and the Council of the League

Note: These projects point to the necessity of the study of Unit Two - International Society Centering in Europe before 1939.

Questions:

1. List attitudes essential to a peaceful, prosperous Western Hemisphere. Which were mentioned in your readings? Which do you believe essential?

2. What solutions to present problems confronting Inter-American cooperation were suggested in your readings?

3. What principles do you believe should be used in solving these problems? What institutions?

4. Are these problems peculiar to the Western Hemisphere?

5. Could the principles and methods you suggest for the solution of these problems be applied to similar problems elsewhere?

Send your answers to the above Questions to:

Marathon Round Tables
National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War
70 East 45th Street, New York, N.Y.

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Pertinent information too recent to be found in published books and pamphlets can be found in current magazines and metropolitan newspapers.